Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Smith
Cases that cite this one
15 later published cases cite this decision.
- Spengler v. Employers Commercial Union Insurance (Ga. Ct. App. 1974)
- National Surety Corporation v. Boney (Ga. Ct. App. 1959)
- People v. Bank of San Luis Obispo (Cal. 1910)
- Bowers v. Keller (Ga. 1938)
- Khosravi v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)
- Muscogee County Board of Tax Assessors v. Alexander Brothers Lumber Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 1970)
- State Highway Department v. Calhoun (Ga. Ct. App. 1966)
- Wood v. Mobley (Ga. Ct. App. 1966)
- Modern Homes Construction Company v. Mack (Ga. 1964)
- Clements v. Peerless Woolen Mills (Ga. 1944)
- City of Valdosta v. Singleton (Ga. 1944)
- Lemon v. Los Angeles Terminal Railway Co. (Cal. Ct. App. 1940)
- Home Insurance v. Willis (Ga. 1934)
- Harris v. Gano (Ga. 1903)
- Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lumpkin (Ga. 1896)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff below obtained a verdict and judgment against the defendant, under the acts imposing penalties upon telegraph companies. (Acts of Oct. 22, 1887, and Dec. 20, 1892.) The judgment was entered Oct. 18th, 1894, and the defendant within the time allowed by law filed its motion for a new trial. The motion was overruled, December 11, 1894. On the 17th of December, 1894, the acts above referred to were repealed generally, and on the 24th of that month a bill of exceptions assigning error in the overruling of the motion for a new trial was sued out by the defendant.
According to the decision of this court in Woodburn v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 95 Ga. 808, the plaintiff had no vested right to the penalty before final judgment. In the case now under consideration, it is true, there was ajudgmentin the plaintiff’s favor,but the judgment was not absolutely final nor the litigation between the parties necessarily at an end. At the time the repealing act was passed the plaintiff was not entitled to an enforcement of his judgment, and the ease must be dealt with as one which was pending when the repeal took place. In principle, therefore, the case falls within the decision above referred to, in which we held that the effect of the repeal was to abate actions for the statutory penalty which were then pending. The leading authorities on this subject are reviewed and the law, ,n our opinion, correctly stated by Pryor, C. J., in the case of Speckert v. City of Louisville, 78 Ky. 289, as follows: “It is well settled that no judgment can be rendered in an action to enforce a penalty, when the statute under which the proceeding is had has been repealed. ‘The repeal of a law imposing a penalty is itself a remission.’ (3 How. 574, Maryland v. B. & O. R. Co.) When such
Judgment reversed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.