Martin v. Town of Statesboro
Opinion of the Court
Tbe municipal authorities of tbe. town of Statesboro passed an ordinance, wbicb was entitled, “An ordinance to require license for cerfcam businesses and occupations; to assess a special tax on same.” It provided, tbat from and after tbe 1st of July, 1896, and annually thereafter, each and every person engaged or who shall engage in any trade, occupation or -business, wbicb was thereinafter enumerated, within tbe corporate limits of tbe town of Statesboro, shall pay a special tax as thereinafter provided, that is to say: 1. Every merchant, storekeeper, or banker, tbe sum of five
Certain persons who were citizens of the town of Statesboro and doing -business therein, some of them engaged in the mercantile business, some in running repair and machine shops, some in running hotels, some in running printing offices, some in running a livery business, harness making, fire insurance, and some in running shoe shops, filed a petition to enjoin the mayor and council from enforcing the license ordinance in question. It was alleged that one of the petitioners operated a livery business using only two horses,,.
The charter of the town whence the power to pass the ordinance claims to have been derived is to be found in the Acts of 1889, p. 799. The provision upon that subject is this: “They [the municipal authorities] shall have full power and authority to levy and collect such special tax on
His Honor, the Circuit Judge, at the hearing, made the-following order: “After hearing argument on the within petition, I am of the opinion that the town of Statesboro, under its charter, has the power to tax occupations, trades and businesses carried on within the town, and the ordinance of which complaint is made is not void and contrary to law. So much of said ordinance, however, as undertakes to tax merchants, and to grade and to regulate the amount of their taxes by the number of clerks they employ, is an improper and illegal method of taxation. They should be taxed (if the purpose is to tax their business) by the amount of business each does; and this should be ascertained by their sales, and not by the number of clerks they employ. So far as the ordinance affects those classes sought to be taxed 'by the numher of clerks they employ, the same is inoperative and void. The injunction is refused as to all persons not affected by the inoperative parts of the ordinance, and ordered to issue-as to those affected.” To this judgment the plaintiffs excepted. Ho exceptions by cross-bill were taken by the municipal authorities to any part of the judgment which might have operated contrary to the interests of the town.
1. The complaint that the levy of this special tax is unauthorized, because the money to be realized therefrom is not' necessary to- defray the current expenses of the town, seems,. if we may quote the language of Mr. Justice Bleckley, “to ignore the mayor and council as agents of thought,. and treat them as agents of work only.” Just how much money is necessary to be raised in order to meet the current expenses of a town is a matter concerning which the mayor"
It was argued with earnestness in the brief of plaintiffs in error, that the words “occupations subject to special tax under the State law,” as employed in the charter, limited the power of the mayor and council to the levy of a special tax upon such occupations only as were subject to special tax under the State law. The construction thus sought to be placed upon this provision of the charter is not justified by the language employed by the General Assembly. It will be seen that the municipal authorities had the power to levy and collect special taxes' on trades, businesses, occupations, theatrical exhibitions, or other performances exercised, performed or carried on within the corporate limits of said town, including circuses and shows of all kinds, itinerant traders, peddlers, and auctioneers generally. There being a number of games, trades and occupations which might be subject to a special tax under the State law, but which would not b-e comprehended within the meaning of either of the special terms above employed, the General Assembly, in this grant of power, extended the authority of the mayor and council to such other games, trades or occupations as were subject to a special tax under the State law, and while
2. In so far as the uniformity of the several license taxes exacted by this ordinance is concerned, we do not think that the complaint of those jietitioners against whom the judge denied -an injunction is well founded. IJpon -each of the several classes of occupations to which the ordinance in question related, the special tax levied was uniform in the sense that no- person engaging in one of them was required to pay a greater sum for his license than another person engaging in a like occupation of the same class; and this is the test of uniformity. It will be seen that he enjoined the collection of the ¡tax as to certain merchants who fell within a given class. Ho exception was taken by -the mayor and council to this ruling. The plaintiffs who prosecute the writ of error here have no- right to complain of the judgment upon that ground; and hence, inasmuch as that branch of the decision is not here upon the complaint of any person .against whom it operates and who could except to it-s terms, we have no authority to inquire into and adjudicate upon its correctness in that respect.
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.