Supreme Court of Georgia, 1906

Wolfe v. Georgia Railway & Electric Co.

Wolfe v. Georgia Railway & Electric Co.
Supreme Court of Georgia · Decided January 13, 1906 · Cobb, Evans, Fish
124 Ga. 693; 53 S.E. 239; 1906 Ga. LEXIS 590

Counsel

Dorsey, Brewster & Eoivell, for plaintiff. Rosser Brandon,. W. T. Colquitt and B. J. Conyers, for defendant.

Wolfe v. Georgia Railway & Electric Co.

Opinion of the Court

Fish, C. J.

(After stating the ease.) ■ Plaintiff bases his claim to recover upon an alleged violation of the well-established rule, that' *696it is the duty of a railroad company to protect a passenger from injury, violence, insult, and ill treatment at the hands of the servants of the carrier, who are in charge of or connected in any way with the carriage in which the passenger is being transported. Savannah Ry. Co. v. Quo, 103 Ga. 125; Georgia Ry. & El. Co. v. Balter, 120 Ga. 391, and cit.; Hutch. Car. §595-6; Thorne. Neg. §3186; Booth on Street Railways, §682. The question sought to be made by the petition is, whether it is an insult, for which an action lies against ■a street railway company, without an allegation of special damages, for a conductor on one of its cars, while endeavoring to comply with the statute requiring him as far as practicable to separate white passengers from colored passengers, to negligently mistake a white passenger for a colored one, and, in the presence and hearing of other passengers, to inform him that he must be seated in that portion of the car set apart for negro passengers. As to whether it is actionable per se to call a white man a negro, or to publish .him as such, see Eden v. Legare, 1 Bay (S. Car.), 171; King v. Wood, 1 Nott & McCord (S. C.); 184; Barrett v. Jarvis, Tappan (Ohio), 244; Johnson v. Brown, 4 Cranch (C. C.), 235; Scott v. Peebles, 2 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 546; McDowell v. Bowles, 8 Jones L. (N. C.) 184; Spotorno v. Fourishon, 40 La. Ann. 423; Tipton v. Times-Democrat Pub. Co., 104 La. Ann. 141. However interesting the question sought to be made in the present case may be, and whatever opinion we may entertain in regard to it, we are not authorized, under the view entertained by a majority of the court, to decide it, for the reason that the petition fails to allege that the plaintiff is a white man. Such an allegation was, of course, essential to maintain the contention that he was insulted by the language used by the conductor. It is true that the petition alleged, ¿*that the effect of said colloquy was to create on the minds of strangers that petitioner had colored blood in his veins, and that he was attempting to pass as a white person; that the effect of said colloquy on persons who knew petitioner was that as a white person he had been associating with negroes.” Merely alleging the effect the colloquy created on the minds of others is very far from alleging plaintiff to be a white man, as such effect might have been produced though the plaintiff may not be a white man. The .allegation as to the effect of the colloquy upon strangers does not show, or clearly indicate, that the plaintiff is a white man, that is, a mem*697ber of the Caucasian race. The plaintiff might be a mulatto and, ■still the effect of the conversation upon the minds of persons to whom he was a stranger might be that he had colored blood in his veins, and that he was attempting to pass as a white person. The allegation “that the effect of said colloquy on persons who knew petitioner was that as a white person he had been associating with negroes,” simply amounts to an allegation that the effect of the ■colloquy upon such persons was that the plaintiff had been associating with negroes, as a white person. A given conversation might produce the effect upon the minds of persons who knew a mulatto, ■or a Chinaman, that he, as a white person, had been associating with negroes, that is, that he had been associating with negroes, as a white person, or, in other words, posing and passing among ne-groes as a member of the Caucasian race. The general demurrer ■assailed every substantial imperfection in the petition, and as the petition was defective in a substantial particular, the demurrer was properly sustained.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Beck, J., not ■presiding, and

Dissenting Opinion

Cobb, P. J., and EvaNS, J.-,

dissenting. Certainty to a common intent is all that was required, under the rules of common-law pleading, in a declaration. Every reasonable presumption was indulged in order to sustain a declaration. Statements involving a less degree of certainty than that above referred to were sometimes permissible in a declaration, when they would, not be allowed in a plea. A statement by way of recital, instead of a direct allegation, was insufficient in a plea, though it was otherwise in a declaration. 1 Chitty on Pl. (16th Am. ed.), 257. The rule is even more liberal in Georgia than it was at common law. However, even under the common-law rule, the allegations of the petition were certainly, as against a general demurrer, amply sufficient to show that the plaintiff was a white person. The petition containing such allegations, the case should have been determined upon its merits.

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