Webb v. Southern Cotton Oil Co.
Cases that cite this one
14 later published cases cite this decision.
- Kenneth M. Henson, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross v. Columbus Bank and Trust Company, Defendant-Appellee-Cross (5th Cir. 1981)
- Lamb v. United States (United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia 1981)
- Henson v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 1977)
- Blaustein v. Harrison (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)
- Laine v. Wright (5th Cir. 1978)
- Hudnall v. Kelly (United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 1975)
- Anderson v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company (Ga. Ct. App. 1963)
- Sherrill v. US FIDELITY & GUARANTY COMPANY (Ga. Ct. App. 1963)
- Ivester v. Southern Railway Company (Ga. Ct. App. 1939)
- Powell v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland (Ga. Ct. App. 1934)
- Hendricks v. Southern Railway Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 1916)
- Fordham v. Hicks (United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia 1915)
- McDaniel v. German American Insurance (Ga. 1910)
- Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Newman (Ga. 1909)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
1. A suit brought in a court of this State and properly removed by the defendant to the Federal court having concurrent jurisdiction thereof, and there dismissed on plaintiff’s motion, can not, under Civil Code, § 3786, be renewed' in a State fcourt, within six months of such dismissal, so as to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations. Cox v. East Tennessee etc. R. Co., 68 Ga. 446. See also Constitution Publishing Co. v. DeLaughter, 95 Ga. 17 (21 S. E. 1000) ; Cox v. Strickland, 120 Ga. 104 (47 S. E. 912).
2. In Cox v. East Tennessee etc. R. Co., 68 Ga. 446, it was held that where a case had been removed from a State court to a Federal court, and, after the time prescribed by the statute of limitations as applicable to the cause of action had elapsed, a nonsuit was granted in the latter court, the case could not be rebrought in the State court within six months so as to avoid- the. bar of the statute. As applied to such a ease, that decision, upon review, is affirmed. McIver v. Florida Central etc. R. Co., 110 Ga. 223 (36 S. E. 775, 65 L. R. A) 437).
3. Section 3786 of the Civil Code provides : “If a plaintiff shall be non-suited, or shall discontinue or dismiss his casé, and shall recommence within six months, such renewed case shall stand upon the same footing, as to limitation, with the original ease; but this privilege of dismissal and renewal shall be exercised only once under this clause.” This section is a codification of the acts of 1847 (Cobb’s Dig. 569) and 1856 (Acts 1855-6, p.237). Constitution Publishing Co. v. Delaughter, supra.
4. The provisions of the Civil Code, § 3786, apply only to cases pending in the State courts, as the act of 1847 (Acts 1847, p. 569) declares: “That whenever any ease now or hereafter pending in any of the courts of this state . . shall be discontinued, dismissed,” etc., the plaintiff may renew the same within six months; Code section 3786 is a codification of this act of 1847 and of the 33d section of the act of 1856 (Cobb’s Dig. 237). Constitution Publishing Co. v. DeLaughter, supra.
5. In view of the foregoing, the court did not err in dismissing the petition on general demurrer.
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.