Broadway National Bank v. Byars
Broadway National Bank v. Byars
Opinion of the Court
The plaintiff in fi. fa. filed a petition for a rule nisi against a sheriff, requiring the latter to show cause why he should not pay the former the amount due on such fi. fa. and he adjudged in contempt of court because of his failure to sell, on August '4, 1908 (the first Tuesday
1. It was proper to overrule a general demurrer to the answer of the sheriff, wherein he made the following allegations: On August 4, 1908, there was pending a case wherein it was sought to enjoin the sheriff from selling the property levied upon. “Defendant further shows, that, at the courthouse in the county of Floyd, within the legal hours of sale, and after 10 o’clock a. m. on said first Tuesday in August, 1908, Henry Walker, attorney for movant, came to this defendant, directed defendant ■ not to expose said property for sale, but to hold said sale until later in ■ the day, as they were proceedmg to try the case, and the said Henry Walker thought it might be settled. Defendant shows, that, knowing no other person who had the right to control said fi. fa., this defendant, in good faith, delayed the sale for a short time, being ready, willing, and expecting to sell said' property within the legal hours of sale.” The judge of the circuit being disqualified, an attorney was duly appointed judge pro hac vice to try the pending injunction case referred to, and counsel for the plaintiff,in fi. fa. consented to try the case before such attorney as judge pro hac vice, and to submit to him “all questions of law and fact without the intervention of a jury. Defendant further shows -that said cause, before said judge pro hac vice, was being tried during the legal, hours of- sale on the first Tuesday in August, 1908, and continued on trial until about one o’clock p. m. on that day;’’ that the said Henry Walker, counsel for movant, during said hours, prevented this defendant from proceeding to sell said property.” The judge pro hac vice rendered judgment at 1 o’clock p. m. on August 4, 1908, enjoining the sheriff from selling the property, upon the payment to the sheriff of a specified amount, which was duly tendered to him, but which counsel for the plaintiff in fi. fa. would not consent for the sheriff to accept.
2. Where the presiding judge is disqualified to try a case wherein an injunction is sought against a sheriff to restrain him from selling certain property levied on and advertised for sale by the latter, and an attorney as judge pro hac vice, to whom the case on final trial is submitted for decision without the intervention of a jui-y, grants such in- • junction, the plaintiff in fi. fa. can not hold the sheriff liable for obeying such injunction and failing to sell the property.
3. The fact that the judgment granting the injunction was reversed by the Supreme Court, and the petition for injunction subsequently dismissed by the court granting it, did not render the sheriff liable because he obeyed the injunction granted and refused to sell the property while the ■ injunction was in force.
4. Counsel for plaintiff in fi. fa. stated to the court, at the beginning of
5. There was no error in overruling the demurrer to the answer, nor in rendering the judgment refusing a rule absolute, the uneontradieted evidence before the trial judge proving the material allegations of the answer hereinbefore set forth.
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.