The court erred in dismissing the petition on general demurrer. The allegations of the petition show a specific and definite contract, the terms of which can not be said as a matter of law to be inequitable and unenforceable, and its specific performance not having been rendered inequitable by reason of the early death of the promisor, which must have been in contemplation of the parties.

Judgment reversed.

dissenting.’ The Civil Code (1910), § 4637, provides as follows: “Mere inadequacy of price, though not sufficient to rescind a contract, may justify a court in refusing to decree a specific performance; so also any other fact showing the contract to be unfair, or unjust, or against good conscience.” Applying the above provisions of the code to the facts alleged in the petition, the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action. See also Leigh v. Crump, 1 Ired. Eq. (36 N. C.) 299; Cannaday v. Shepard, 2 Jones Eq. (55 N. C.) 224; Lloyd v. Wheatly, Id. 267; Herren v. Rich, 95 N. C. 500; Love v. Welch, 97 N. C. 200 (2 S. E. 242) ; Adams Eq. 87, and notes; Ramsay v. Gheen, 99 N. C. 215 (6 S. E. 75).