Cottle v. McCaskill
Cottle v. McCaskill
Opinion of the Court
The record in this case discloses that E. J. Cottle owed a number of notes to the Bank of Ty Ty at the time that D. D. McCaskill, deceased, became the purchaser of the assets of the bank, including a stock assessment, the total amount of such notes and stock assessment against E. J. Cottle aggregating nearly $6,000. McCaskill, in seeking to collect the amount of indebtedness against Cottle, entered into an agreement by the terms of which Cottle was to pay $3,000 and receive all of the notes and the stock assessment, upon which notes he appeared as maker and liable under the law by virtue of the stock assessment. In agreeing to accept this reduction it was expressly agreed that Cottle was only to be relieved from his liability upon these notes where he appeared as maker, and the stock assessment. To secure the payment of the $3,000 Cottle gave to McCaskill two promissory notes, one for $1500 due on demand, and the other due November 27, 1927, secured by a deed to certain described realty. It was agreed that the note due on demand was to be paid by delivery of lumber to the amount of $1500, and secured by a bill of sale to the lumber. There appeared certain notes in the hands of McCaskill that bore the indorsement of E. J. Cottle; and after having purchased lumber sufficient in amount to satisfy the demand note, McCaskill and Cottle entered into an agreement by the terms of which McCaskill purchased additional lumber to satisfy the notes upon which Cottle was indorser. A witness, Mr. T. M. McCranie, testified that Mr. Cottle stated, with reference to this agreement, “I don’t see any reason why I should not do that.” This lumber was delivered, and the notes upon which Cottle appeared as indorser were mailed to Cottle as satisfied. Mr. Cottle’s attorney testified that Cottle refused to accept the notes, stating that the lumber was to be applied on his individual debt. Mrs. Cottle, the plaintiff in error, seeks to charge to the estate of McCaskill all of the lumber in satisfaction of the two notes for
The grounds of the special demurrer were met by amendment to the answer, g,nd the judge did not err in overruling the demurrer. The amending grounds of the motion for new trial are but elaborations of the general grounds that the verdict is contrary to the evidence and without evidence to support it; and that the verdict is contrary to law. E. D. Smith, a witness for Mrs. Hudie E. Cottle, the plaintiff, testified: “I have represented Mr. E. J. Cottle in all of his legal matters for the past fifteen years. In the summer of 1926 he employed me to assist him to reach a settlement with D. D. McCaskill on account of certain notes given by Mr. Cottle to the Bank of Ty Ty, which had been purchased and were then held by Mr. McCaskill. We entered into negotiations with Mr. McCaskill shortly after I was employed, and had a number of conferences with him in my office, at which his attorney, Mr. Steve Mitchell, was present. Mr. McCaskill held three classes of obligations against Mr. Cottle: a stock assessment for several thousand dollars, certain notes which Mr. Cottle had signed as principal, and certain notes which Mr. Cottle had signed as security. At one of the conferences between Mr. Cottle and Mr. McCaskill, at which both Mr. Mitchell and myself were present, Mr. Cottle stated that he was not able to pay all of the notes and claims held against him; he stated that he was anxious to first pay the notes which he had signed as principal, as he felt under more obligation to pay notes of this character than to pay the notes which he had signed as security. He stated that he was not able to pay all of the notes and the stock assessment held by Mr. McCaskill against him, and that he wished to settle and pay first the notes which he had signed as principal, and asked Mr. McCaskill to -name the lowest figure he would accept in payment of notes of this character, with the understanding that the stock assessment would be canceled. After several conversations it was finally agreed between Mr. Cottle and Mr. McCaskill that Mr. Cottle would pay to Mr. McCaskill the sum of $3000 in satis
Mr. T. M. McCranie testified for the defendants, as follows: “I was employed by D. D. MeCaskill for several years before his death. I am, to some extent, acquainted with his purchase of lumber from Mr. Cottle of Ty Ty. During the time Mr. MeCaskill was negotiating with Mr. Cottle to purchase timber to be shipped to Hortense, Mr. MeCaskill and myself met Mr. Cottle in front of the Bank of Tifton, and Mr. MeCaskill told Mr. Cottle that he was going to build a good many houses down there and that he was going to have to buy more lumber than he had expected to have to buy; he had talked to him previously to that time; and he told Mr. Cottle that he thought he could use enough to -take up all of his indorsements. Mr. Cottle answered, H don’t see any reason why I should not do that.’ After that conversation Mr. MeCaskill did receive certain lumber from Mr. Cottle. At the time of the conversation in front of the Bank at Tifton between Mr. Mc-Caskill and Mr. Cottle, nothing was said in regard to applying the lumber which Mr. MeCaskill was purchasing, from Mr. Cottle, or had already purchased, upon the original note of Mr. Cottle, or upon his notes to which he referred as notes of primary liability; that was not discussed. I have never heard until to-day a word said about any primary liability. Mr. MeCaskill told Mr. Cottle that he wanted to buy more lumber and that he would probably take up his whole account of indorsement with lumber;' and Mr. Cottle answered: ‘I don’t see any reason why I should not do that.’”
There was other evidence both for the plaintiff and defendant, to the same effect as above; but the foregoing is sufficient to show that the verdict is not without evidence to support it, and is not .contrary to law for that reason. The question was one for the jury, and under the evidence they found in favor of the defendants; and we can not say as matter of law that the verdict was without evidence to support it, and was contrary to law.
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.