1. An entry of levy by a sheriff on a tax execution, and a sheriff’s* deed made in pursuance of a sale based on such entry, can not be so reformed as to describe the property by a description materially different from the description appearing in the original entry of levy. 61 C. J. 1363, § 1937; 23 R. C. L. 315, § 8; Batelle v. Knight, 23 S. Dak. 161 (120 N. W. 1102, 20 Ann. Cas. 456; Black on Tax Titles, § 409; Altes v. Hinekler, 36 Ill. 265 (85 Am. D. 406); Keepfer v. Force, 86 Ind. 81; Bowers v. Andrews, 52 Miss. 596. See Brinson v. Lassiter, 81 Ga. 40 (2 a.) (6 S. E. 468). The court did not err in sustaining the general demurrer to the defendants’ answer in the nature of a cross-bill.

2. The evidence set forth in ground 4 of the motion for a new trial tended to support tlie allegations of the petition, to which no demurrer was filed, and therefore was not subject to objection, on the ground that the tender as pleaded was insufficient. Kelly v. Strouse, 116 Ga. 872 (2) (43 S. E. 280).

3. The uncontradicted evidence substantially proving the case as laid, the court did not err in directing the verdict for the plaintiff.

4. It is not clear from the record that the decree provided that before an entry of cancellation the complainant pay the taxes on the particular land involved. Direction is given that if said decree does not already so provide, it be made condition of cancellation that complainant pay to the court the taxes actually due on this particular land, with interest and cost of sale, in accordance with the tender alleged in the petition. Davis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 48 Ga. App. 179 (172 S. E. 467). If required, let an issue as to the amount be submitted to a jury.

Judgment affirmed, with direction.