There was no abuse of discretion in overruling the motion to continue. When the case was first reached for trial on January 15, 1941, the plaintiff was ready for the trial to proceed, but the defendants were not ready, and the ease was reassigned for a hearing on January 25, 1941, on which date the plaintiff moved for a continuance, on the ground that two of his witnesses, his sister-in-law and son-in-law, were both sick and could not be present. The plaintiff swore that he could not safely go to trial without them; that he did not consent for them to remain away; that they had promised to come to the hearing, and he 'and his counsel had relied on them. On cross-examination he testified, in part: “I do not know anything in particular the witnesses would swear. They just know the case and all its circumstances from the beginning to the end.” In answer to a question from his attorney, he stated that he could prove by each of his witnesses that the allegations in his petition were true. The judge asked him if he could not testify to the same facts that he wished to prove by each of his witnesses; and the plaintiff answered that .he could, but he wanted the witnesses.

There was no error in refusing an injunction. In a previous suit between the same parties on substantially the same issues, where the present plaintiff was a defendant, the jury found against him, and in favor of the plaintiff in that suit for the premises in dispute; and a decree having been entered, and no exception taken, the defendant (now plaintiff) is not entitled to an injunction preventing the sheriff from evicting him under a writ of possession issued as a result of the verdict and decree in the former suit.

Judgment affirmed.