(After stating the foregoing facts.) In construing art. 7, sec,. 6, par. 2, of the constitution of this State (Code, § 2-5402), which declares the purposes for which the General Assembly can authorize- the counties to levy taxes, this court, in Floyd County v. Scoggins, 164 Ga. 485 (139 S. E. 11, 53 A. L. R. 1286), specifically ruled that the counties of 'the State could not be held amenable to the workmen’s compensation law. In Murphy v. Constitution Indemnity Co., 172 Ga. 378 (157 S. E. 471), where it was sought to hold the Troup County board of education liable under the workmen’s compensation law for injuries received by a school-bus driver, this court held that the Industrial Commission (now State Board of Workmen’s Compensation) had no jurisdiction to make an award, asserting that: '“The reasoning on this subject is clearly stated in Floyd County v. Scoggins, supra.” These two cases were subsequently relied upon and cited in Perdue v. Maryland Casualty Co., 43 Ga. App. 853 (160 S. E. 720). While one Justice dissented in Floyd County v. Scoggins, we think that the majority opinion is correct, and adhere to the ruling there made.

In so far as a county is concerned, we can see no effect that the amending act of 1943 (Ga. L. 1943, p. 401) had on the workmen’s compensation law. To the definition of “employer” this act merely added “the State of Georgia and all departments thereof.” The original act had already sought to include counties, though its application to counties had been held unconstitutional in Floyd County v. Scoggins, supra, and the status of the counties was in no way changed by the amendment which added to the definition of employer “the State of Georgia and all departments thereof.”

Having ruled that the counties of the State are not covered by the workmen’s compensation law, section 2 of the act of 1943 (Ga. L. 1943, p. 401), designated as section 114-101A of the Code, could have no application to the county as an employer; nor does any ruling in State Highway Department v. Bass, 197 Ga. 356 (29 S. E. 2d, 161), afford authority for including a county as an employer under the workmen’s compensation law, Code, § 114-101, or the amendment of 1943 (Ga. L. 1943, p.,401). It is therefore *486 unnecessary to discuss the questions raised under (C) and (D) of the motion to dismiss filed by the county.

The court did not err in sustaining the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation in dismissing the claim.

Judgment affiruied.