Barr v. City Council of Augusta
Cases that cite this one
16 later published cases cite this decision.
- Zepp v. Mayor & Council of the City of Athens (Ga. 1986)
- Platt v. Town of Torrey (Utah 1997)
- Diverse Power, Inc. v. City of LaGrange, Georgia (11th Cir. 2019)
- Mitchell v. City of Wichita (Kan. 2000)
- Hamsley v. City of Unadilla (Ga. 1995)
- Powell v. Board of Commissioners of Roads & Revenues (Ga. 1975)
- Hart v. Columbus (Ga. Ct. App. 1972)
- Singer v. City of Cordele (Ga. 1969)
- Glendale Estates, Inc. v. Mayor of Americus (Ga. 1966)
- City of Big Spring v. Board of Control of the State (Tex. App. 1965)
- Johnson v. State of Georgia (Ga. Ct. App. 1962)
- City of Miami Beach v. Schauer (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)
- Crawford v. City of Billings (Mont. 1956)
- City of Warm Springs v. Bulloch (Ga. 1956)
- City of Moultrie v. Burgess (Ga. 1955)
- Oltman v. City of Pompano Beach (Broward County Circuit Court 1977)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
1. “The business affairs of a municipality are committed to the corporate authorities, and the courts will not interfere except in a clear case of mismanagement or fraud.” McMaster v. Waynesboro, 122 Ga. 231 (5) (50 S. E. 122); South Georgia Power Co. v. Baumann, 169 Ga. 649, 652 (151 S. E. 513); Lawson v. Moultrie, 194 Ga. 699, 703 (22 S. E. 2d, 592).
2. The fixing of water rates, from time to time, by a municipality, is a legislative or governmental power, and one council may not, by contract or ordinance, deprive succeeding councils of this legislative or governmental power. Code, § 69-202; Horkan v. Moultrie, 136 Ga. 561, 563 (71 S. E. 785); Screws v. Atlanta, 189 Ga. 839, 843 (8 S. E. 2d, 16); Barr v. City Council of Augusta (case No. 17013), ante, 750, headnote 2.
3. A municipal corporation may not compel any person outside its territorial limits to accept water service which it undertakes to furnish, nor may the municipal authorities be compelled to render such service. A municipal corporation may classify rates to be charged in outlying territories, and upon failure of customers to pay such charges, the municipal corporation may discontinue its service. An ordinance, which provides that rates for water service shall be higher in territory outside the corporate limits, is not unconstitutional and void as denying “due pro *754 cess” and “equal protection” under the Federal and State Constitutions. Collier v. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 575 (173 S. E. 853).
4. The question of whether or not an ordinance is reasonable is one of law for the court. 2 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 1583, § 729; 37 Am. Jur., 801, § 172; Central Railroad & Bkg. Co. v. Brunswick & Western R. Co., 87 Ga. 392 (13 S. E. 520); Metropolitan Street R. Co. v. Johnson, 90 Ga. 501 (7) (16 S. E. 49); Columbus R. Co. v. Waller, 12 Ga. App. 674 (78 S. E. 52). Under the preceding rulings, the ordinance of March 7, 1949, fixing a higher rate for water service outside the corporate limits of the city, was not unreasonable or discriminatory.
5. The courts will not inquire into the motives of a municipal council in the enactment of an ordinance. Barr v. City Council of Augusta (case No. 17013), ante, 750. Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.