Manning v. Georgia Power Co.
Cases that cite this one
31 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Martha P. McCorkle and Edward E. McCorkle v. The United States of America and Conrad Weihnacht Construction Company, a Florida Corporation (11th Cir. 1984)
- Yoho v. Ringier of America, Inc. (Ga. 1993)
- Rickets v. TRI-STATE SYSTEMS, INC. (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
- KEVIN SINYARD v. PIEDMONT HOSPITAL, INC. (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)
- Flossie Marie Massey v. United States (11th Cir. 1984)
- Creeden v. Fuentes (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)
- Yoho v. Ringier of America, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)
- Brown v. Advantage Engineering, Inc. (United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 1990)
- Singleton v. Georgia Pacific Corp. (Ga. 1984)
- Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Zep, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2024)
- Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Zep, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2024)
- ABIEGALE ROGERS, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF SONNY ROGERS v. HHRM SELF-PERFORM, LLC (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)
- Nelson A. Sprowson, II v. Rudolfo Villalobos (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
- Carr v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)
- Charlene Carr v. Fedex Ground Package System (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)
- Adamson v. General Electric Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)
- Beers Construction Co. v. Doyle (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)
- Southern Railway Co. v. Hand (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)
- Guillman v. Georgia Power Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)
- Fennell v. Max Rittenbaum, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)
- Wright v. M. D. Hodges Enterprises, Inc. (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)
- Lathroum v. Potomac Electric Power Co. (Md. 1987)
- Brady v. Ralph Parsons Co. (Md. 1987)
- Carver v. Jasper Construction Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)
- Menard v. Fairchild (Ga. 1985)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Richard Manning was injured when he came in contact with a 115,000 volt conductor while working as a painter at a Georgia Power Company facility. At the time of his injury he was employed by Joseph Hartman d/b/a The Tower People, which was under contract
The statutory employer doctrine is based on OCGA § 34-9-8 (Code Ann. § 114-112), which states in pertinent part: “(a) A principal, intermediate, or subcontractor shall be liable for compensation to any employee injured while in the employ of any of his subcontractors engaged upon the subject matter of the contract to the same extent as the immediate employer . : .
“(d) This Code section shall apply only in cases where the injury occurred on, in, or about the premises on which the principal contractor has undertaken to execute work or which are otherwise under his control or management.” See Wright Associates v. Rieder, 247 Ga. 496(1) (277 SE2d 41) (1981). Thus the statutory employer doctrine permits liability for workers’ compensation benefits to attach vicariously against someone other than an injured employee’s employer. In return, the vicariously liable party is immune from tort liability for the injury suffered. OCGA § 34-9-11 (Code Ann. § 114-103); Wright Assoc. v. Rieder, supra. By this section the legislature intended to protect persons working for subcontractors who are financially irresponsible or who are otherwise exempt from the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
In Evans v. Hawkins, 114 Ga. App. 120 (150 SE2d 324) (1966), it was established that “principal” in paragraph (a) meant “principal contractor,” just as in paragraph (d), and not a principal party to whom an obligation to perform work is owed. Thus a property owner, although he may be a “principal,” is not a principal contractor within the meaning of this section and is not a statutory employer who is liable for workers’ compensation benefits or immune to tort liability by reason of the exclusive remedy provision of the Act, OCGA § 34-9-11 (Code Ann. § 114-103). The Court of Appeals apparently lost track of Evans however, in deciding Godbee v. Western Electric Co., 161 Ga. App. 731 (288 SE2d 881) (1982). Godbee ignored Evans and announced the rule that OCGA § 34-9-8(a) (Code Ann. § 114-112)
Applying the precepts of Modlin to the present case it is clear that we must reverse. Georgia Power is an owner (and is not acting as a contractor), on whose property Manning was injured. The Act does not make Georgia Power liable for workers’ compensation benefits in such circumstances, nor does it immunize Georgia Power from potential liability in tort. Therefore it was error for the Court of Appeals to hold that Georgia Power Company was a statutory employer of Manning and immune to tort liability. The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.