Ameen Jamel Thomas was convicted by a jury of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault in connection with the shooting death of Michael Gatewood.* 1 On appeal, Thomas asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, and that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of certain prejudicial evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.

*155Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that victim Michael Gatewood, accompanied by Billy Joe Smith, drove to an apartment complex for the purpose of purchasing marijuana. Gatewood stopped the car and they were approached by four or five young males who asked what they wanted. Gatewood held out some money and requested $45 worth of marijuana, whereupon one of the men grabbed the money and walked away from the car. An argument ensued among the others on the street as to why that individual kept the money. Moments later, Thomas approached the car and fired a single gunshot into the driver’s window, killing Gatewood.

Eyewitnesses to the events testified that Thomas was in possession of a .32 caliber handgun both before and after the shooting, and that it was he who pointed the gun into the car and shot Gatewood. Thomas later told his friends, “I done killed this cracker.”

1. The evidence was sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), to enable a rational trier of fact to have found Thomas guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder.

2. Thomas asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial after the State injected evidence of an unrelated murder.

Thomas testified in his own defense that he was at a movie with his friend, Fred Dewberry, at the time of the shooting. The State called Fred Dewberry’s mother, Jacqueline Dewberry, to rebut certain testimony elicited during the defense case. Preliminarily, the State established that the witness was the mother of two teenage sons. The prosecutor then solicited testimony that a third teenage son was shot and killed earlier that year by “a boy [who] tried to rob him.” The defense objected on relevancy grounds, asked the court to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony, and moved for a mistrial based on the prejudicial nature of the remarks. The defense then reconsidered its request and declined a curative instruction. The court denied the motion for mistrial, instructed the jury to completely disregard the testimony, and ensured that the jurors could follow those instructions. No further relief was requested.

Pretermitting whether the issue was properly preserved for appellate review, see Ford v. State, 269 Ga. 139 (3) (498 SE2d 58) (1998), we conclude that the prejudicial nature of the testimony was corrected by withdrawing it from the jury’s consideration under proper instructions. See Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 455 (1) (490 SE2d 379) (1997); Stanley v. State, 250 Ga. 3 (2) (295 SE2d 315) (1982). Under the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the refusal to grant a mistrial.

3. The remaining enumerations of error were not preserved for *156appellate review. See generally State v. Larocque, 268 Ga. 352 (489 SE2d 806) (1997).

Judgment affirmed.