Veal v. Veal
Veal v. Veal
Opinion of the Court
Ms. Veal (“wife”) appeals from the trial court’s order granting full custody of her biological daughter H. to Mr. Veal (“husband”). Because husband is neither the biological nor the legal father of the child, we find that the trial court erred by awarding husband custody of H. Therefore, we reverse.
H. was born April 10, 1997. Husband was present at H.’s birth and his name was put on her birth certificate, though both parties knew that he was not the child’s father. Husband and wife were married on May 31, 1997, and had three other children during their marriage.
Husband and wife separated on May 2,2003, and filed for divorce soon thereafter. The divorce settlement, which was incorporated into a final decree of divorce on October 30, 2003, made custody and visitation arrangements for the three children of the marriage, but made no mention of H.
In 2004, husband filed a motion to set aside the final decree of divorce on the grounds that it was void for failing to address custody and visitation with respect to H. The trial court reopened the case, and on February 28, 2004, entered a temporary order granting the parties joint custody of H. On October 31, 2005, however, the trial court found that there had been a change in circumstances affecting the welfare of H. and awarded full custody to husband.
H. was born prior to the parties’ marriage. “Only the mother of a child born out of wedlock is entitled to [her] custody, unless the father legitimates [her] as provided in Code Section 19-7-22. Otherwise, the mother may exercise all parental power over the child.”
Moreover, the legitimation process is not applicable under the circumstances presented here because both parties acknowledge that they knew all along that husband was not H.’s biological father. The legitimation process is meant to establish legal ties between a biological father and child where the parents were not married at the
Husband contends, however, that he legitimated H. under OCGA § 19-7-20 (c), which provides that “[t]he marriage of the mother and reputed father of a child born out of wedlock and the recognition by the father of the child as his shall render the child legitimate.”
Citing Baker v. Baker,
We acknowledge the unfortunate nature of the outcome in this case, as it is apparent from the record that husband has been a caring father to H., and that he treated her as he did his biological children. But before the law can allow a step-parent to seek custody of a child against the wishes of a biological parent, formal legal procedures and
The means by which the husband in this case should have established legal paternal ties with H. was through the formal adoption process. That process is designed to protect the interests of all parties involved, especially the children who are, after all, entirely innocent in these situations.
Because husband is neither the biological nor the legal father of H., we conclude that the trial court erred by awarding him custody of the child.
Judgment reversed.
The trial court was particularly concerned with the fact that wife had degraded husband in H.’s presence and had interfered with husband’s visitation rights.
OCGA § 19-7-25.
OCGA § 19-7-22.
235 Ga. App. 588, 589 (510 SE2d 311) (1998); see also In re Pickett, 131 Ga. App. 159, 160 (205 SE2d 522) (1974) (“the father alone has the right to legitimate a child”).
OCGA § 19-7-20 (c).
276 Ga. 778 (582 SE2d 102) (2003).
Reference
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- VEAL v. VEAL
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