In the Matter of Nathaniel Antonio Barnes

Supreme Court of Georgia
In the Matter of Nathaniel Antonio Barnes, 304 Ga. 324 (Ga. 2018)

In the Matter of Nathaniel Antonio Barnes

Opinion

304 Ga. 324
FINAL COPY




S18Y0982. IN THE MATTER OF NATHANIEL ANTONIO BARNES, JR.

      PER CURIAM.

      This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for voluntary

discipline filed by Nathaniel Antonio Barnes, Jr. (State Bar No. 220785),

pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (b). On November 9, 2017, Barnes, who has been

a member of the State Bar of Georgia since 2007, pleaded guilty in the Superior

Court of DeKalb County to a felony charge of possession of cocaine and a

related misdemeanor charge of disorderly conduct, but sentencing was deferred

subject to Barnes’s completion of the DeKalb County Drug Court Program. Per

the terms of the order accepting Barnes into the drug court program, upon his

successful completion of the program, the State will dismiss the charges at issue

and allow record restriction of the case’s disposition. By this petition, Barnes

seeks the imposition of a 21-month suspension, retroactive to the November 9,

2017 date of his entry into the drug court program and with conditions on

reinstatement, specifically, his successful completion of the drug court program.
The State Bar has submitted a response to the petition, recommending that it be

accepted by this Court.

      As recited by Barnes, the facts underlying his criminal prosecution were

as follows. A neighbor in Barnes’s condominium complex observed, from inside

her condominium, Barnes walking around the common areas of the complex in

his underwear and holding a knife. Unbeknownst to the neighbor, Barnes was

in the grip of a paranoid delusion — caused by the fact that Barnes had been

ingesting cocaine and not sleeping for three days — to the effect that an

(imagined) assailant had entered Barnes’s condominium through an open

window and fled out through the front door. The neighbor called the police, who

arrived and received Barnes’s explanation for the behavior observed by his

neighbor. In the course of their investigation, the police observed cocaine in

Barnes’s condominium.

      Barnes acknowledges that entry of his guilty plea for possession of

cocaine is sufficient to invoke the disciplinary process. Under Rule 8.4 (a) (2),

a felony conviction authorizes, but does not necessarily demand, disbarment.




                                       2
See In the Matter of Waldrop, 
283 Ga. 80, 81
 (
656 SE2d 529
) (2008).1 Barnes

notes that, shortly after his release, he admitted himself for voluntary inpatient

treatment for his depression and addiction issues. Following his discharge from

that treatment, he has participated in additional counseling and recovery

treatment and views his entry into the drug court program as part of his

commitment to rehabilitation and recovery. Barnes also notes that he changed

the status of his Bar membership to “inactive” prior to the entry of his guilty

plea and is employed full time outside of the legal profession. In mitigation,

Barnes notes that he had no prior disciplinary record, did not have a dishonest

or selfish motive, was suffering from depression and chemical dependency at the

time of his conduct, has accepted full and unqualified responsibility for his

behavior, made timely disclosure to the disciplinary authorities and has

maintained a cooperative attitude throughout the process, is respected

professionally and within the drug court program and his recovery community,

and is remorseful.

       In support of his suggested discipline, both Barnes and the State Bar cite,


       1
         Rule 8.4 (b) (1) provides that, for purposes of the rule, “conviction” shall include
a guilty plea “accepted by a court, whether or not a sentence has been imposed[.]”

                                              3
among other cases, the decision of this Court in In the Matter of Topmiller, 
293 Ga. 667
 (
748 SE2d 919
) (2013), in which we imposed an 18-month suspension

where the lawyer pleaded guilty to possession of more than an ounce of

marijuana, and we conditioned reinstatement upon successful completion of a

drug court program. Topmiller is compelling authority as to the appropriateness

of Barnes’s suggested resolution of this disciplinary matter, given that both this

case and that one involve petitions for voluntary discipline arising from guilty

pleas to felony drug possession counts where the attorney volunteered to

complete a drug court program and the court deferred sentencing. Moreover,

neither Topmiller nor this case involved the representation of a client or any

injury to a client, and Barnes, as in Topmiller, has no prior disciplinary record,

did not act with a selfish or dishonest motive in regard to a client, was

undergoing emotional difficulties, accepted responsibility for his actions, had

voluntarily ceased the practice of law by the time of the entry of his guilty plea,

and has expressed remorse and his need for substance abuse treatment. See

Topmiller, 
293 Ga. at 668
. The additional factor of Barnes wielding a knife

while walking in his condominium complex warrants a somewhat longer

suspension than the 18 months imposed in Topmiller, and a 21-month

                                        4
suspension with conditions for reinstatement is within the range of sanctions we

have imposed in similar cases. See Waldrop, 
283 Ga. at 80-82
 (two-year

suspension following guilty plea to possession of controlled substance, with

conditions for reinstatement including completion of first offender probation);

In the Matter of Lewis, 
282 Ga. 649
 (
651 SE2d 729
) (2007) (two-year

suspension following guilty plea to cocaine possession, with reinstatement

conditioned upon successful participation in State Bar’s Lawyer Assistance

Program).

      Therefore, having reviewed the record, the Court agrees that acceptance

of this petition and imposition of a suspension is the appropriate sanction.

Accordingly, we hereby order that Nathaniel Antonio Barnes, Jr., be suspended

for a minimum of 21 months, retroactive to November 9, 2017, when he entered

the DeKalb County Drug Court Program. At any time after the conclusion of 21

months, if Barnes wishes to seek reinstatement, he must present proof to the

State Bar that he has successfully completed the DeKalb County Drug Court

Program. If the State Bar agrees that this condition has been met, it will submit

a notice of compliance to this Court, and the Court will issue an order granting

or denying reinstatement.

                                       5
      Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Twenty-one-month suspension

with conditions for reinstatement. Hines, C. J., Melton, P. J., Benham, Hunstein,

Nahmias, Blackwell, Boggs, and Peterson, JJ., concur.




                                       6
                        Decided August 20, 2018.

     Suspension.

     Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittelman,

Jonathan W. Hewett, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of

Georgia.




                                   7


Reference

Cited By
2 cases
Status
Published