FINAL COPY


          S22A0837. CAMDEN COUNTY v. SWEATT et al.


      MCMILLIAN, Justice.

      Camden County (the “County”) appeals the superior court’s

denial of its “Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Other Relief”

concerning an order entered by Camden County Probate Judge

Robert C. Sweatt, Jr., setting a special election for a referendum on

whether resolutions authorizing the County’s purchase of land for a

rocket launch facility should be repealed (the “Referendum”). The

County asserts that the Referendum was not authorized under

subparagraph (b) (2) of Article IX, Section II, Paragraph I of the

Georgia Constitution, which established home rule for counties in

this state (the “Home Rule Paragraph”)1 and that the results of the

Referendum are a nullity. As a result, the County argues that the

superior court erred in denying its petition for writs of prohibition


      1 The full text of the Home Rule Paragraph is attached as Appendix I to

this opinion.
and mandamus against Judge Sweatt and its petition for a judgment

declaring that the Referendum was not authorized under the

Constitution. We disagree and affirm for the reasons set forth

below.2

     The facts are undisputed. Beginning in 2015, the Board of

Commissioners for Camden County, Georgia (the “Board”) began

making plans to build a commercial rocket launch facility (the

“spaceport”) in Camden County. On June 3, 2015, the Board

approved the County’s entry into an option agreement with Union

Carbide Corporation (the “Option Agreement”) for the purchase of

certain land on which to build the spaceport and later approved

amendments to the Option Agreement that apparently extended the

length of the option period.3 However, citizen opposition to the




     2 We are aided by helpful amicus curiae briefs filed by (1) Association

County Commissioners of Georgia and (2) Ben Goff, Jacqueline Eichhorn,
University of Georgia School of Law First Amendment Clinic, and the Georgia
First Amendment Foundation. We thank them for their assistance.
      3 Although the amendments to the Option Agreement extending the

option period are not in the record on appeal, the parties do not contest that
the Option Agreement was extended several times.

                                      2
project arose over time, and on December 14, 2021,4 a number of

registered electors in the County filed a petition under the Home

Rule Paragraph in the Probate Court of Camden County (the

“Electors’ Petition”) seeking a special election for a referendum on

the issue of whether the Board’s resolutions authorizing the Option

Agreement and its extensions (the “Resolutions”) should be

repealed.

     The County filed a caveat to the Electors’ Petition alleging that

the petitioners failed to meet the requirements of the Home Rule

Paragraph because the filing contained a number of duplicate and

inconsistent voter signatures, which brought the number of electors

below the Home Rule Paragraph’s requirement for obtaining a

referendum. Judge Sweatt issued an order dismissing the caveat on

February 8, 2022 (the “Caveat Order”), determining that there is no

legal authority for filing an objection to a petition filed by electors


     4 That same day, two electors, James Goodman and Paul A. Harris, also

filed suit in the Superior Court of Camden County to prevent the County from
closing on the purchase of the land for the spaceport and obtained a temporary
restraining order to that effect. However, the superior court later denied
injunctive relief following an evidentiary hearing.
                                      3
under the Home Rule Paragraph, and even if such authority existed,

the County’s caveat was not verified as required under Georgia law.

See OCGA § 15-9-88 (In probate court, “[a]ll objections or caveats to

an order sought shall be in writing and verified, setting forth the

grounds of such caveat.”).

     That same day, February 8, 2022, Judge Sweatt also issued an

order granting the Electors’ Petition (the “Referendum Order”). The

order determined that (1) the required number of verified electors

had signed the petition; (2) the petition requested that the following

question be put to the County’s electors at a special election called

pursuant to the Home Rule Paragraph:

     Shall the resolutions of the Board of Commissioners of
     Camden County, Georgia authorizing the Option
     Contract with Union Carbide Corporation and Camden
     County’s right and option to purchase the property
     described therein be repealed[;]

and (3) the petition satisfied the requirements of the Home Rule

Paragraph. Based on these findings, the order directed that a special

election on the question would be held on March 8, 2022. The County

did not attempt to appeal either the Referendum Order or the

                                  4
Caveat Order.

     However, prior to the special election, on February 24, 2022,

the County filed a “Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Other Relief”

in the Superior Court of Camden County against Judge Sweatt and

also named James Goodman and Paul A. Harris, who had been

among the electors to sign the Electors’ Petition, as interested

parties who may wish to intervene in the proceeding. The petition

sought writs of prohibition and mandamus against Judge Sweatt,

asserting that he had exceeded the probate court’s jurisdiction in

setting the special election. The petition also sought a declaratory

judgment that the Electors’ Petition was invalid, the Referendum

Order was a nullity, and the Referendum was unauthorized, along

with further declaratory relief to avoid consequences to the County

arising from the Referendum. Goodman and Harris successfully

moved to intervene in this action on February 25, 2022.5 An

expedited hearing was held on March 3, 2022, and the next day,


     5  Goodman and Harris are hereinafter referred to collectively as the
“Intervenor-Appellees.”

                                    5
March 4, the superior court issued a written order6 summarily

denying the County’s petition.7 On March 8, 2022, the Referendum

was held, resulting in a vote in favor of repealing the Resolutions.

      In considering the County’s appeal in this case, we will address

separately each form of relief sought in the County’s Petition: (1)

writ of mandamus; (2) declaratory judgment; and (3) writ of

prohibition.

      1. Writ of Mandamus: The County petitioned the superior court




      6 This order also denied as moot a motion filed by the Intervenor-
Appellees seeking to dismiss the County’s petition.
      7 On March 4, 2022, the same day the superior court issued its order, the

County filed an emergency motion in the Court of Appeals seeking to prevent
the probate court from certifying the results of the Referendum, and the Court
of Appeals transferred the matter to this Court several days later. We denied
the emergency motion on March 10, 2022. See Case No. S22M0759. On March
14, 2022, the County filed an application for Interlocutory Appeal, which we
dismissed on the ground that the County was entitled to a direct appeal from
the superior court’s order. See Case No. S22I0782. The County’s separate
direct appeal was docketed in this Court and orally argued by the parties on
October 6, 2022, at a special session held in Augusta, Georgia.

                                      6
for a writ of mandamus pursuant to OCGA §§ 9-6-208 and 9-6-21,9

asserting that it is entitled to such relief “because the constitutional

provision at issue does not allow for a referendum in this

circumstance.” The County’s petition for mandamus sought a writ

commanding Judge Sweatt to “abandon his exercise of jurisdiction

over the Petition”; “refrain from canvassing the returns and

declaring and certifying the results of the March 8 election to the

County”; “refrain from certifying the results of the March 8 election

to the Secretary of State”; and “issue an order declaring the Petition



     8 Under OCGA § 9-6-20,

     [a]ll official duties should be faithfully performed, and whenever,
     from any cause, a defect of legal justice would ensue from a failure
     to perform or from improper performance, the writ of mandamus
     may issue to compel a due performance if there is no other specific
     legal remedy for the legal rights; provided, however, that no writ
     of mandamus to compel the removal of a judge shall issue where
     no motion to recuse has been filed, if such motion is available, or
     where a motion to recuse has been denied after assignment to a
     separate judge for hearing.
     9 OCGA § 9-6-21 (a) provides:

            Mandamus shall not lie as a private remedy between
     individuals to enforce private rights nor to a public officer who has
     an absolute discretion to act or not to act unless there is a gross
     abuse of such discretion. However, mandamus shall not be
     confined to the enforcement of mere ministerial duties.


                                      7
invalid.”

     This Court has described a writ of mandamus as

     an extraordinary remedy to compel a public officer to
     perform a required duty when there is no other adequate
     legal remedy. It is a discretionary remedy that courts may
     grant only when the petitioner has a clear legal right to
     the relief sought or the public official has committed a
     gross abuse of discretion. In general, mandamus relief is
     not available to compel officials to follow a general course
     of conduct, perform a discretionary act, or undo a past act.

Gaddy v. Ga. Dept. of Revenue, 

 (3) (

) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied).

See also R. A. F. v. Robinson, 

 (1) (

)

(2010) (“Mandamus can be used to compel an official to exercise his

or her discretion, but not to direct the manner in which that

discretion is exercised.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Rather,

“mandamus relief applies prospectively only. It will not lie to compel

the undoing of acts already done and this is so even though the

action taken was clearly [in violation of the Georgia Constitution].”

Atlanta Independent School System v. Lane, 

 (6)

(

) (1996) (affirming denial of mandamus relief seeking


                                  8
repayment of amounts paid by city to school district under an

agreement that violated the Georgia Constitution).

     Under the Home Rule Paragraph, the probate court judge’s

first responsibility upon receipt of a petition filed by electors for a

special election is “[to] determine the validity of such petition.” Ga.

Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (b) (2) (hereinafter

“subparagraph (b) (2)”). If the judge determines that the petition is

valid, “it shall be his duty to issue the call for an election for the

purpose of submitting such amendment or repeal to the registered

electors of the county for their approval or rejection” and to follow

certain other procedures in conjunction with that election. Id.10 If the

judge determines that the petition is invalid, “he shall cause to be

published in explicit detail the reasons why such petition is not

valid[.]” 

 Here, Judge Sweatt determined that the Electors’

Petition was valid and called the special election on February 8,

2022. The special election took place on March 8, 2022, and Judge


     10 The County does not deny that Judge Sweatt has complied with the

remaining requirements and procedures of subparagraph (b) (2) with regard to
the election.
                                     9
Sweatt thereafter certified the results. On appeal, the County

contends that the Superior Court should have issued a writ of

mandamus to reverse the judge’s determination that the Electors’

Petition was valid. In other words, the County asks for a writ of

mandamus commanding the judge to undo his determination and

the acts that followed. Under these circumstances, we conclude that

the superior court properly denied the County’s petition for a writ of

mandamus because it sought only to compel Judge Sweatt to undo

actions he had already taken.

     2. Declaratory Judgment: The County contends that the

superior court erred in denying the declaratory relief it sought11



     11 The County sought a declaratory judgment on the following issues:

     [t]hat the Petition is invalid under [the Home Rule Paragraph];
     [t]hat the [Referendum Order] . . . is a nullity because it was issued
     beyond the Probate Court’s jurisdiction and in violation of the
     Constitution; [t]hat as a result of the nullity of the [Referendum
     Order], the [Referendum] is unauthorized and in contravention of
     the Constitution; [t]hat as a result, the County is not obligated to
     expend funds for an illegal election because it would violate
     Georgia law; [t]hat as a result, the repeal of the resolutions as
     would be effected by the [Referendum] will be invalid as
     “inconsistent” with the Constitution; [t]hat as a result, the status
     of the Option Contract would remain unaffected by the returns of
     the [Referendum] or any further action taken by the Honorable

                                      10
because the Electors’ Petition was not authorized under the Home

Rule Paragraph.12

      (a) Before we address the merits of the County’s argument,

however, we first consider the Intervenor-Appellees’ assertion that

the County is not authorized to pursue an action for declaratory

judgment because it became a party to the probate court proceedings


       Judge Sweatt including, but not limited [to], Judge Sweatt’s
       further exercise of jurisdiction over the [Electors’] Petition in
       contravention to the writs petitioned for herein.
(Citation and paragraph numbering omitted.)
       12 Judge Sweatt argues on appeal that sovereign immunity bars a

request for declaratory relief against him in his official capacity, citing
GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Bordeaux, 

, 403 (3) (

)
(2019) (concluding that the probate judge was a public employee of the State
and could assert sovereign immunity when sued in his official capacity by
entity in connection with issuing a gun carry license). However, sovereign
immunity does not apply to lawsuits between political subdivisions of the State
because “[n]either entity retains a superior authority over the other that would
prevent it from being hailed into a court of law by the other.” City of College
Park v. Clayton County, 

 (1) (b) (

) (2019).
Likewise, the County is not sovereign over Judge Sweatt, who was sued in his
official capacity, nor is Judge Sweatt sovereign over the County. Rather, they
stand on equal footing for purposes of sovereign immunity in this case because
“a suit against a county officer in [his] official capacity is a suit against the
county itself.” Layer v. Barrow County, 

 (1) (

)
(2015) (emphasis in original). See also Gilbert v. Richardson, 

(2), n. 4 (

) (1994). Thus, sovereign immunity does not apply to
this lawsuit. See City of College Park, 

 (1) (b). Judge Sweatt does
not otherwise argue that he was not the appropriate respondent in the
County’s petition for declaratory judgment, so we express no opinion on that
issue.

                                       11
when it filed a caveat to the Electors’ Petition and then failed to

appeal the Referendum Order validating the petition. The

Intervenor-Appellees contend that the County is barred “both as a

matter of collateral estoppel and as a failure of a prerequisite to its

substantive claims.” We disagree.

      As to collateral estoppel, and assuming without deciding that

the Electors’ Petition is an “action” to which the doctrine of collateral

estoppel applies, the doctrine does not bar the County because the

County was never a party to the probate court proceedings. “The

doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the re-adjudication of an

issue that has previously been litigated and adjudicated on the

merits in another action between the same parties or their privies.”13

Copelan v. Copelan, 

 (

) (2014) (citation

and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). See also Pike County



      13 “A privy is generally defined as one who is represented at trial and

who is in law so connected with a party to the judgment as to have such an
identity of interest that the party to the judgment represented the same legal
right.” Lilly v. Heard, 

 (2) (c) (

) (2014) (citation
and punctuation omitted). The Intervenor-Appellees do not contend that any
party involved in the probate court proceedings was the County’s privy.

                                      12
v. Callaway-Ingram, 

 (2) (

) (2013).

Therefore, the claims of an individual or entity who was not a party

to, and whose interests were not represented in, the prior action will

not be barred by collateral estoppel. See In re T. M. G., 

 (

) (2002) (foster parents’ claim for adoption of child

not barred because they were not a party to earlier adoption

proceeding with different prospective parents, nor were their

interests represented by the parties to that proceeding).

      This Court has defined the term “party to an action” to include

“all who are directly interested in the subject matter, and who have

a right to make [a] defense, control the pleadings, examine and

cross-examine witnesses, and appeal from the judgment.” State Bar

of Ga. v. Beazley, 

 (1) (b) (

) (1986).14

See also Smith v. Gettinger, 

 (1847) (plaintiff was not

a party to a prior attachment action rendered in favor of defendant


      14 Although this definition arose in the context of res judicata, we see no

reason why the same definition would not apply equally for the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. See Butler v. Turner, 

 (1) (

)
(2001) (both res judicata and “[t]he related doctrine of collateral estoppel . . .
require[ ] the identity of the parties or their privies in both actions”).
                                       13
against a third party where he “had no power, in his own right, to

make a defense against [the attachment], to adduce testimony, to

examine witnesses, to control the proceedings, or to enter an

appeal”).

     The County did not become a party to the probate court

proceedings. As Judge Sweatt determined, even though the County

filed a caveat opposing the Electors’ Petition, it had no right to make

a defense to the petition. The Home Rule Paragraph makes no

provision authorizing a county, or any other party, to file a caveat,

or any other form of opposition, to an elector’s petition in the probate

court. Instead, the Home Rule Paragraph provides that elections

called by the probate judge under that paragraph “shall be held

under the same laws and rules and regulations as govern special

elections, except as otherwise provided herein.” Ga. Const. of 1983,

Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (b) (2). OCGA § 21-2-540 (a) (1) provides that

     [e]very . . . special election shall be held and conducted in
     all respects in accordance with the provisions of this
     chapter relating to general primaries and general
     elections; and the provisions of this chapter relating to
     general primaries and general elections shall apply

                                  14
     thereto insofar as practicable and as not inconsistent with
     any other provisions of this chapter.

And those special election “laws and rules and regulations” make

clear that the County was not a party to the probate court

proceedings.

     With respect to challenging an election, the statute governing

contests to elections provides in pertinent part: “[T]he approval or

disapproval of any question submitted to electors at an election may

be contested by . . . any aggrieved elector who was entitled to vote .

. . for or against such question.” OCGA § 21-2-521. The statute thus

limits the right to contest elections to “electors.” Because the County

is not an elector, it would not be authorized to contest the outcome

of the special election under the Election Code. Moreover, we could

not locate, and the Intervenor-Appellees do not point out, any

authority in the Election Code, OCGA § 21-2-1 et seq., or otherwise

that would allow the County to file a caveat or any other objection

before an election and contest an application to submit a question to

the electorate under the Home Rule Paragraph. Where there is no


                                  15
authority for a county to participate in the petitioning for a special

election under the Home Rule Paragraph, the County cannot be said

to have a “direct interest” in the probate court proceedings in this

case.

        The conclusion that the County was not a party to the probate

court proceedings also answers the Intervenor-Appellees’ assertion

that the County had to appeal the Referendum Order before seeking

a declaratory judgment. Because the County was not a party to the

probate court proceedings, it had no right to appeal the Referendum

Order. See State v. Cash, 

 (1) (b) (

) (2015)

(“[T]he Appellate Practice Act, see OCGA §§ 5-6-30 to 5-6-51 . . .

grants the right of appeal only to either party in any civil case and

the     defendant   in   any   criminal   proceeding.”   (citation   and

punctuation omitted)). Cf. Davis v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co.,

 (

) (2009) (trial court’s ruling disposing

of appellant’s motion to intervene entered contemporaneously with

a ruling granting summary judgment to one of the parties to the suit

“does not make [appellant] a party to the suit, and does not confer

                                   16
standing on her to appeal the grant of partial summary judgment to

one of the parties”).15 And we could locate no authority authorizing


      15 To the extent that the Intervenor-Appellees also argue that the County

nevertheless should have moved to intervene in the probate court proceedings,
the Intervenor-Appellees do not cite, nor could we find, legal authority under
which the County would have been permitted to take such action. In Georgia,
non-party intervention in court proceedings is governed by OCGA § 9-11-24 of
Georgia’s Civil Practice Act (“CPA”). However, application of the CPA is limited
to “actions of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity,”
OCGA § 9-11-1 (emphasis supplied), or special statutory proceedings as
prescribed in OCGA § 9-11-81. Georgia law governing probate court
proceedings provides for intervention only in civil cases. See OCGA § 15-9-122
(“Unless provided to the contrary [under the law], the general laws and rules
of practice, pleading, procedure, and evidence that are applicable to the
superior courts of this state shall be applicable to and govern in civil cases in
the probate courts.” (emphasis supplied)); Uniform Probate Court Rule 2.7 (B)
(allowing parties to intervene “in civil cases before Article 6 Probate Courts”
(emphasis supplied)). While the CPA does not define “actions of a civil nature,”
it provides that “‘[c]ivil action’ means an action founded on private rights,
arising either from contract or tort,” OCGA § 9-2-1, and the Georgia Code
defines “civil case” in the context of probate courts as “those civil matters” that
meet certain conditions. OCGA § 15-9-120 (1) (emphasis supplied).
       Here, the Electors’ Petition was not based on the violation of any private
right; rather, it was based on the home rule power conferred on counties under
the Home Rule Paragraph and the concomitant power conferred on the
electorate to amend or repeal an ordinance, resolution, or regulation adopted
by a county’s governing authority. Moreover, the Home Rule Paragraph
describes the process by which the electorate may seek to amend or repeal
certain “local acts or ordinances, resolutions, or regulations” and does not refer
to the procedures set out under the CPA. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II,
Par. I (b) (2). And although OCGA § 9-11-81 provides that the CPA’s provision
governing intervention, OCGA § 9-11-24, also applies to all special statutory
proceedings in this state, the Home Rule Paragraph cannot be classified as
establishing a “special statutory proceeding” as it arises under the Georgia
Constitution, not the Georgia Code. Thus, we see no reason to characterize the
Electors’ Petition as a civil action or a special statutory proceeding in which

                                        17
the County to appeal the Caveat Order. Although the Appellate

Practice Act provides for direct appeals from “[a]ll judgments or

orders sustaining motions to dismiss a caveat to the probate of a

will,” OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (9), no similar provision exists for

judgments     or   orders    denying      caveats   under   any    other

circumstances.

     Accordingly, we conclude that because the County was not a

party to the probate court proceedings, its claim for declaratory

relief is not barred by either collateral estoppel or its failure to take

further direct action with regard to those proceedings. See

Callaway-Ingram, 

 (2) (prior litigation “did not, and

could not, conclude the claims” of defendant, because she was not a

party to the prior case).

     (b) We turn now to the County’s argument that it is entitled to

declaratory relief because the special election procedures under the

Home Rule Paragraph do not apply to the Resolutions in this case.



intervention under the CPA would apply.

                                   18
      To begin, we briefly review the history of home rule in Georgia.

In 1965, the Georgia legislature first established home rule for local

governments, by enacting the Municipal Home Rule Act of 1965,

OCGA § 36-35-3 (b), and simultaneously proposing an amendment

to the Georgia Constitution to provide home rule for counties, which

was ratified by the state’s voters in 1966. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,

The Georgia Home Rule System, 

, 105-06 (II)

(A) (1998).16 Prior to that time, the General Assembly exercised

plenary power over local government. See 

 (“Few jurisdictions

equaled Georgia’s adamant resistance to the home rule movement.

The state’s historic devotion to legislative supremacy held strong for

many [decades].”). As this Court has previously found and as

discussed further below, the system of “home rule” for counties

established under the Home Rule Paragraph confers “two




      16 This disparity is explained by the fact that the Georgia Constitution

previously had been amended to allow for the passage of municipal home rule
legislation, but the Constitution contained no such provision for counties.
Therefore, the legislature’s only option was to propose a constitutional
amendment in order to establish home rule for counties. See Sentell, 50 Mercer
L. Rev. at 110 (II) (B) (2).
                                     19
‘legislating’ powers” to Georgia counties. Bd. of Commrs. of Miller

County v. Callan, 

 (1) (a) (

) (2012),

quoting Sentell, 50 Mercer L. Rev. at 133 (III) (A) (4). “At the first

tier, the [county’s] governing authority is empowered to adopt

measures for its . . . county that do not rise to the level of affecting

state legislation.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). See also

Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (a) (permitting counties “to

adopt clearly reasonable ordinances, resolutions, or regulations

relating to its property, affairs, and local government for which no

provision has been made by general law and which is not

inconsistent with this Constitution or any local law applicable

thereto”) (hereinafter “subparagraph (a)”). “However, the second-

tier delegation constitutes the system’s most extensive grant of local

legislating power; it comprises, no less, the essence of Georgia’s

home rule complex.” Callan, 

 (1) (a) (cleaned up); see

also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (b). Under

subparagraph (b), “counties are empowered to change existing state

law,” Callan, 

 (1) (a) (cleaned up), under two separate

                                   20
procedures. Under the first of these procedures, the County may

amend or repeal “the local acts applicable to its governing authority”

by a resolution or ordinance adopted by its governing authority in a

two-vote procedure. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (b) (1)

(hereinafter “subparagraph (b) (1)”). The second of these procedures

allows the electorate to petition for a special election to amend or

repeal “such local acts or ordinances, resolutions, or regulations

adopted pursuant to subparagraph (a).” See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art.

IX, Sec. II, Par. I (b) (2).

      It is the second of these procedures and the scope of the power

given to the electorate, which is at issue in this appeal – that is,

whether the use of the referendum procedure is limited to the

amendment or repeal of local acts applicable to a county’s governing

authority, as the County contends, or whether it also allows a

county’s electorate to seek a referendum on the amendment or

repeal of measures that are adopted by a county’s governing

authority pursuant to subparagraph (a), like the Resolutions

authorizing the County to enter into and extend the Option

                                  21
Agreement here. All parties agree that the referendum procedure

allows the electorate to amend local acts applicable to the County’s

governing authority under the second-tier delegation of authority,

but the County argues that the referendum procedure is limited to

such local acts and that the referendum called here to overturn the

Resolutions adopted by the County was unauthorized. Cf. Kemp v.

City of Claxton, 

 (1) (

) (1998)

(holding that the petition procedure under Municipal Home Rule Act

“applies only to amendments to municipal charters”).

     In analyzing this issue, we begin with the text of the Home

Rule Paragraph. In conferring the first-tier delegation of legislative

power to counties, that provision reads:

     The governing authority of each county shall have
     legislative power to adopt clearly reasonable ordinances,
     resolutions, or regulations relating to its property, affairs,
     and local government for which no provision has been
     made by general law and which is not inconsistent with
     this Constitution or any local law applicable thereto. Any
     such local law shall remain in force and effect until
     amended or repealed as provided in subparagraph (b).




                                  22
Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (a).17 There is no dispute

that subparagraph (a) authorized the Board to pass the Resolutions

approving the Option Agreement and its extensions, which relate to

property and the affairs of the County.

        Our focus, however, is on the constitutional text addressing the

second-tier delegation of legislative power, which states, in relevant

part:

              Except as provided in subparagraph (c),[18] a county
        may, as an incident of its home rule power, amend or
        repeal the local acts applicable to its governing authority
        by following either of the procedures hereinafter set forth:
                 (1) Such local acts may be amended or repealed
              by a resolution or ordinance duly adopted at two
              regular consecutive meetings of the county
              governing authority not less than seven nor more
              than 60 days apart. . . .
                 (2) Amendments to or repeals of such local acts or
              ordinances, resolutions, or regulations adopted
              pursuant to subparagraph (a) hereof may be

        17 Subparagraph (a) also delineates the powers remaining to the General

Assembly in light of this delegation.
       18 Subparagraph (c) of the Home Rule Paragraph contains a list of

matters excluded from the legislative powers granted in subparagraphs (a) and
(b), none of which are applicable in this case, and further excludes “any other
matters which the General Assembly by general law has preempted or may
hereafter preempt, but such matters shall be the subject of general law or the
subject of local acts of the General Assembly to the extent that the enactment
of such local acts is otherwise permitted under this Constitution.” Ga. Const.
of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (c).
                                       23
           initiated by a petition filed with the judge of the
           probate court of the county. . . .

Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (b) (emphasis supplied).

     In determining the meaning of this language,

     [w]e generally apply the ordinary signification to words in
     construing a constitutional provision. This means we
     afford the constitutional text its plain and ordinary
     meaning, view the text in the context in which it appears,
     and read the text in its most natural and reasonable way,
     as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.

McInerney v. McInerney, 

 (2) (

) (2022)

(citations and punctuation omitted). See also Olevik v. State, 

 (2) (c) (i) (

) (2017) (constitutional text is

interpreted “according to the original public meaning of its text,” for

which we consider the text’s “plain and ordinary meaning” (citation

and punctuation omitted)). In other words, we look “for the meaning

the people understood a provision to have at the time they enacted

it.” Olevik, 

 (2) (c) (i). “And although the text is always

our starting point . . . (and often our ending point, as well), the

broader context in which that text was enacted may also be a critical

consideration.” 

 (2) (c) (i). Moreover, constitutional

                                   24
interpretation differs from statutory interpretation in that “[o]ur

objective focus is even more important when we interpret the

Constitution. Unlike ordinary legislation, the people — not merely

elected legislators — are the ‘makers’ of the Georgia Constitution.”

 (2) (c) (i).

      In addition, “[i]t is a basic rule of construction that a statute

[or constitutional provision] should be construed to make all its

parts harmonize and to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each

part, as it is not presumed that the [drafters] intended that any part

would be without meaning.” McIver v. State, 

 (2) (b)

(

) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also

McInerney, 

 (2) (“[T]his Court must construe the

Georgia Constitution to make its parts harmonize and to give

sensible meaning to each of them.” (citation and punctuation

omitted)); Brown v. Liberty County, 

 (

)

(1999) (same). And it is well settled that in interpreting statutory

text, “courts generally should avoid a construction that makes some

language mere surplusage.” Middleton v. State, 

 (3)

                                  25
(

) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). This

“canon of statutory construction applies with at least equal force in

the constitutional context.” Garcia-Jarquin v. State, 

 (

) (2022) (Bethel, J., concurring). See also Gwinnett

County School District v. Cox, 

 (2) (c) (

)

(2011) (“Established rules of constitutional construction prohibit us

from any interpretation that would render a word superfluous or

meaningless.”).

     Applying these rules of construction to the text of the Home

Rule Paragraph, we recognize that the introductory text of

subparagraph (b) grants a county the authority to amend or repeal

“the local acts applicable to its governing authority” by two different

processes. Subparagraph (b) (1) outlines the procedure by which a

county’s governing authority may amend or repeal “such local acts.”

At the time the Home Rule Paragraph was ratified in 1966, the term

“such” was defined to mean “[o]f this kind having [a] particular

quality or character specified . . . . [S]uch represents the object as

already particularized . . . and is a descriptive or relevant word,

                                  26
referring to the last antecedent.” Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1600

(4th ed. 1951). Thus, “such local acts” clearly refers to “the local acts

applicable to its governing authority” as set out in the introductory

text. But subparagraph (b) (2) sets out the procedure by which a

county’s electorate may seek a referendum on the amendment or

repeal of “such local acts or ordinances, resolutions, or regulations

adopted pursuant to subparagraph (a).” (Emphasis supplied.)

     This language in subparagraph (b) (2) plainly grants repeal

and amendment powers to the electorate for “ordinances,

resolutions, or regulations adopted pursuant to subparagraph (a)” in

addition to “such local acts” as referred to in the introductory text

and subparagraph (b) (1). Both subparagraphs (b) (1) and (2) refer

to “such local acts” and thus are consistent with the introductory

text; subparagraph (b) (1) addresses only the governing authority’s

power to amend or repeal such local acts through a two-vote

procedure. Subparagraph (b) (2), on the other hand, describes in

detail a special election/referendum process to amend or repeal such

local acts, as well as county ordinances, resolutions, and regulations

                                   27
adopted by the county’s governing authority under the first-tier

delegation in subparagraph (a).19 To read subparagraphs (b) (1) and

(2) as granting strictly coextensive powers, as the County urges us

to do, would require us to ignore the phrase “or ordinances,

resolutions, or regulations adopted pursuant to subparagraph (a)” in

the text of subparagraph (b) (2), a reading that would violate well-

established tenets of constitutional interpretation that generally

require each part of the text be given a sensible reading and not be

rendered superfluous.20 See McIver, 

 (2) (b);

Middleton, 

 (3); McInerney, 

 (2).

      We are unpersuaded by the County’s warnings about the




      19  Notably, subparagraph (b) (2) does not use the term “such” when
referring to “ordinances, resolutions, or regulations,” which is in contrast to its
use of the term “such local acts,” thereby supporting that the “ordinances,
resolutions, or regulations” referred to are of a different kind than “such local
acts.”
       20 The County also argues that “ordinances, resolutions, or regulations”

in subparagraph (b) (2) may refer to law passed under the two-vote process in
subparagraph (b) (1), but that argument likewise ignores critical language in
subparagraph (b) (2), which references “ordinances, resolutions, or regulations
adopted pursuant to subparagraph (a),” and not that law adopted pursuant to
subparagraph (b) (1). Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (b) (2) (emphasis
supplied).

                                        28
potential consequences of allowing the electorate to amend or repeal

ordinances, resolutions, or regulations. The County urges that the

Secretary of State may be compelled to publish all such amendments

under subparagraph (g)21 of the Home Rule Paragraph; but that

subparagraph on its face applies only to local acts, which, as

discussed above, are distinct from ordinances, resolutions, or

regulations. The County also warns that allowing the electorate to

amend or repeal acts of a county’s governing authority could lead to

a perpetual cycle of the same act being passed by the county and

repealed by the electorate. But there is little evidence that such a

parade of horribles would occur, given that a county’s governing

authority, which is comprised of elected officials, would be unlikely


      21 That subparagraph provides:

            No amendment or revision of any local act made pursuant to
     subparagraph (b) of this section shall become effective until a copy
     of such amendment or revision, a copy of the required notice of
     publication, and an affidavit of a duly authorized representative of
     the newspaper in which such notice was published to the effect
     that said notice has been published as provided in said
     subparagraph has been filed with the Secretary of State. The
     Secretary of State shall provide for the publication and
     distribution of all such amendments and revisions at least
     annually.
Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (g) (emphasis supplied).
                                       29
to routinely disregard the will of the electorate and given that

subparagraph (b) (2) provides that “[a] referendum on any such

amendment or repeal shall not be held more often than once each

year.” In any event, even if such a scenario were to occur, we are

bound to apply the plain meaning of the constitutional provision.

     We conclude, therefore, giving effect to all parts of the text, that

the Home Rule Paragraph authorized the County’s electorate to

petition for the repeal of the Resolutions and that Judge Sweatt was

authorized to consider the Electors’ Petition to determine whether it

met the requirements under that provision for obtaining a

referendum on the issue.

     We recognize that our holding here is in tension with Kemp,

 (1), in which we construed the statutory home rule

provisions applicable to municipalities under the Municipal Home

Rule Act. That act contains a provision somewhat similar to

subparagraph (b) of the Home Rule Paragraph and states that “a

municipal corporation may, as an incident of its home rule power,

amend its charter by following either of [two] procedures.” OCGA §

                                   30
36-35-3 (b). One of the prescribed procedures provides that

     [a]mendments to charters or amendments to or repeals of
     ordinances, resolutions, or regulations adopted pursuant
     to subsection (a) of this Code section may be initiated by
     a petition, filed with the governing authority of the
     municipal corporation . . . .

OCGA § 36-35-3 (b) (2) (A).

     In Kemp, we determined that in granting a writ of mandamus

to compel consideration of a petition to repeal a city ordinance under

the Municipal Home Rule Act, the trial court had erroneously relied

upon “the reference to ‘amendments to or repeals of ordinances,

resolutions, or regulations,’ found in OCGA § 36-35-3 (b) (2) (A).”

Kemp, 

 (1). Reasoning that “the very concept of home

rule suggests that the provisions of (b) (2) apply only to charter

amendments,” the Court determined that because “[a]ll of OCGA §

36-35-3 (b) is prefaced by a statement that what follows are the

methods by which a municipal corporation may ‘amend its charter,’”

the introductory language showed “that the petition and referendum

provision is intended to be available only when the proposed

amendment is intended to affect a city charter.” Id. Accordingly, the

                                 31
Court reversed the grant of mandamus, holding “[a]s we must

strictly construe the grant of legislative power to the governing

authority, [the Court] must reject plaintiffs’ argument that the

electorate can directly exercise such general legislative power,” and

that “[t]he petition procedure of OCGA § 36-35-3 (b) (2) applies only

to amendments to municipal charters.” Id.

      Because, here, we are construing a completely separate legal

provision, the holding in Kemp does not control our decision in this

case,22 and we need not consider at this time whether Kemp should

be overruled in light of today’s ruling. Nevertheless, we note that in

reaching the holding in Kemp, this Court dismissed some of the

canons of construction we apply in this case, stating, instead, that

“the spirit and intent of the legislation prevails over a literal reading



      22 Moreover, because Kemp was decided in 1998, more than 30 years after

the ratification of the Home Rule Paragraph in 1966 and more than 15 years
after the 1982 ratification of the current Georgia Constitution, in which that
provision was carried forward, Kemp’s interpretation of the similar language
of the Municipal Home Rule Act forms no part of the legal context in which the
Home Rule Paragraph was adopted. Cf. Olevik, 

 (2) (b) (i) (part
of the broader context in which we consider constitutional text is “the body of
pre-enactment decisions of this Court interpreting the meaning of . . . text that
the framers of our Constitution subsequently chose to use”).
                                       32
of the language,” and “[t]he legislative intent will be effectuated

even if some language must be eliminated.” Kemp, 

-

76 (1).

      Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s denial of the

County’s petition for declaratory relief.

      3. Writ of Prohibition: The County also sought a writ of

prohibition against Judge Sweatt on the grounds that he lacked

authority and jurisdiction to call for the special election. See OCGA

§§ 9-6-40,23 9-6-41,24 and 9-6-42.25

      A writ of prohibition seeks “to prevent a tribunal possessing



      23 OCGA § 9-6-40 provides:

              The writ of prohibition is the counterpart of mandamus, to
       restrain subordinate courts and inferior judicial tribunals from
       exceeding their jurisdiction where no other legal remedy or relief
       is given. The granting or refusal thereof is governed by the same
       principles of right, necessity, and justice as apply to mandamus;
       provided, however, that no writ of prohibition to compel the
       removal of a judge shall issue where no motion to recuse has been
       filed, if such motion is available, or where a motion to recuse has
       been denied after assignment to a separate judge for hearing.
(Emphasis supplied.)
       24 Under OCGA § 9-6-41, a “writ of prohibition may be granted at any

time, on proper showing made.”
       25 “The writ of prohibition will not lie to the duly inaugurated Governor,

but it lies to all other executive or military officers when acting as a judicial or
quasi-judicial tribunal.” OCGA § 9-6-42.
                                        33
judicial powers from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within

its cognizance, or from exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which

it has cognizance.” Stokes v. Edwards, 

 (

) (2000) (citation and punctuation omitted). Therefore, this

remedy “is available only where the court sought to be restrained

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction or acts in excess of its jurisdiction

[.]” 

. See also Ray v. Jolles, 

 (

) (2006) (affirming denial of writ of prohibition where probate

court had subject-matter jurisdiction and acted within its authority).

     The County argues that Judge Sweatt exceeded his jurisdiction

in addressing the Electors’ Petition because the Resolutions were

not subject to amendment or repeal under the special election

process set out in the Home Rule Paragraph. That argument is

unavailing, however, because, as discussed in Division 2 (b), we

conclude that the Home Rule Paragraph authorized Camden County

electors to pursue a referendum seeking repeal of the Resolutions in

this case. Accordingly, Judge Sweatt acted within the probate court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction and the authority granted under the

                                  34
Home Rule Paragraph in calling for the Referendum, and the

superior court was correct in denying the County’s petition for a writ

of prohibition.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.




                                 35
                           Appendix I

Home rule for counties.

      (a) The governing authority of each county shall
have legislative power to adopt clearly reasonable
ordinances, resolutions, or regulations relating to its
property, affairs, and local government for which no
provision has been made by general law and which is not
inconsistent with this Constitution or any local law
applicable thereto. Any such local law shall remain in
force and effect until amended or repealed as provided in
subparagraph (b). This, however, shall not restrict the
authority of the General Assembly by general law to
further define this power or to broaden, limit, or
otherwise regulate the exercise thereof. The General
Assembly shall not pass any local law to repeal, modify,
or supersede any action taken by a county governing
authority under this section except as authorized under
subparagraph (c) hereof.
      (b) Except as provided in subparagraph (c), a county
may, as an incident of its home rule power, amend or
repeal the local acts applicable to its governing authority
by following either of the procedures hereinafter set forth:
            (1) Such local acts may be amended or repealed
      by a resolution or ordinance duly adopted at two
      regular consecutive meetings of the county
      governing authority not less than seven nor more
      than 60 days apart. A notice containing a synopsis of
      the proposed amendment or repeal shall be
      published in the official county organ once a week for
      three weeks within a period of 60 days immediately
      preceding its final adoption. Such notice shall state
      that a copy of the proposed amendment or repeal is
      on file in the office of the clerk of the superior court

                             36
of the county for the purpose of examination and
inspection by the public. The clerk of the superior
court shall furnish anyone, upon written request, a
copy of the proposed amendment or repeal. No
amendment or repeal hereunder shall be valid to
change or repeal an amendment adopted pursuant
to a referendum as provided in (2) of this
subparagraph or to change or repeal a local act of the
General Assembly ratified in a referendum by the
electors of such county unless at least 12 months
have elapsed after such referendum. No amendment
hereunder shall be valid if inconsistent with any
provision of this Constitution or if provision has been
made therefor by general law.
      (2) Amendments to or repeals of such local acts
or ordinances, resolutions, or regulations adopted
pursuant to subparagraph (a) hereof may be
initiated by a petition filed with the judge of the
probate court of the county containing, in cases of
counties with a population of 5,000 or less, the
signatures of at least 25 percent of the electors
registered to vote in the last general election; in
cases of counties with a population of more than
5,000 but not more than 50,000, at least 20 percent
of the electors registered to vote in the last general
election; and, in cases of a county with a population
of more than 50,000, at least 10 percent of the
electors registered to vote in the last general
election, which petition shall specifically set forth
the exact language of the proposed amendment or
repeal. The judge of the probate court shall
determine the validity of such petition within 60
days of its being filed with the judge of the probate
court. In the event the judge of the probate court
determines that such petition is valid, it shall be his

                       37
duty to issue the call for an election for the purpose
of submitting such amendment or repeal to the
registered electors of the county for their approval or
rejection. Such call shall be issued not less than ten
nor more than 60 days after the date of the filing of
the petition. He shall set the date of such election for
a day not less than 60 nor more than 90 days after
the date of such filing. The judge of the probate court
shall cause a notice of the date of said election to be
published in the official organ of the county once a
week for three weeks immediately preceding such
date. Said notice shall also contain a synopsis of the
proposed amendment or repeal and shall state that
a copy thereof is on file in the office of the judge of
the probate court of the county for the purpose of
examination and inspection by the public. The judge
of the probate court shall furnish anyone, upon
written request, a copy of the proposed amendment
or repeal. If more than one-half of the votes cast on
such question are for approval of the amendment or
repeal, it shall become of full force and effect;
otherwise, it shall be void and of no force and effect.
The expense of such election shall be borne by the
county, and it shall be the duty of the judge of the
probate court to hold and conduct such election.
Such election shall be held under the same laws and
rules and regulations as govern special elections,
except as otherwise provided herein. It shall be the
duty of the judge of the probate court to canvass the
returns and declare and certify the result of the
election. It shall be his further duty to certify the
result thereof to the Secretary of State in accordance
with the provisions of subparagraph (g) of this
Paragraph. A referendum on any such amendment
or repeal shall not be held more often than once each

                        38
      year. No amendment hereunder shall be valid if
      inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution
      or if provision has been made therefor by general
      law.
In the event that the judge of the probate court
determines that such petition was not valid, he shall
cause to be published in explicit detail the reasons why
such petition is not valid; provided, however, that, in any
proceeding in which the validity of the petition is at issue,
the tribunal considering such issue shall not be limited by
the reasons assigned. Such publication shall be in the
official organ of the county in the week immediately
following the date on which such petition is declared to be
not valid.
      (c) The power granted to counties in subparagraphs
(a) and (b) above shall not be construed to extend to the
following matters or any other matters which the General
Assembly by general law has preempted or may hereafter
preempt, but such matters shall be the subject of general
law or the subject of local acts of the General Assembly to
the extent that the enactment of such local acts is
otherwise permitted under this Constitution:
            (1) Action affecting any elective county office,
      the salaries thereof, or the personnel thereof, except
      the personnel subject to the jurisdiction of the
      county governing authority.
            (2) Action affecting the composition, form,
      procedure      for    election     or   appointment,
      compensation, and expenses and allowances in the
      nature of compensation of the county governing
      authority.
            (3) Action defining any criminal offense or
      providing for criminal punishment.
            (4) Action adopting any form of taxation beyond
      that authorized by law or by this Constitution.

                             39
            (5) Action extending the power of regulation
      over any business activity regulated by the Georgia
      Public Service Commission beyond that authorized
      by local or general law or by this Constitution.
            (6) Action affecting the exercise of the power of
      eminent domain.
            (7) Action affecting any court or the personnel
      thereof.
            (8) Action affecting any public school system.
      (d) The power granted in subparagraphs (a) and (b)
of this Paragraph shall not include the power to take any
action affecting the private or civil law governing private
or civil relationships, except as is incident to the exercise
of an independent governmental power.
      (e) Nothing in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), or (d) shall
affect the provisions of subparagraph (f) of this
Paragraph.
      (f) The governing authority of each county is
authorized to fix the salary, compensation, and expenses
of those employed by such governing authority and to
establish and maintain retirement or pension systems,
insurance, workers’ compensation, and hospitalization
benefits for said employees.
      (g) No amendment or revision of any local act made
pursuant to subparagraph (b) of this section shall become
effective until a copy of such amendment or revision, a
copy of the required notice of publication, and an affidavit
of a duly authorized representative of the newspaper in
which such notice was published to the effect that said
notice has been published as provided in said
subparagraph has been filed with the Secretary of State.
The Secretary of State shall provide for the publication
and distribution of all such amendments and revisions at
least annually.


                             40
Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I.



     BETHEL, Justice, concurring dubitante.

     I am satisfied that the Court has carefully, faithfully, and

accurately applied the proper tools and framework to determine the

meaning of the petition and referendum provisions of subparagraph

(b) (2) of the Home Rule Paragraph in our Constitution.

Nevertheless, I am thoroughly uncertain that the meaning we thus

discern is what the people intended when they included the Home

Rule Paragraph in the Constitution. My uneasiness is compounded

by the fact that the structure of the paragraph itself is decidedly

unhelpful. Moreover, I have concerns about the burden this

interpretation will place on Georgia’s counties and, in due time,

municipalities. But, in our system of limited government, our duty

is to hold parties to the language they use and not to save them from

it. Thus, my concurrence is given albeit with significant doubt and

discomfort.

     As explained in the opinion of the Court, the Home Rule

                                   41
Paragraph was crafted by the General Assembly and incorporated

into the State Constitution by a vote of the people to give certain

legislative powers to counties so that the counties would have

greater power to manage their own affairs. The General Assembly

made a nearly identical provision for Georgia’s municipalities

through   statutory   measures.     See   OCGA     §   36-35-3.   Both

constitutional home rule for counties and statutory home rule for

municipalities include a virtually identical petition and referendum

mechanism that is the focus of the case before us. Our first effort at

interpreting this language in the context of the municipal home rule

statute led us to a conclusion opposite of the one we reach today. See

generally Kemp v. City of Claxton, 

 (

)

(1998). The absence of any discernible effort to change the rule after

its articulation in Kemp leads me to believe that the rule articulated

there may be the rule desired by, or at least acceptable to, the people

and their legislative representatives.

     Moreover, as the majority notes, these home rule measures

were adopted against the backdrop of a state legislature with a

                                  42
reputation for being stridently opposed to implementing home rule

provisions. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Home Rule

System, 

, 105-106 (II) (A) (1998). The

interpretation we provide today, however, seems to open a very

broad path to extensive efforts outside the control of the General

Assembly to tinker with the day-to-day operational decisions of local

governments that seems at odds with what we might have expected

to be a limited experiment in home rule. Instead, Georgia appears

to have chosen to allow for petition and referendum challenges to

virtually every decision of local governments. This would constitute

a giant leap toward what nears a direct democracy model for local

government. Of course, it is not inconceivable to imagine that the

legislature’s hostility to home rule was really rooted in a distrust of

local elected officials rather than an aversion to ceding any of the

legislature’s own power to the counties. If that was the case, then

allowing home rule with a strong check from the local citizenry via

the petition and referendum process may not seem so odd. But the

lack of contemporaneous evidence of that understanding makes that

                                  43
explanation seem unlikely to me.

     To say that the constitutional Home Rule Paragraph has

drafting problems is kind. The structure of subparagraph (b) also

adds to my doubt about our resolution of the question before us. It

is quite confounding that the initial text of subparagraph (b)

indicates that the subparagraph will provide for the methods of

amending or repealing “the local acts applicable to its governing

authority” only to have the provisions of (b) (2) provide for the ability

to amend or repeal a much broader and materially different set of

actions by the local government. Additional concern is generated by

the provisions of subparagraph (g), which provides that an

“amendment or revision of any local act made pursuant to

subparagraph (b)” will not be effective until certain filings are made

with the Secretary of State and requires that the Secretary of State

subsequently provide       for at    least annual publication and

distribution of the amendment or revision. (Emphasis supplied.) Ga.

Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (b). This subparagraph can

only be reasonably understood to apply to changes to local acts

                                    44
applicable to the governing authority of the county. It makes no

allowance for referenda related to operational decisions. But

subparagraph (b) (2), which encompasses more than “local acts,”

requires the probate judge to certify the results of the election on the

referendum “to the Secretary of State in accordance with the

provisions of subparagraph (g)[.]” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. IX, Sec.

II, Par. I (b). The majority acknowledges that subparagraph (g) “on

its face applies only to local acts, which, as discussed above, are

distinct from ordinances, resolutions, or regulations.” But what,

exactly, the Secretary of State is supposed to do with that

certification when it does not relate to local acts applicable to the

governing authority remains an open question. I will not delve

further into the tangle. I only note that the clumsiness of the

structure casts doubt on the true meaning of the text.26



     26 As a former member of both a city council and the General Assembly,

I appreciate the challenges of the drafting process and the many ways
confusing language and structure can make their way into language ultimately
adopted by a legislative body. The structure we find here, however, should
serve as an encouragement to all those involved in the drafting process to
continually look at the document as a whole to ensure clarity. Regrettably,

                                    45
      The next chapter in this story could be challenging. Our

reading of the language here, of course, signals a looming stare

decisis analysis for our holding in Kemp. Whatever the result of that

analysis may be, our holding here will, I expect, usher in a frightful

season for local governments in Georgia. While getting 10-25

percent of registered voters (depending on population) to sign a

petition to force a referendum should not be described as “easy,” it

will undoubtedly prove more realistic for those who are concerned

about matters related to local alcohol ordinances, zoning ordinances

and decisions, taxation rates, and budgeting decisions than it might

be to collect sufficient signatures to challenge the structural

“governing authority” questions otherwise found in subparagraph

(b). I worry that a considerable minority group or groups within a

community will be empowered to regularly subject their local




what we are left with in subparagraph (b) is the equivalent of a provision that
indicates it will provide travel directions to Atlanta, only to include directions
to Darien, Dalton, Hahira, and Hiawassee, as well. The reader is left to wonder
whether the error was in the description of the contents or in the contents
themselves.

                                       46
community to the expense of a series of referenda as a means of

either protest or in an attempt to thwart the will of a fatigued

majority in a low turnout election.27 I hope I am wrong.

      Nevertheless, despite my doubts, I am compelled to concur. But

it is not because the Court reaches the outcome I prefer. And it is

not because I believe my concerns will prove to be unfounded.

Rather, I concur because we exercise only judicial power and that

power is limited. Here, that power extends to a determination of the

meaning and impact of words the people ratified as the framework

by which they consent to be governed. The interpretation the Court

reaches is not beyond critique. Indeed, the confusing nature of the

operative language might afford many readings. But, the Court has

reached the most plausible reading that gives the greatest effect to

the language in the document. All competing readings I have

identified have greater challenges and deficiencies than the one we

reach today. So, I concur, dubitante.



      27 How hard will it be to collect signatures on a petition to repeal the

adoption of a resolution increasing or merely setting the millage rate?
                                      47
     I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Boggs joins in this

concurrence.



                    Decided February 7, 2023.

     Home Rule Provision; constitutional question. Camden

Superior Court. Before Judge Scarlett.

     John S. Myers; Hall Booth Smith, William B. Carver, Sr.,

Russell A. Britt, Pearson K. Cunningham, for appellant.

     Walker Hulbert Gray & Moore, Kellye C. Moore; Ellis Painter

Ratterree & Adams, Dana F. Braun, Kimberly C. Butler, Philip M.

Thompson, for appellees.

     Clare R. Norins; Larry W. Ramsey, Jr., G. Joseph Scheuer,

amici curiae.




                                48