NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia



                                                    Decided: December 20, 2024


                       S24A0894. WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.


         MCMILLIAN, Justice.

        In October 2018, a jury found Jasmine Williams guilty of

malice murder in connection with the shooting death of Gregory

Swinson. 1 On appeal, Williams argues that (1) the trial judge should

have recused himself for his conduct during the trial; (2) the trial

court erred in failing to charge the jury on justification, accident,

and voluntary manslaughter; and (3) her trial counsel rendered



        1 Swinson was shot on or about September 16, 2017, and succumbed to

his injuries approximately four days later. On November 13, 2017, a Coffee
County grand jury indicted Williams for felony murder (Count 1) and malice
murder (Count 2). At a jury trial in October 2018, the jury found Williams
guilty on both counts. The trial court sentenced Williams to serve life in prison
without the possibility of parole on Count 2; Count 1 was vacated by operation
of law. Williams timely filed a motion for new trial, which was amended
through new counsel on August 31, 2023, and September 18, 2023. Following
a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial, as amended, on
September 27, 2023. Williams timely appealed, and her case was docketed to
the August 2024 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
constitutionally ineffective assistance by withdrawing his request to

charge on defense of habitation. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

     The evidence presented at trial showed that Williams and

Swinson began a romantic relationship around April 2017. For a

short period of time, Swinson lived with Williams in her home in

Coffee County before moving into his own apartment. Williams’s

roommates, brothers Chad and Dustin Kitchens, continued living in

her home. On the evening of September 15, 2017, Williams and

Swinson went to Swinson’s grandmother’s home where they hung

out with various relatives for a couple of hours. Around 9:30 p.m.,

Williams and Swinson went to Williams’s grandparents’ home,

where they drank alcohol, played cards, and watched football until

about midnight. Swinson then returned to his grandmother’s house

and spoke with his grandmother and uncle.

     Swinson’s uncle testified that when Swinson came inside, he

“was crying and screaming at the top of his voice about . . .
                                 2
[Williams].” Swinson had scratches on his back and his chest and a

“busted” lip. Swinson’s grandmother testified that he had so many

scratches on his body that “[h]e looked like a cat had been over him.”

Swinson told his uncle that Williams had scratched him and that he

had to “g[e]t her off of him” by pushing her. Later, Swinson’s

grandmother agreed to drive Swinson to Williams’s house to pick up

a car that Williams and Swinson’s grandmother had discussed

because, according to Swinson, Williams had told him to come pick

up the car. Swinson’s grandmother drove him to Williams’s house

and dropped him off.

     Chad testified that at roughly 3:00 a.m., Swinson ran into his

bedroom, waking him up, and told him that he wanted him to “be a

witness to whatever happens.” Chad told Swinson, “[Y]’all don’t

start this tonight,” but Swinson insisted on showing Chad his back,

which was covered with scratches. Chad then looked through his

bedroom door into the hallway and saw Williams walking toward

them, holding a gun in her hand. Swinson said, “[S]he’s got a gun.”
                                  3
Chad rubbed his eyes, still groggy from just waking up, and heard

Williams say, “[W]ell, why don’t you get the f**k out, Greg,” followed

by a gunshot. When he opened his eyes, he saw Swinson fall to the

ground in the bedroom and told Williams, who had entered the

bedroom, to call 911. As Chad waited for law enforcement officers to

arrive, he did not see anything out of place in the house other than

Swinson’s cell phone on the floor near the back door.

     A recording of Williams’s 911 call was played at trial. During

that call, Williams told the 911 operator, “I shot him in the head. . .

. We were together in a relationship, and we broke up, and I got mad,

and I didn’t realize that I had the trigger pulled, and I hit him in the

head with the gun, and it went off, and it shot him in the head.”

Later, one of the responding law enforcement officers heard

Williams talking on her cell phone, via speaker phone, with someone

she referred to as “mama” and heard the person on the other line

tell Williams: “[unintelligible] it was self-defense . . . he was on you.

You tell them he was on you.” Swinson was transported to a local
                                   4
hospital, where he died from his injuries several days later.

     Officers were able to locate the firearm Williams used to shoot

Swinson in a linen closet in the hallway. Williams told one officer

that she hit Swinson in the head with the gun and “it went off.” She

told another officer that she and Swinson were breaking up and that

he struck her in the face, so “she grabbed a gun” and “struck him in

the head,” and “the gun went off.” She also told another officer that

she had been “arguing over her relationship” with Swinson since

7:30 that evening and that “she went and got her gun and she was

going to hit . . . him with it and it went off.” Crime scene photographs

taken of Williams’s living room showed that no furniture or other

items appeared to have been knocked over or disturbed.

     While at the police department, Williams and her mother

requested that officers take photographs of injuries on Williams’s

body. Williams stated, however, that they were “old injuries . . . from

being sexual.” The next day, Williams again asked officers to take

photographs of new injuries that had emerged – two bruises on her
                                   5
legs and a small injury on her finger.

     A firearms examiner with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation

testified that she evaluated the gun used by Williams, a Smith &

Wesson .357 Magnum revolver, and determined that the firearm

worked correctly and that the revolver’s two types of safeties were

functional, meaning that the weapon “cannot go off accidentally”

because the safeties would “physically block it.” For the gun to fire,

the shooter had to pull the trigger “all the way to the rear back.” The

medical examiner who performed the autopsy testified that Swinson

had a wound on his lower lip and abrasions “in various stages of

healing” on his face, neck, chest, back, and both arms. The abrasions

were consistent with scratches. The medical examiner concluded

that Swinson died from a gunshot wound to his head. Swinson was

shot at an intermediate range, at most two or three feet, and did not

suffer a “contact gunshot wound” where the “muzzle of the gun is in

contact with the skin of the victim.” The bullet entered the right side

of his head and exited through the front of his scalp.
                                  6
     The State also presented evidence of Williams’s prior use of

firearms to threaten men she had dated. Samual Holland,

Williams’s former fiancé, testified that one day around April 2015,

he came home from work to find that Williams had cut her own

wrists because she was upset that he had come home late. When

Holland tried to bandage her wrists, Williams started yelling and

hit Holland’s leg with a knife. Williams then shouted, “[W]ell, we’ll

both just die then,” and, “I’m going to shoot you . . . you deserve to

die.” When Holland saw Williams stand up and walk in the direction

of a firearm on the kitchen counter, he fled to his vehicle and left.

     Cody Willard testified that he and Williams had a brief

romantic relationship. After they broke up, Willard remained

friends with Williams’s roommate Chad. One day in the fall of 2016,

Willard and some other friends were parked outside Williams’s

home talking with Chad. When Willard had to use the restroom, he

decided to do so behind the shed in Williams’s backyard. While on

his way to the shed, he saw Williams sitting outside. Williams told
                                   7
him he needed to leave. Willard returned to his friend’s car and

continued speaking with Chad. Williams then came outside with a

gun and told Willard he needed to leave now. Willard jokingly

responded, “You won’t shoot me.” Williams, who was “kind of . . .

point[ing the gun] at [Willard],” told Willard, “I won’t shoot them,

but I’ll shoot you.” Willard and his friends then drove away. Willard

testified that the gun Williams used to threaten him appeared to be

the same gun that Williams shot Swinson with. Dustin also testified

as to this incident and recounted that Williams came into the house

that day and told him, “I’m going to kill Cody Willard,” and then

retrieved a firearm. He then looked outside and saw Williams

holding the firearm while she approached the vehicle that Willard

was sitting in.

     Williams testified in her own defense at trial. According to

Williams, she purchased a box of wine on the evening of September

15, and she and Swinson were drinking the wine that evening. They

got into an argument in the car on the way home from her
                                 8
grandparents’ house, and she hit Swinson in the face; Swinson then

hit her in the face in retaliation. At Swinson’s request, Williams

drove Swinson to his grandmother’s house. When they arrived,

Swinson got into a “stance like a boxer” and said, “[W]hy don’t you

want to fight me now when I can protect myself?” She claimed

Swinson swung at her and grabbed her by the waist and pinned her

up on the car and that she then scratched him. Williams also stated

that Swinson then carried her and slammed her into the door of his

grandmother’s house. Swinson’s uncle opened the door and told

them they “needed to take it somewhere else,” so Swinson let her go,

and she drove home.

      When she returned home, Williams called her friend who

suggested that Williams put Swinson’s things outside so she would

not have to interact with Swinson if he came over.2 When Swinson

texted her and told her that he was coming over, she told him they


      2 Williams’s friend testified at trial and confirmed that this conversation

took place.
                                       9
should “do this tomorrow,” but Swinson responded that he was

coming over anyway. 3 Williams testified that when Swinson arrived,

he banged on her door. She opened the door and stepped outside to

tell him that his things were on the porch before going back inside

the house. Swinson started banging on the door again, and when she

cracked the door open to tell him to leave, he “pushed his way inside

the house.” Once inside, he “picked [her] up and tossed [her] down

on the floor.” When she “got back up and . . . tried to push him out

some more,” Swinson “picked [her] up again and . . . tossed [her] over

the couch.”

         After she got up, Swinson was already in Chad’s bedroom, so

she went to the linen closet and retrieved her gun from its holster to

“scare” Swinson. She went to Chad’s bedroom and said, “[G]et the F

out.” Williams claimed, “The next thing I remember is I raised the

gun over my head, upward, and I went to hit him. I swung it down


         3 No other evidence of this text message exchange was introduced at

trial.
                                      10
to hit him on the head with it and then I saw him fall down. And I

saw him fall down and I thought I had knocked him out, but then I

saw the blood and Chad screamed. So I ran and grabbed my phone

and I threw the gun into the closet and I called the police.” However,

Williams also testified that she did not know whether the gun

actually hit Swinson when it went off.

     1. Williams first asserts that the trial judge should have

granted her motion to recuse. The record shows that, on the morning

of the third day of trial, Williams filed a motion to recuse the trial

judge, which was referred to and heard by a different judge. At an

evidentiary hearing conducted that same day, Williams’s former

employer, local attorney Patrick Ferris, testified that, on the

previous day, he had entered the courtroom after court had been

adjourned to speak with friends inside. When he entered, he saw the

trial judge speaking to other local attorneys – Bruce Edwards and

Margaret McManes. Ferris became concerned because he knew that

Edwards and McManes were close to Swinson; that they considered
                                 11
Swinson to be like a son to them; and that they were known to be

Swinson’s unofficial “adoptive parents.” Ferris did not hear the

conversation, but texted Williams’s trial counsel to advise him of the

situation. Ferris agreed that the jurors had already left the

courtroom at the time of the conversation.

     McManes testified that she and Edwards considered Swinson

to be their “adopted son.” She explained that after court had

adjourned and the jurors were dismissed, she approached the trial

judge and asked if she could discuss something unrelated to the case.

She and the judge were standing near the exit door when they

discussed her biological son’s internship at the District Attorney’s

office the previous summer and thanked the judge for providing

career advice to her son during his internship. The judge

complimented McManes on her son’s polite manners and discussed

the difficulties of raising children with manners. McManes and the

judge also discussed other local attorneys they knew, and then

Edwards joined the conversation and discussed a friend that he had
                                 12
recently encountered at a high school reunion. McManes testified

that they never discussed anything about the pending trial.

     A court reporter for another judge testified that she had

entered the courtroom to locate Edwards on behalf of the Clerk of

Court regarding an unrelated matter. At that time, court had

already adjourned and the trial judge was speaking with McManes

and Edwards. When she approached Edwards, she heard a portion

of the conversation; they were discussing the poor health of another

judge and the death of that judge’s son. At that point, she told

Edwards that he was wanted in the clerk’s office and the

conversation ended. She did not hear anyone discuss the case or

Swinson. The assigned judge denied Williams’s request to question

the trial judge at the hearing and denied the motion that same day,

making findings of fact and concluding that “a fair-minded and

impartial person would not have a reasonable perception of a judge’s

lack of impartiality based upon objective facts set forth in the

affidavit, facts of the case, or reasonable inferences therefrom.”
                                  13
     We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to recuse for an

abuse of discretion. See Pierce v. State, 

 (9) (

) (2024). “When considering the issue of recusal, both

OCGA § 15-1-8 and . . . the Code of the Judicial Conduct should be

applied. The Code of Judicial Conduct provides a broader rule of

disqualification than does OCGA § 15-1-8.” Barnett v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2017) (citation and punctuation

omitted). Williams does not allege that any provision of OCGA § 15-

1-8 is applicable here.4 Rather, she relies on Rule 2.11 (A) of the


     4 This statute provides:



     (a) No judge or Justice of any court, magistrate, nor presiding
     officer of any inferior judicature or commission shall:
            (1) Sit in any case or proceeding in which he is pecuniarily
            interested;
            (2) Preside, act, or serve in any case or matter when such
            judge is related by consanguinity or affinity within the third
            degree as computed according to the civil law to any party
            interested in the result of the case or matter; or
            (3) Sit in any case or proceeding in which he has been of
            counsel, nor in which he has presided in any inferior
            judicature, when his ruling or decision is the subject of
            review, without the consent of all parties in interest. In all
            cases in which the presiding judge of the superior court was

                                      14
Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that “[j]udges

shall disqualify themselves in any proceeding in which their

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Specifically, Williams

argues that, although the conversation at issue here might seem

innocuous on the surface, it created the perception that the judge

was sympathetic to the State’s case by speaking with the victim’s

quasi-adoptive family while the trial was still pending.




            employed as counsel before his appointment as judge, he
            shall preside in such cases if the opposite party or counsel
            agree in writing that he may preside, unless he declines to
            do so.
     (b) No judge or Justice of any court, magistrate, nor presiding
     officer of any inferior judicature or commission shall be
     disqualified from sitting in any case or proceeding because of the
     fact that he is a policyholder or is related to a policyholder of any
     mutual insurance company which has no capital stock.
     (c) Nothing in this Code section shall be construed as applying to
     the qualifications of trial jurors.
     (d) In all cases in which a part-time judge has a conflict because
     such judge or his or her partner or associate represents a
     governmental agency or entity, a subdivision of government, or
     any other client, the judge will recuse himself or herself or, with
     the permission of the parties, transfer the case to the state or
     superior court, but such judge will not otherwise be disqualified or
     prohibited from serving as attorney for such governmental
     entities.
                                        15
     As an initial matter, we note that the trial judge properly

referred the recusal motion to a neutral judge, who conducted a

timely evidentiary hearing. See Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. Rule 25.3 (“If it

is found that the motion [to recuse] is timely, the [required] affidavit

sufficient and that recusal would be authorized if some or all of the

facts set forth in the affidavit are true, another judge shall be

assigned to hear the motion to recuse.”); Henderson v. State, 

 (1) (

) (2014) (outlining procedures when

assessing a motion to recuse). And that neutral judge found no

evidence that the parties involved discussed the pending trial in any

way, and it is undisputed that there were no jury members present

in the courtroom to witness the discussion. Because these findings

are supported by evidence in the record, we conclude that the

neutral judge did not abuse his discretion in determining, under a

reasonable person standard, that the limited conversation unrelated

to the pending trial did not result in the appearance of impropriety.

See Heidt v. State, 

 (3) (

) (2013)
                                  16
(defendant failed to show judge’s impartiality might reasonably be

questioned where testimony regarding the judge’s out-of-court

statement merely showed the judge had expressed “some sort of

agreement” to a third-party statement that defendant would not

receive a fair trial in Effingham County, but failed to show the judge

had revealed any bias against defendant); Turner v. State, 

 (

) (2006) (“Keeping in mind the reality that

any judge will have come to the bench after having had extensive

contacts with the community, we conclude that [the judge’s] limited

contact with [the defendant] and her mother is not enough to call

into question his impartiality in this case.” (citation and punctuation

omitted)).5 Accordingly, this enumeration of error fails.

      2. Williams next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing



      5 Serdula v. State, 

 (

) (2018), which Williams

relies on, is readily distinguishable. In that case, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to recuse
without referring the motion to another judge. Id. at 591 (1) (“Even if the trial
court were not inclined to recuse itself, at a minimum, the motion should have
been referred to another judge.”).
                                        17
to charge the jury on self-defense, accident,6 and voluntary

manslaughter.

      Williams’s initial requests to charge included requests for

accident, voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, justification

generally, self-defense, defense of property, and defense of

habitation.     At   the    charge     conference,     Williams      withdrew

justification generally and defense of habitation. After the trial court

declined to charge on accident, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary

manslaughter, self-defense, and defense of property, 7 Williams

renewed her objections, which the trial court denied. But the trial



      6 Although Williams did not separately enumerate the omission of the

accident charge as error in her appellate brief, she did argue with citations to
the record and citations to authority that the trial court erred in refusing to
give a charge on accident. For these reasons, we conclude that this argument
was not abandoned as the State argues. Cf. Supreme Court Rule 22 (1) (“Any
enumerated error or subpart of an enumerated error not supported by
argument, citations to authority, and citations to the record shall be deemed
abandoned.”).
      7 The trial court ultimately gave a charge on general affirmative

defenses: “Ladies and Gentlemen, an affirmative defense is a defense that
admits the doing of the act charged but seeks to justify, excuse, or mitigate it.
Once an affirmative defense is raised, the burden is on the State to disprove it
beyond a reasonable doubt.”
                                      18
court responded that Williams would, nonetheless, be able to argue

self-defense in closing arguments, specifically referencing that

Williams had testified that Swinson “threw her down twice” and

“wouldn’t leave” prior to the shooting. 8

      “[T]o authorize a requested jury instruction, there need only be

slight evidence supporting the theory of the charge.” Wainwright v.

State, 

 (5) (

) (2019) (citation and

punctuation omitted). “We review de novo a properly preserved

claim that a trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on an

applicable principle of law.” Eubanks v. State, 

 (3)

(b) (

) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).

      (a)   Self-Defense

      Williams argues that the evidence showed that she was




      8 During closing argument, trial counsel argued that Swinson broke into

Williams’s house, stayed despite her request to leave, and “thr[e]w her around”
before she got the gun and told him to “get the F out.” Counsel also argued that
Williams did not intend to kill Swinson and that the gun went off as the result
of an accident.
                                       19
preparing to defend herself when the gun fired accidentally and that

she was, therefore, entitled to a charge on both self-defense and

accident. “Although a defendant may assert both the defense of

accident and the defense of self-defense, the defendant is entitled to

charges on both only if slight evidence supports both charges.”

Johnson v. State, 

 (1) (c) (

) (2024).

Turning first to self-defense, we note that OCGA § 16-3-21 (a)

provides that “[a] person is justified in threatening or using force

against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably

believes that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself or

herself or a third person against such other’s imminent use of

unlawful force.”

     Williams has failed to point to even slight evidence that she

reasonably believed at the time of the shooting that force was

necessary to defend herself against Swinson’s imminent use of

unlawful force. Although Williams eventually claimed at trial that

Swinson picked her up and threw her down upon coming into the
                                 20
house, Williams’s own testimony showed that whatever altercation

occurred between her and Swinson had concluded at the time she

decided to retrieve her gun. On cross-examination, she conceded

that Swinson “did not do anything towards [her]” while she was

holding the gun. Also, both Williams and Chad testified that

Swinson was in Chad’s bedroom when Williams went to retrieve her

gun. And Chad testified that when he awoke with Swinson in his

bedroom, Swinson told him that he wanted Chad “to be a witness to

whatever happens,” and showed Chad scratches on his back.

Finally, there is no evidence that Swinson was armed that evening

or that Williams was otherwise in immediate danger from Swinson

at the time of the shooting. In short, while Williams and Swinson

may have been engaged in a physical confrontation in a general

sense, the evidence showed that the two had separated and that

Swinson was not imminently attacking Williams when she shot him.

See Redding v. State, 

 (3) (

) (2021)

(appellant’s testimony that the victim threatened him earlier in the
                                21
evening did not show imminent danger); Cloud v. State, 

 (

 (2011) (“Justification cannot be based on an

assault which has ended.”). Thus, we conclude that the trial court

did not err in refusing to give a self-defense charge. See Merritt v.

State, 

 (7) (

) (2021) (trial court did not

err by refusing to give self-defense charge where appellant pointed

to no evidence that shooting the victim was necessary to defend

himself or any third person from imminent use of unlawful force);

Garner v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2018) (trial

court did not err by refusing to charge on self-defense where there

was no evidence that appellant was in fear of suffering harm during

the encounter with the victim or that the victim was reaching for a

weapon).

     (b)   Accident

     “To succeed on an affirmative defense of accident, the

defendant must show that he acted without criminal intent, was not

engaged in a criminal scheme, and was not criminally negligent,
                                 22
that is, he did not act in a manner showing an utter disregard for

the safety of others who might reasonably be expected to be injured

thereby.” Mills v. State, 

 (4) (

) (2010).

See also OCGA § 16-2-2 (“A person shall not be found guilty of any

crime committed by misfortune or accident where it satisfactorily

appears there was no criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or

criminal negligence.”).

     Here, Williams’s own testimony showed that, after an evening

in which she drank several glasses of wine, she retrieved her gun—

that she knew to be loaded—from its holster and walked down the

hall with the gun to Chad’s room in order to “intimidate” Swinson

and that she intentionally “raised the gun over [her] head” and then

“swung it down to hit him on the head with it” while her finger was

“probably” on the trigger. At a minimum, “[m]isuse of a firearm in

the manner described by [Williams] shows a degree of culpability

that constitutes criminal negligence.” Mills, 

 (4)

(because defendant was criminally negligent in climbing into bed
                                 23
with victim holding a loaded handgun with his finger on the trigger

and pointing the gun at the victim, defendant was not entitled to a

charge on accident). Because “death caused by criminal negligence

is not an accident,” the trial court did not err in refusing to charge

the jury on this defense. 

 (citation and punctuation omitted). See

also Bonner v. State, 

 (3) (

) (2021)

(trial court did not err in refusing to charge on accident where, other

than appellant’s conclusory statement, no evidence suggested that

the gun malfunctioned or that the shooting was accidental); Stewart

v. State, 

 (2) (

) (1991) (no accident

charge required where defendant said pre-trial that he aimed a

loaded gun at the victim’s face to show her what “being under the

gun” was like and also testified that he pulled a loaded gun across

his lap to show her what “being under the gun was like”; both

scenarios show criminal negligence). Cf. Schmitt v. State, 

 (1) (

) (2024) (trial court error in denying

accident charge as defense to malice murder count was not harmless
                                  24
where appellant’s theory of accident did not rest on conduct that was

criminally negligent).

     (c)   Voluntary Manslaughter

     Williams also argues that her testimony that Swinson entered

her home and “tossed [her] down” was sufficient to require the trial

court to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter. We disagree.

     OCGA § 16-5-2 (a) provides:

      A person commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter
     when he causes the death of another human being under
     circumstances which would otherwise be murder and if he
     acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and
     irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation
     sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person;
     however, if there should have been an interval between
     the provocation and the killing sufficient for the voice of
     reason and humanity to be heard, of which the jury in all
     cases shall be the judge, the killing shall be attributed to
     deliberate revenge and be punished as murder.

We have consistently held that fear of attack and fighting are not

the kind of “serious provocation” that can reduce the offense of

murder to voluntary manslaughter. See Behl v. State, 

 (1) (

) (2023) (“[N]either fear that someone is going to
                                 25
pull a weapon nor fighting are the types of provocation that demand

a voluntary manslaughter charge.” (citation and punctuation

omitted)); Johnson v. State, 

 (

) (2022)

(“The fact that an uninvited guest approaches the defendant’s door,

knocks on the door, and then does not immediately comply with a

request to leave” does not constitute the provocation necessary to

support voluntary manslaughter.); Williams v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2019) (voluntary manslaughter requires

that a defendant “was so angered that he reacted passionately,” not

merely that the defendant “was attempting to repel an attack”).

Thus, the evidence that Swinson entered Williams’s home and

fought with her does not demonstrate the type of circumstances that

we have found would excite such passion in a reasonable person to

justify a voluntary manslaughter charge. Accordingly, the trial court

did not err in refusing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter.

     3. Lastly, Williams alleges that her trial counsel rendered

constitutionally ineffective assistance by withdrawing the request to
                                 26
charge the jury on defense of habitation because the evidence

showed that she was defending her home when she accidentally shot

Swinson. 9

     To prevail on her claim, Williams must show both that

counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient

performance prejudiced her defense. See Strickland v. Washington,


     9 OCGA § 16-3-23 provides:



     A person is justified in threatening or using force against another
     when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such
     threat or force is necessary to prevent or terminate such other’s
     unlawful entry into or attack upon a habitation; however, such
     person is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to
     cause death or great bodily harm only if:
            (1) The entry is made or attempted in a violent and
     tumultuous manner and he or she reasonably believes that the
     entry is attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering
     personal violence to any person dwelling or being therein and that
     such force is necessary to prevent the assault or offer of personal
     violence;
            (2) That force is used against another person who is not a
     member of the family or household and who unlawfully and
     forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence
     and the person using such force knew or had reason to believe that
     an unlawful and forcible entry occurred; or
            (3) The person using such force reasonably believes that the
     entry is made or attempted for the purpose of committing a felony
     therein and that such force is necessary to prevent the commission
     of the felony.
                                        27


 (III) (

, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). “To prove

deficient performance, a defendant must show that [her] counsel

performed in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the

circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms.” Pyne

v. State, 

 (1) (

) (2024) (citation and

punctuation omitted). “To satisfy the prejudice prong, a defendant

must establish a reasonable probability that, in the absence of

counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the trial would have

been different.” Perkins v. State, 

 (5) (

)

(2022). If Williams fails to make a sufficient showing on one part of

the Strickland test, we need not address the other. See Bowman v.

State, 

 (2) (

) (2024).

     Pretermitting whether counsel was deficient in withdrawing

the request to charge on the defense of habitation and whether there

was slight evidence to support the charge, Williams has failed to

show prejudice. The evidence supporting this defense was weak, and

the evidence of Williams’s guilt was strong. Williams claimed at trial
                                 28
that Swinson entered her home with force and “tossed [her] down”

and that she went to get her gun in order to tell Swinson to leave.

But crime scene photographs and Chad’s testimony showed that

nothing was out of place in the living room area where the

altercation was alleged to have taken place, other than Swinson’s

cell phone on the floor. Also, Swinson was unarmed and had

retreated to Chad’s bedroom when Williams went to get her gun.

And Chad testified that Swinson had asked him to “be a witness to

whatever happens.” Moreover, in her call to the 911 operator and

when questioned by law enforcement officers after the shooting,

Williams never claimed that she accidentally shot Swinson while

attempting to make him leave her home; instead, she explained that

she accidentally shot Swinson while they were arguing and breaking

up.

      Other evidence also supported that Williams shot Swinson out

of anger. Williams admitted to the 911 operator that she “didn’t

realize that [she] had the trigger pulled.” Also, Swinson’s
                                29
grandmother and uncle confirmed that Swinson and Williams had

been fighting earlier in the evening, and Swinson had significantly

more physical injuries than Williams despite Williams’s testimony

that Swinson had thrown her over the couch. Finally, the State

presented evidence that Williams had a history of threatening to

shoot her romantic partners without provocation.10

     Accordingly, because Williams has not shown that there is a

reasonable probability that the result of her trial would have been

different but for counsel’s withdrawal of the request to charge on the

defense of habitation, her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

fails. See State v. Newman, 

 (2) (a) (

) (2019) (in the context of plain error, trial court’s failure to

charge on defense of habitation “did not likely affect the outcome of

the trial court proceedings” in light of the compelling evidence of

defendant’s guilt); Barrett v. State, 

 (3) (c) (5)


     10 Williams does not claim on appeal that this evidence was improperly

admitted, and we express no opinion on that issue.
                                     30
(

) (2012) (no prejudice shown from counsel’s failure to

request defense of habitation charge where defendant’s own

testimony would not have established reasonable belief that deadly

force was necessary to prevent unlawful entry into residence); Hill

v. State, 

 (7) (

) (2012) (appellant failed

to show prejudice where evidence of his guilt was overwhelming and

he did not establish how a jury charge on defense of habitation would

have raised a reasonable probability that the outcome of the case

would have been different).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.




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