NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.


In the Supreme Court of Georgia



                                                    Decided: January 17, 2024


                         S23A1179. WEEMS v. THE STATE.


         PINSON, Justice.

        On the morning of June 3, 2018, a motorist driving down Brom-

ack Drive in Fulton County saw a man lying in the front yard of a

home, covered in blood and shaking back and forth. She called 911,

and the man in the yard, Christopher Welch, was taken to the hos-

pital where he died of blood loss from a gunshot wound to his head.

As part of the investigation of Welch’s shooting, the police entered

the home that Welch was found in front of, and law enforcement

found Welch’s girlfriend, Chloe Dowdy, shot to death in one of the

bedrooms. That bedroom belonged to Rufus Weems, who was later

convicted of two counts of malice murder and other crimes related to
Welch’s and Dowdy’s deaths. 1

      On appeal, Weems raises several claims. He contends that the

evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions as a matter of

constitutional due process, and under OCGA § 24-14-6 because the

State failed to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis of guilt be-

yond a reasonable doubt. He challenges the trial court’s denial of his

motion for new trial on the “general grounds” under OCGA §§ 5-5-


      1 The shootings occurred on the morning of June 3, 2018. On September

14, 2018, a Fulton County grand jury returned an indictment charging Weems
with malice murder of Dowdy (Count 1), malice murder of Welch (Count 2),
felony murder of Dowdy predicated on aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon (Count 3), felony murder of Welch predicated on aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon (Count 4), felony murder of Dowdy predicated on posses-
sion of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 5), felony murder of Welch predi-
cated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 6), aggravated as-
sault of Dowdy (Count 7), aggravated assault of Welch (Count 8), possession of
a firearm during commission of a crime (Count 9), and two counts of possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon (Counts 10, 11). At a jury trial from November
4, 2019, to November 14, 2019, the jury returned guilty verdicts on Counts 1-
10 (the State nolle prossed Count 11). The trial court sentenced Weems to con-
current life sentences without parole for the malice murders of Dowdy and
Welch (Counts 1 and 2); five years without parole, consecutive to Count 2, for
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 9); and five
years without parole, consecutive to Count 9, for possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon (Count 10). The remaining counts either merged or were va-
cated by operation of law. Weems, through trial counsel, filed a timely motion
for new trial on December 5, 2019, which he amended through new counsel
multiple times. Weems waived hearing on the motion for new trial and, on
March 31, 2023, the trial court denied the motion as amended. Weems filed a
timely notice of appeal on April 28, 2023. His appeal was docketed to the Au-
gust 2023 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
                                       2
20 and 5-5-21. And he claims the trial court erred by not allowing a

witness to testify remotely and by commenting on the evidence.

     Each claim fails. The evidence was sufficient to support

Weems’s convictions as a matter of constitutional due process, and

it authorized the jury to reject Weems’s hypothesis that someone

else was the shooter. As for the trial court’s ruling on the general

grounds, Weems has not established that the trial court applied the

wrong standard, and his argument is otherwise not properly before

us. The trial court was required to deny his motion for remote testi-

mony under the relevant Superior Court rule after the State ob-

jected. And Weems has not shown that the trial court’s repeating of

a witness’s testimony while ruling on an objection was an improper

comment on the evidence. So Weems’s convictions and sentence are

affirmed.

     1. The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to

the verdicts, showed the following. At the time of the shooting,

Weems was staying in a spare room at the home of Lakesha Reed,

who lived with her children, her mother (Carrie Reed) and her

                                 3
brother (James Jordan III) on Bromack Drive in Fulton County. On

the night of June 2, 2018, all of them, including Weems, ordered

pizza and watched a movie at home. By 1:00 a.m. on June 3, 2018,

everyone had gone to bed—Lakesha, Carrie, and Weems in their re-

spective bedrooms (with the children split between Lakesha’s and

Carrie’s rooms) and Jordan on the couch in the living room. In the

early hours of that morning, Jordan woke up because someone was

walking from the hall bathroom to Weems’s room with a flashlight.

Jordan did not see who this was. Separately, Lakesha saw a

stranger, who was using his phone as a flashlight, walk into the hall-

way bathroom that was across from her bedroom. She later identi-

fied the stranger as one of the shooting victims, Christopher Welch.

     Still later that morning, close to sunrise, Jordan saw Weems

leave and return with another man and go into Weems’s bedroom.

After Weems’s bedroom door closed, Jordan heard gunshots.

Lakesha and Carrie also heard the gunshots and hid in Carrie’s

bathroom with Jordan and the children. While in the bathroom,

Lakesha and Carrie each looked out a window and saw Weems—

                                  4
who they each described as wearing a white tank top and basketball

shorts—get into his car and drive away. Jordan did not see Weems

when he looked out the window, but he saw Weems’s car driving

away.

     Around 7:00 a.m. on June 3rd, Cynthia Johnson drove past

Lakesha’s home, heard gunshots, and saw two men leave the home.

One of the men had a dark complexion and a “low haircut” and was

wearing a white T-shirt and shorts and carrying a handgun; she saw

him get into a car. The other man walked around the side of the

building. After seeing this, Johnson stopped at a gas station for a

few minutes, then got back in her car and drove by Lakesha’s home

again, where she saw Welch lying on the ground, covered in blood

and shaking. Johnson stopped and called 911. She did not think that

Welch was one of the two men she saw leaving the home earlier that

morning. In the meantime, Lakesha, Carrie, and Jordan left their

hiding place in Carrie’s bathroom after they heard a woman outside

the home scream. They saw blood throughout the hallway leading to

the front door.

                                5
     Soon after, the police arrived. Welch was taken to the hospital,

where he died of blood loss from a gunshot wound. At trial, the med-

ical examiner explained that Welch had suffered two gunshot

wounds—one to his hand, which was not fatal, and a second to his

head, which caused him to bleed to death.

     As part of the investigation of Welch’s shooting, the police en-

tered Lakesha’s home soon after arriving on June 3rd. Inside, offic-

ers found the body of Chloe Dowdy, Welch’s girlfriend, in Weems’s

bedroom. Like Welch, Dowdy had also suffered two gunshot

wounds—one to her head, which killed her instantly, and a second

to her back.

     Jacquelyn Holt testified that Welch and Dowdy had been stay-

ing at her apartment, but she asked them to stay somewhere else on

the night of June 2nd. Around 11:00 p.m. that night, someone drove

Welch to Holt’s house and picked up Dowdy.

     Welch’s mother testified that, two or three years earlier, Welch

had brought Weems to her house at least twice, but she did not know

whether the two men had stayed in touch. She last saw Welch on

                                 6
the Wednesday before his death, when he gave her some money. At

that time, she saw that Welch had a large amount of cash in his

backpack. A backpack full of cash was found at the crime scene. Af-

ter the shooting, the Reed family gave law enforcement Weems’s

name. Detective Courtney Murphy testified that Weems also fit

Johnson’s description of the man she saw outside the house with a

handgun. Lakesha, Carrie, and law enforcement tried calling

Weems in the hours after the shooting. Lakesha spoke to Weems

briefly on the phone, and he denied knowing anything about the

shooting and refused to return to her home. Several days after the

shooting, law enforcement found Weems and his car at an aban-

doned apartment building in Jonesboro and arrested him.

      2. Weems contends the evidence was not sufficient to support

his two convictions for malice murder or his firearms convictions ei-

ther as a matter of constitutional due process or under OCGA § 24-

14-6.2


      2 To the extent Weems challenges the sufficiency of the evidence support-

ing the counts for which he was found guilty but not convicted, those challenges

                                       7
     (a) When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter

of due process, we view the evidence presented in the light most fa-

vorable to the verdicts to determine whether a rational trier of fact

could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Jackson v. Virginia, 

 (III) (B) (

, 61

LE2d 560) (1979). In doing so, we do not “weigh the evidence on ap-

peal or resolve conflicts in trial testimony,” Byers v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2021) (citation and punctuation omit-

ted), but instead defer “to the jury’s assessment of the weight and

credibility of the evidence,” Jones v. State, 

 (

) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     The evidence here was sufficient as a matter of constitutional

due process to authorize the jury’s guilty verdicts for the two malice

murders, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession

of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Viewed in the light

most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the evidence showed that



are moot because they either merged or were vacated by operation of law. See,
e.g., Beamon v. State, 

 (2) n.2 (

) (2022).
                                     8
Weems knew Welch, Lakesha saw Welch in the house with a flash-

light, Jordan saw someone with a flashlight go into Weems’s room,

multiple gunshots were heard from his room, Dowdy’s body was

found shot to death in the same room, and only Weems emerged

from the room unharmed. Weems also left the scene immediately

after the shooting and while Welch was still alive but bleeding from

his gunshot wounds. As discussed further below, the jury was au-

thorized to reject Weems’s defense that someone else was the

shooter. Together, this evidence was constitutionally sufficient to

authorize the jury to find Weems guilty of the two murders and the

firearms offenses for which he was convicted.3 See Scoggins v. State,

__ Ga. __ (__ SE2d __) (2023).

      (b) When a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, the



      3 A certified copy of Weems’s prior conviction for robbery was introduced

at trial. This, in combination with the evidence that Johnson saw Weems with
a handgun and other evidence supporting he shot Dowdy and Welch, was suf-
ficient to support his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
See OCGA § 16-11-131 (a)-(b); Walker v. State, 

 (10) (c) (certi-
fied copies of prior felony conviction combined with evidence supporting con-
victions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during commission of a
crime were sufficient to support conviction for possession of a firearm by a con-
victed felon).
                                        9
State must present sufficient evidence to “exclude every other rea-

sonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” OCGA §

24-14-6. Weems contends the evidence that supported his conviction

was entirely circumstantial and the State failed to exclude the hy-

pothesis that an alternative suspect, William Jones, killed Welch

and Dowdy.

     During the investigation of the shooting, an individual named

Christina Eaves gave Jones’s name to the police as a possible sus-

pect, but Detective Murphy did not interview Jones. Weems called

Jones to testify at trial. At trial, Jones denied knowing anything

about the shooting at Bromack Drive or any of the individuals in-

volved and said he was with his sister in Auburn, Alabama on the

day of the shooting. He did not know that Eaves had given his name

to the police as a potential suspect in the shooting and said Eaves

was his ex-girlfriend and had been upset about their breakup

around the time of the shooting in June 2018.

     The evidence was also sufficient under OCGA § 24-14-6. The

jury was authorized to reject as unreasonable Weems’s hypothesis

                                10
that Jones was the shooter based on the evidence discussed above as

well as Jones’s testimony, which the jury was free to credit, that he

was in Alabama at the time of the shooting and that his ex-girlfriend

had given his name to police soon after their breakup. 4 See McNabb

v. State, 

 (1) (b) (

) (2022) (the ev-

idence, though circumstantial, authorized the conviction for malice

murder where testimony established that “other leads and rumors

had proven fruitless” and the person defendant hypothesized had

committed the crime could not have done so because he was in jail

when the crimes were committed).

      3. Weems claims that the trial court erred by denying his mo-

tion for new trial on the “general grounds.” See OCGA §§ 5-5-20 (“In

any case when the verdict of a jury is found contrary to evidence and

the principles of justice and equity, the judge presiding may grant a


      4 Detective Murphy also investigated another suspect, Zaykeya Clark,

whose name the detective received in connection with a tip about graffiti at a
local library. But Murphy determined that Clark was not in the area at the
time of the shooting and excluded him as a suspect. To the extent Weems ar-
gues on appeal that the State did not exclude his hypothesis that Clark could
have been the shooter, Detective Murphy’s testimony that Clark was not pre-
sent at or near Bromack Drive at the time of the shooting was sufficient for the
jury to reject this hypothesis.
                                      11
new trial before another jury.”); 5-5-21 (“The presiding judge may

exercise a sound discretion in granting or refusing new trials in

cases where the verdict may be decidedly and strongly against the

weight of the evidence even though there may appear to be some

slight evidence in favor of the finding.”). These “general grounds”

statutes require the trial judge to sit as the “thirteenth juror” and

consider conflicts in the evidence, witness credibility, and the weight

of the evidence. King v. State, 

 (2) (

)

(2023). We review whether the trial court exercised its discretion as

the thirteenth juror, but the decision to grant a new trial on the gen-

eral grounds is vested solely in the trial court and not subject to our

review. See 

     In its order denying Weems’s motion for new trial, the trial

court ruled that “Defendant’s case is not an exceptional one where

the evidence preponderates heavily against the jury’s verdicts. On

the contrary, the evidence heavily supported the verdicts. Accord-

ingly, the Court declines to exercise its discretion as the ‘13th juror’

to grant Defendant’s request for a new trial under sections 5-5-20

                                  12
and 5-5-21.” This order makes clear that the court applied the cor-

rect standard to this claim, so it did not abuse its discretion in that

respect. See King, 

 (2) (concluding that the defendant’s

claim under the general grounds failed because the trial court “found

that ‘the weight of the evidence does not preponderate heavily

against the verdict and the verdict was not contrary to the evidence

or the principles of justice and equity’”). Weems’s argument is oth-

erwise not subject to review by this Court. See id.

        4. Weems claims that the trial court erred by denying his re-

quest to present the testimony of Christina Eaves by videoconfer-

ence.

        At trial, Weems asked for Eaves to testify by videoconference

under Uniform Superior Court Rule 9.2 (C) (2019). Defense counsel

proffered that Eaves, who had left the State after being subpoenaed

in Georgia, would testify that William Jones, who was also under

subpoena, had confessed to her that he shot Welch and Dowdy. The

version of Uniform Superior Court Rule 9.2 (C) in force at the time



                                  13
of Weems’s 2019 trial provided that witnesses “may testify” by vide-

oconference, but that in a criminal case, “a timely objection shall be

sustained.” Uniform Superior Court Rule 9.2 (C) (2019). The State

objected to Eaves testifying by videoconference because it had con-

cerns about Eaves’s credibility based on earlier conversations and

wanted to be able to confront her in person. So the trial court sus-

tained the State’s objection to the presentation of Eaves’s testimony

by videoconference. The trial court did not rule that Eaves’s testi-

mony was inadmissible, however: the court offered to assist defense

counsel with securing Eaves’s live testimony, including by entertain-

ing a motion for funds to pay her travel expenses or to enforce an

out-of-state subpoena. Weems did not take any of those steps and

did not call Eaves to testify at trial, but he did call Jones as a wit-

ness.

        Weems now argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

denying his request under Rule 9.2 (C) (2019), but the plain lan-

guage of that rule does not give a trial court discretion to overrule a



                                   14
timely objection to a request to have a witness testify by videocon-

ference. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 9.2 (C) (2019) (“In any

pending matter, a witness may testify via video conference. . . . In

any criminal matter, a timely objection shall be sustained.”). Weems

offers no contrary reading of the rule. Instead, Weems cites the

COVID-19 pandemic as support for granting his request. But his

trial predated the implementation of COVID-19-related precautions

in Georgia courts. See Order Declaring Statewide Judicial Emer-

gency (Ga. Mar. 14, 2020). And in any event, at no point during the

period the COVID-19-related emergency orders were in effect were

the rules amended to allow additional remote testimony over objec-

tion in criminal trials. See id. Instead, the version of Rule 9.2 (C)

that was operative during Weems’s trial remained in effect until

that Rule was amended effective March 1, 2023. 5

     Weems also contends that not having Eaves’s testimony likely

affected the verdict and deprived him of a meaningful opportunity


     5 As amended, Rule 9.2 still requires trial courts to sustain an objection

to a witness testifying by video in a criminal trial. Uniform Superior Court
Rule 9.2 (D) (2) (2023).
                                     15
to present a complete defense in violation of his due process rights

under the federal and state constitutions. But this constitutional

claim was neither raised nor ruled on below, so it is not properly

before us. See Mahdi v. State, 

 (1) (

)

(2021).

         5. Weems contends that the trial court erred by improperly

commenting on the evidence in violation of his state and federal due

process rights, as well as Georgia law, citing OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1)

(“It is error for any judge, during any phase of any criminal case, to

express or intimate to the jury the judge’s opinion as to whether a

fact at issue has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the ac-

cused.”).6 Weems did not raise any of these claims below. As a result,

his constitutional due process claim is not properly before us, see

Mahdi, 

 (1), and we review his statutory claim for

plain error. See OCGA § 17-8-57 (b) (“[F]ailure to make a timely ob-




         6 Weems also cites OCGA § 9-10-7, but that statute applies only in civil

cases.
                                        16
jection to an alleged violation of [OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1)] shall pre-

clude appellate review, unless such violation constitutes plain error

which affects substantive rights of the parties.”). To show plain er-

ror, he must show that the alleged error (1) was not affirmatively

waived, (2) was obvious beyond reasonable dispute, and (3) affected

his substantial rights, “which ordinarily means showing that it af-

fected the outcome of the trial.” Moore v. State, 

(4) (

) (2022) (citation omitted). If the defendant makes

this showing, then this Court may exercise its “discretion to remedy

the error only if the error ‘seriously affected the fairness, integrity,

or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” 

 (4) (quoting

Hawkins v. State, 

 (3) (

) (2018)) (alter-

ation accepted).

     At trial, Jordan testified that he “heard a lady screaming after

6:30.” The prosecutor then asked, “And what do you mean by that?”

Defense counsel objected to the question. In addressing the objec-

tion, the trial court said, “Why don’t you ask a more narrow question.

There didn’t seem to be ambiguity in the answer. He said he heard

                                  17
a lady scream after 6:30.” Weems argues that the trial court’s final

statement restating the witness’s testimony was an improper com-

ment on the evidence.

     The trial court’s statement did not obviously violate OCGA §

17-8-57 (a) (1) because the trial court did not appear to express or

intimate an opinion about the evidence or whether a fact at issue

was proven. Instead, the court simply repeated the witness’s testi-

mony nearly verbatim in the course of sustaining Weems’s objection

to the follow-up question, stated that the testimony was not ambig-

uous, and directed the State to rephrase its question. See, e.g., Ses-

sions v. State, 

, 348 (3) (

) (2018) (“We have

previously explained that the remarks of a judge explaining a reason

for his ruling are neither an expression of opinion nor a comment on

the evidence.”) (punctuation and citation omitted). Absent obvious

error, this claim fails.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.




                                 18