NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
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official text of the opinion.


In the Supreme Court of Georgia



                                                   Decided: January 28, 2025


                   S25A0042. GARCIA-SOLIS v. THE STATE.

        LAGRUA, Justice.

        Appellant Hector Garcia-Solis appeals his convictions for

malice murder and other crimes connected to the shooting death of

Hall County Deputy Sheriff Blane Dixon on July 7, 2019. 1 On


                                  —————————————————————
        1 On August 19, 2019, a Hall County grand jury indicted Garcia-Solis,

Brayan Cruz, Eric Velazquez, and London Clements—individually and as
parties concerned in the commission of a crime—for the following counts:
malice murder (Count 1—Garcia-Solis, Cruz, Velazquez, and Clements); felony
murder predicated on aggravated assault on a peace officer (Count 2—Garcia-
Solis, Cruz, Velazquez, and Clements); felony murder predicated on conspiracy
to commit robbery and burglary (Count 3—Garcia-Solis, Cruz, Velazquez, and
Clements); aggravated assault on a peace officer (Count 4—Garcia-Solis, Cruz,
Velazquez, and Clements); conspiracy to commit robbery and burglary (Count
5—Garcia-Solis, Cruz, Velazquez, and Clements); burglary in the second
degree (Counts 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 14—Garcia-Solis and Velazquez); entering
an automobile (Count 12—Garcia-Solis and Velazquez); criminal attempt to
commit burglary, second degree (Count 13—Garcia-Solis and Velazquez); and
theft by receiving stolen property (Count 15—Garcia-Solis).
       Cruz entered a guilty plea to Counts 4 and 5 and testified for the State
at trial. Garcia-Solis, Velazquez, and Clements were jointly tried from June 21
to July 8, 2021. The jury found Garcia-Solis guilty on all counts. The trial court
sentenced Garcia-Solis to life in prison without the possibility of parole on the
malice murder count (Count 1), plus a total of 35 consecutive years to serve for
Counts 5 and 7-15. The trial court merged the aggravated assault count (Count
appeal, Garcia-Solis contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient

to support his conviction for malice murder; (2) the trial court erred

by denying his motion for change of venue; and (3) the trial court

erred in sentencing him to life without parole because, among other

claims, he was 17 years old at the time the underlying crimes were

committed.      For the reasons that follow, we affirm Garcia-Solis’s

convictions and sentences in this case.

    (a)    The July 6 burglaries and initial investigation

      The evidence presented at trial showed that, on the morning of

July 2, 2019, two residents of Hall County discovered that their

vehicles—a 2009 red Dodge Caliber and a 2002 silver Toyota

Avalon—had been stolen overnight, and they reported the thefts to



                        —————————————————————
4) and purported to merge the felony murder counts (Counts 2 and 3) into the
malice murder conviction (Count 1), but the felony murder verdicts were
actually “vacated by operation of law.” Graves v. State, 

 (4)
(

) (2016). “This error in nomenclature was harmless, however,
because” Garcia-Solis “was not convicted of or sentenced for the felony murder
counts.” Worthen v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2019).
       Garcia-Solis filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended
through new counsel. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the motion for
new trial, the trial court denied the motion on November 4, 2022. Garcia-Solis
filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court, and the case was docketed to the
term beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
                                      2
law enforcement. A few days later, during the early morning hours

of July 6, several break-ins occurred at automobile dealerships and

pawnshops in the Hall County area. Because most of the pawnshops

were equipped with security systems to monitor after-hours activity,

the burglaries and attempted burglaries at the pawnshops—

namely, Swap and Trade Pawn, Foxhole Guns and Archery, and

Double Deuce Pawn and Gun—were the first incidents to be

reported to law enforcement. Based on surveillance videos from the

pawnshops, law enforcement officers were able to establish that,

between 3:15 a.m. and 5:20 a.m. on July 6, two suspects—each

carrying firearms and wearing dark clothing, a mask, and gloves—

broke into or attempted to break into the pawnshops. 2                  The

surveillance videos also established that the suspects gained entry

to at least one of the pawnshops by attaching a strap to the front

doors of the shop, connecting it to the rear tailgate of a pickup truck,



                       —————————————————————
     2 The owner of Foxhole Guns and Archery testified that, because he had

installed steel roll down doors and bars on the exterior of the building, the
suspects attempting to break into the pawnshop were unable to gain access
inside.
                                     3
and pulling the truck forward to force open the doors. Two crossbows

were stolen from Swap and Trade Pawn and 23 firearms—including

handguns, rifles, and revolvers—and ammunition were stolen from

Double Deuce Pawn and Gun. 3

      While investigating the pawnshop burglaries on the morning

of July 6, law enforcement officers learned that several automobile

dealerships had also been broken into overnight, including Los

Plebes Auto Sales, Texano Auto Sales, Texas Trucks and Autos, and

Eddie’s Auto Sales. 4 Francisco Cuella, the owner of Los Plebes Auto

Sales, testified that, when he arrived at the dealership around 9:00

a.m. on July 6, he realized that five pickup trucks had been stolen

from his lot, including a 2015 Dodge Ram 2500, which law

enforcement officers later established was the pickup truck used in

the burglary at Swap and Trade Pawn. Cuella testified that one of

the other stolen pickup trucks was discovered later that morning in


                        —————————————————————
      3 The owner of Swap and Trade Pawn testified that he also sold guns at

his pawnshop, but “they [we]re all locked in safes” and thus were inaccessible.
      4 The owners of Texas Trucks and Autos and Eddie’s Auto Sales testified

that, although their businesses were burglarized and some of their property
was damaged, nothing was stolen from their dealerships.
                                      4
a nearby neighborhood. 5 According to Cuella and law enforcement

officers investigating the thefts, a doorbell camera installed on the

exterior of one of the houses in this neighborhood captured video of

the stolen pickup truck driving into the neighborhood, followed by a

red Dodge Caliber. The video recordings also showed two men “jump

out of the truck to get in a red Caliber.” Based on surveillance video

from Los Plebes, law enforcement officers were able to establish that

the dealership was broken into around 1:23 a.m. on July 6, that the

suspects were wearing dark clothing, face masks, and gloves, and

that at least one of the suspects was armed with a handgun.

     Celia Hernandez, the office manager for Texano Auto Sales,

testified that Texano was also burglarized during the early morning

hours of July 6. Based on surveillance video from Texano, law

enforcement officers determined that two suspects—armed with

handguns and wearing dark clothing, masks, and gloves—broke into

the dealership’s office, at which point, one of the suspects started


                      —————————————————————
     5 The remaining pickup trucks were located by law enforcement officers

throughout the day.
                                    5
going through files inside the office. When Hernandez examined the

office after the burglary, she noticed that a file had been dropped on

the floor that related to “an incident with [Garcia-Solis] in their

business.” Hernandez testified that, in 2018, Garcia-Solis broke into

a pickup truck located at the dealership—an incident for which

Garcia-Solis was later charged—and Hernandez kept a file on the

incident. Hernandez advised law enforcement officers investigating

the July 6 burglary that Garcia-Solis might be involved because she

discovered this file on the floor and because she noted in the video

recording “the interest [the man] took in reading [the file].”

According to Hernandez, no cars were stolen from the dealership

during the July 6 burglary because the exit was blocked with other

cars.

        Holly Lester, a DeKalb County crime scene investigator who

resided in Hall County at the time, testified that, between the late-

night hours of July 5 and early morning hours of July 6, “crime scene

investigative tools” and “various police equipment”—including a

radio, gun belt, flashlight, bulletproof vest, and baton—were stolen

                                  6
from her county-owned van, which was parked in front of her

residence. At trial, Lester reviewed images taken from the

surveillance video at Double Deuce Pawn and Gun capturing the

burglary on July 6, and she confirmed that a bulletproof vest worn

by one of the suspects in the video and the baton he was carrying

appeared to be “consistent with” the vest and baton “missing out of

[her] van.”

     After compiling and reviewing the surveillance videos from the

impacted dealerships and pawnshops, law enforcement officers were

able to establish that the same suspects likely committed all the

burglaries, as they were wearing “the same masks and clothing in

all of the thefts.”

     Antony Macias—a friend of the co-defendants—testified at

trial that, on the morning of July 6, he was watching the news when

he heard that several automobile dealerships and pawnshops had

been burglarized the night before.          A few hours later, Macias’s

friend “Adrian”6 contacted him to ask if Garcia-Solis and Velazquez

                       —————————————————————
     6 Macias testified that he did not know Adrian’s last name.

                                     7
could come shoot guns at Macias’s uncle’s ranch in Hall County,

where Macias was staying.       Not long afterwards, Garcia-Solis,

Velazquez, and Adrian “pulled up” to the ranch in a “red Dodge car.”

When Garcia-Solis and Velazquez arrived at the ranch, they told

Macias that “they had some stolen guns” and asked to shoot them at

the ranch. Macias testified that Garcia-Solis and Velazquez opened

the trunk of the Dodge, and there were “two handguns and a

shotgun” inside. One of the handguns was a gray .45-caliber that

“had a little like skull” or “helmet” on it, and the other was a 9-

millimeter handgun. Macias testified that Garcia-Solis, Velazquez,

and Adrian stayed at the ranch shooting until about 1:30 or 2:00

p.m., and during that time, Garcia-Solis was shooting the .45-caliber

handgun with the “helmet” on it.

     Cruz testified that, on the night of July 6, he and his friend

Jiovanny Castillo went to Adrian’s house, and they saw Garcia-Solis

and Velazquez, who each had a gun. Cruz observed that Garcia-

Solis was also wearing a bulletproof vest. Garcia-Solis and

Velazquez told Cruz and Castillo that “they robbed a pawnshop” and

                                   8
“they got a truck and tied it on the door and started getting guns.”

Cruz and Castillo testified that, around 10:00 p.m., Garcia-Solis

gave Cruz, Castillo, and Velazquez a ride in a “four-door,” red Dodge,

which Garcia-Solis told them was stolen, and Garcia-Solis drove the

group to a thrift store and parked behind it. Garcia-Solis gave Cruz

the key to the Dodge, and they walked home.

     (b) The July 7 police chase, shootings, and subsequent
investigation

     On the afternoon of July 7, Investigator Jeremy Grindle with

the Hall County Sheriff’s Department discovered the stolen red

Dodge Caliber and silver Toyota Avalon parked behind the thrift

store. Investigator Grindle testified that, because they “believed

that the red Dodge Caliber was involved in” the burglaries,

Investigator Grindle and other law enforcement officers went

through the process of affixing tracking devices “to the bottom of the

frame of the car[s]” to “emit[] a GPS signal” that law enforcement

officers could monitor in the event the vehicles started moving.

     According to Cruz, around 6:00 p.m. on July 7, he and Clements


                                  9
went to Castillo’s house, and Clements started communicating

“through Snap-Chat” with Velazquez about “hit[ting] a lick at the

pawn store” to “steal the guns and sell them.” Castillo testified that

he understood the group was planning “to go and hit [] pawnshops”

that night in a “[s]tolo”—another term for a “stolen vehicle”—but he

did not join them. Cruz and Clements secured a ride to Velazquez’s

house with a friend, and when they arrived, Garcia-Solis was

already there and discussed “hitting a lick” and how they needed to

wear masks and gloves to ensure they did not leave their

“fingerprints or DNA on the stolen vehicle” or anywhere else.

     Around 10:00 p.m., Garcia-Solis, Cruz, Velazquez, and

Clements arrived at the thrift store where the stolen cars were

parked. The group “gear[ed] up” by “putting on gloves, masks, [and]

getting ready,” and Cruz testified that Garcia-Solis and Velazquez

also had handguns with them. According to Cruz, the group “hopped

in [the] gray Toyota,” and Velazquez started driving. Cruz testified

that, as soon as they turned out of the thrift store and started

driving up the street, a law enforcement officer pulled up behind

                                 10
them and “start[ed] flashing his lights.” Cruz testified that Garcia-

Solis and Clements told Velazquez to keep driving, and Velazquez

started “hitting . . . mailboxes” and eventually ran into a telephone

pole. According to Cruz, after the crash, “[they] all ran,” and Garcia-

Solis and Velazquez were armed at the time. Surveillance video from

a nearby laundromat confirmed that the defendants fled the crash

site together.

     Cruz testified that Deputy Dixon was running after them, and

at that point, Cruz ran and hid under a shed behind one of the

houses. While Cruz was under the shed, he “heard the officer give

[Garcia-Solis] instructions like put your hands up, put your hands

up.” Cruz testified that “[i]t got quiet for a few seconds,” and then,

he heard gunshots.

     One of the law enforcement officers involved in the chase,

Sergeant Charles Hewell, testified that he and Deputy Dixon were

keeping a watch on the stolen vehicles that night, and as soon as the

Toyota Avalon started to move away from the thrift store, he advised

Deputy Dixon to follow it. Minutes later, Deputy Dixon alerted

                                  11
Sergeant Hewell that he was behind the Toyota Avalon. According

to Sergeant Hewell, the Toyota ultimately crashed into a telephone

pole, and when he reached the crash site, Sergeant Hewell saw

Deputy Dixon and the suspects running from the site of the crash.

Sergeant Hewell then “exited [his] vehicle and gave chase behind

them.”

     Sergeant Howell started following the suspects into the

adjacent neighborhood, and as he was running through the area, he

heard Deputy Dixon yell, “Hey, Sarge, I have one.” Sergeant Hewell

testified that he ran towards Deputy Dixon’s voice and overheard

Deputy Dixon give the suspect commands. As Sergeant Hewell got

closer, he heard “shots fired from the suspect.” Sergeant Hewell then

heard Deputy Dixon say, “I’m hit.”

     The video recordings from Deputy Dixon’s body camera, which

were admitted into evidence through the testimony of GBI Special

Agent Jamie Abercrombie at trial, showed that Garcia-Solis was

standing at the corner of a house when Deputy Dixon made physical

contact with him and that Garcia-Solis had something in his hand.

                                 12
Agent Abercrombie testified that the video recording also reflected

that Deputy Dixon gave Garcia-Solis commands to show his hands,

but Garcia-Solis did not follow the commands and walked behind

the house. According to Agent Abercrombie, the video recording then

showed a “muzzle flash from [Garcia-Solis’s] gun as he t[ook] the

first shot at Deputy Dixon.” The first shot was “followed by four

more” shots. Deputy Dixon then moved up to the porch of the house,

and “two additional shots [we]re fired before Deputy Dixon beg[an]

to return fire himself.”7

      According to Sergeant Hewell, when he got to the house where

Deputy Dixon had been shot, “the suspect was not there,” so

Sergeant Hewell “began to run as fast as [he] could” to try and locate

the suspect. As Sergeant Hewell was running, he came “face to face”

with Garcia-Solis, who ran “away from [him] across the street.”

Sergeant Hewell gave Garcia-Solis commands to “show [his] hands

[and] stop moving,” but Garcia-Solis did not comply. Sergeant


                        —————————————————————
      7 One of the shots fired from Garcia-Solis’s weapon struck Deputy Dixon

below his bulletproof vest.
                                     13
Hewell started shooting at Garcia-Solis and eventually “saw him

fall.” Sergeant Hewell then called for a medical unit, and Garcia-

Solis was transported to the hospital. Garcia-Solis received a

gunshot wound to the head near his left eye and survived. Deputy

Dixon was shot once in the abdomen below his bulletproof vest. He

was also transported to the hospital by law enforcement officers,

where—as the medical examiner confirmed at trial—he died from

the gunshot wound to his abdomen.

     In the early morning hours of July 8, GBI agents arrived at the

crime scene and discovered shell casings on the porch of a house

from Deputy Dixon’s service revolver, as well as 9-millimeter shell

casings, a .45-caliber shell casing, a 1911 Sig Sauer .45-caliber

handgun, a key to a Dodge Caliber, and shell casings from Sergeant

Hewell’s service revolver. The GBI firearms examiner testified that

the .45-caliber Sig Sauer recovered at the scene had a helmet on the

handle, and when she examined the fatal bullet removed from

Deputy Dixon’s body during his autopsy, she established that the

bullet was fired from this weapon. Law enforcement officers also

                                14
confirmed that the .45-caliber Sig Sauer was stolen from Double

Deuce Pawn on July 6.

     At trial, one of Garcia-Solis’s trauma nurses testified that,

while Garcia-Solis was in the hospital being treated for his gunshot

wound, he talked to her about the events leading up to the death of

Deputy Dixon on July 7. Garcia-Solis explained that his group was

planning on “hitting a lick” that night, but after the car chase began,

the group’s plan had been to leave one guy to shoot, while all the

others ran. He then told her that he was the one who stayed and

shot Deputy Dixon.

     Garcia-Solis also testified at trial and admitted to the

following: (1) he was one of the individuals who appeared in the

surveillance videos presented at trial of the automobile dealership

and pawnshop burglaries committed on July 6; (2) he was

responsible for stealing weapons and other items during the

burglaries; (3) he was armed during the burglaries; (4) Velazquez

was with him during the burglaries; (5) Clements, Cruz, and

Velazquez were with him on the night of July 7, and they planned

                                  15
to “hit a lick;” (6) he shot and killed Deputy Dixon; and (7) he

committed a prior burglary at Texano Auto Sales in 2018.

     1. Garcia-Solis contends that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his conviction for malice murder because no evidence was

presented at trial to show any express or implied malice on his part

in causing the death of Deputy Dixon. We disagree.

     When assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
     evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, the
     evidence presented at trial is viewed in the light most
     favorable to the verdicts to determine whether any
     rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty
     beyond a reasonable doubt of all the crimes of which he
     was convicted. In making this determination, we do not
     evaluate witness credibility, resolve inconsistencies in the
     evidence, or assess the weight of the evidence; these tasks
     are left to the sole discretion of the jury. The jury’s
     verdicts will be upheld as long as some competent
     evidence, even if contradicted, supports each fact
     necessary to make out the State’s case.

Ridley v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2023) (citing

Jones v. State, 

 (2) (

 (2018)). See also

Jackson v. Virginia, 

 (III) (B) (

, 61

LE2d 560) (1979). Applying that standard here and viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was

                                 16
sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support

Garcia-Solis’s conviction for malice murder.

     “A person commits the offense of murder when he unlawfully

and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the

death of another human being.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (a). “Express malice

is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of another

human being which is manifested by external circumstances capable

of proof. Malice shall be implied where no considerable provocation

appears and where all the circumstances of the killing show an

abandoned and malignant heart.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (b).

     For a malice murder conviction, the requisite criminal
     intent is that of malice, which incorporates the intent to
     kill. The malice necessary to establish malice murder may
     be formed in an instant, as long as it is present at the time
     of the killing. Whether a killing was intentional and
     malicious is for the jury to determine.

Scoggins v. State, 

 (1) (a) (

) (2023)

(citing Benton v. State, 

 (1) (a) (

)

(2019); emphasis supplied).

     In this case, the evidence established that, after committing a


                                  17
series of burglaries in which ammunition and a large number of

firearms were stolen, Garcia-Solis armed himself and traveled in a

stolen vehicle with his co-defendants to continue “hit[ting] licks.”

When law enforcement officers intercepted and attempted to stop

the stolen vehicle—resulting in a car crash—Garcia-Solis and his co-

defendants fled into an adjacent neighborhood, where Garcia-Solis

encountered Deputy Dixon. Garcia-Solis ignored Deputy Dixon’s

explicit commands to show his hands and took “the first shot at

Deputy Dixon,” followed by six more shots, before Deputy Dixon was

even able “to return fire.”

     Additionally, at trial, one of Garcia-Solis’s treating nurses

testified that, while Garcia-Solis was in the hospital, he divulged his

group’s plan to drive around in a stolen vehicle on the night of July

7 to “hit[] a lick,” and he confided that, after the car chase began,

they planned to leave one guy to shoot, while the others ran away.

Garcia-Solis told the nurse that he was the one who stayed behind

and shot Deputy Dixon. Garcia-Solis also admitted at trial that he

committed the crimes leading up to the car chase and crash, and he

                                  18
shot and killed Deputy Dixon.

     In short, Garcia-Solis’s admission that he intentionally shot

Deputy Dixon to help his co-defendants get away and the video

recordings from Deputy Dixon’s body camera showing that Garcia-

Solis shot Deputy Dixon multiple times before Deputy Dixon

returned fire reflect that, even if Garcia-Solis did not “intend” to kill

the deputy, the act of shooting at him shows an “abandoned and

malignant heart,” OCGA § 16-5-1 (b), and is more than enough to

support Garcia-Solis’s conviction for malice murder. Scoggins, 

 (1) (a).

     2.    Garcia-Solis next contends that the trial court erred in

denying his motion to transfer venue under OCGA § 17-7-1508


                       —————————————————————
     8 This statute provides that

     [t]he defendant, in any criminal case in which a trial by jury is
     provided, may move in writing for a change of venue, whenever, in
     the defendant’s or defense counsel’s judgment, an impartial jury
     cannot be obtained in the county where the crime is alleged to have
     been committed. Upon the hearing of the motion it shall not be
     necessary to examine all persons in the county liable to serve on
     juries, but the judge shall hear evidence by affidavit or oral
     testimony in support of or against the motion. If, from the evidence
     submitted, the judge is satisfied that an impartial jury cannot be
     obtained to try the case, the judge shall grant a change in venue.
     The judge shall transfer the case to any county that may be agreed
                                     19
because, in Garcia-Solis’s view, there was a high likelihood of

prejudice, and he could not receive a fair trial in Hall County due to

pretrial publicity. We see no merit to this claim.

      “To succeed on a motion for change of venue, ‘a defendant must

show either that the setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial

or that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice to a degree

that rendered a fair trial impossible.’” Moss v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2019) (quoting Heidt v. State, 

 (4) (

) (2013)).                To demonstrate “inherent

prejudice,” the “record must establish that the publicity contained

information that was unduly extensive, factually incorrect,

inflammatory or reflective of an atmosphere of hostility.” Heidt, 

 (4) (citation and punctuation omitted). As to actual

prejudice, the question for the Court “is not the number of jurors

                        —————————————————————
    upon by the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or the defense
    counsel, to be tried in the county agreed upon. The judge has the
    discretion to reject any county agreed upon; if a county is not thus
    agreed upon, or if the judge, in the exercise of discretion, rejects a
    county agreed upon, the judge shall select such county as in the
    judge’s judgment will afford a fair and impartial jury to try the
    case and have it transferred accordingly.
OCGA § 17-7-150 (a) (1) (A).
                                      20
who had heard about the case or had knowledge of those involved in

the case,” but “whether those jurors who had heard about the case

could lay aside their opinions and render a verdict based on the

evidence.” Moss, 305 Ga.at 881 (2) (citation and punctuation

omitted). And “[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion for change

of venue will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” Id.

        Garcia-Solis contends that, here, venue should have been

moved both because the setting was inherently prejudicial and

because the jury selection led to actual prejudice. Both contentions

fail.

        With respect to inherent prejudice, Garcia-Solis argues that

Macias and Hernandez, two of the State’s witnesses at trial, testified

that they saw news coverage regarding Deputy Dixon’s death the

day after the shooting occurred. But, because Macias and Hernandez

were witnesses in this case, changing venue would not have made

any difference. And Garcia-Solis has not shown or even argued that

any of this purported news coverage “contained information that

was unduly extensive, factually incorrect, inflammatory or reflective

                                  21
of an atmosphere of hostility.” Heidt, 

 (4). As such,

Garcia-Solis has made no showing of “inherent prejudice,” and the

record does not otherwise support such a claim. 

     With respect to the jury selection, Garcia-Solis argues that,

during voir dire, one of the jurors stated that the way the news

media portrayed the defendants “caused him to have a somewhat

negative opinion of the case,” and Garcia-Solis asserts that another

juror, in responding to the juror questionnaire, indicated that his

friends, co-workers, and family members had expressed negative

opinions about the defendants in this case. But Garcia-Solis has not

shown that those issues created actual prejudice to the degree that

made a fair trial impossible.

     A “trial court is not required to strike for cause a potential juror

who simply questions his or her impartiality or expresses

reservations about his or her ability to set aside personal

experiences.” Anderson v. State, 

 (2) (

)

(2003) (citation omitted). And “it is well settled that a trial court is

permitted to objectively question prospective jurors in a manner

                                   22
calculated to determine if they are unalterably prejudiced against

the defendant.” Heidt, 

 (5). Here, when questioned

further by the trial court, the two jurors at issue explained that they

did not have an opinion about the defendants, were willing to listen

to the evidence, recognized that the media’s portrayal of criminal

defendants was not always fair, and affirmed that such media

coverage would not impact their ability to be fair and impartial in

this case. “Thus, striking [these jurors] for cause was not

demanded.” Anderson, 

 (2). And, despite Garcia-

Solis’s argument about these jurors, neither one was ultimately

selected to serve on the jury.

     More generally, during voir dire, the trial court asked

prospective jurors the proper, statutory questions in determining

whether they could be fair and impartial in this case. As a result of

that process, only one juror was excused for cause because of his

feelings about the case. See Heidt, 

 (4) (concluding

that “an excusal percentage of approximately ten percent is well

below the rate that would indicate actual prejudice rendering a fair

                                  23
trial impossible”). And, in denying Garcia-Solis’s motion to transfer

venue, the trial court, in assessing whether actual prejudice existed,

observed that the jury questionnaires revealed most of the jurors

“knew little to nothing about the case” and that, during the more

than two years since the crimes had been committed, there had been

a “global pandemic” and “presidential election,” among other

significant events. Accordingly, Garcia-Solis has made no showing

“that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice to a degree

that rendered a fair trial impossible.” 

 (4).

         We thus conclude that these circumstances are “not indicative

of such prejudice that the trial court’s denial of a change in venue

was an abuse of discretion,” Moss, 

 (2), and this claim

fails.

         3. Finally, Garcia-Solis contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by sentencing him to life without the possibility of parole

because (1) he was 17 years old at the time of the offenses in this

case; (2) “[t]he State failed to show that [he] is irreparably corrupt”;

(3) he admitted to the jury that he shot and killed Deputy Dixon and

                                     24
committed the other crimes in this case, which revealed “his capacity

for remorse and rehabilitation”; (4) he conceded at trial that, given

his age, “he did not think through the danger of his actions”; and (5)

this “shift in his understanding over just two years, between age 17

and age 19, demonstrate[d] [his] ability to be rehabilitated.” In

support of these claims, Garcia-Solis relies on Veal v. State, 

 (

) (2016), in which this Court held that a

sentencing court must do more than simply consider generally a

juvenile offender’s “youth and attendant characteristics”; it also had

to make a “distinct determination on the record” that the juvenile

offender is “irreparably corrupt or permanently incorrigible.” 

 (5) (d). We see no merit to these contentions.

     As an initial matter, after the United States Supreme Court

issued its decision in Jones v. Mississippi, 

 (

,

209 LE2d 390) (2021), this Court overruled Veal. See Holmes v.

State, 

 (

) (2021). In Holmes, we concluded

that, given the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, Veal was wrongly

decided, and “to the extent Veal suggested a requirement that

                                  25
sentencers provide explicit, on-the-record explanations regarding

determinations of permanent incorrigibility and the characteristics

of children, . . . we were mistaken.” 

 (3) (citing Jones,

supra). We expounded upon this further in Sillah v. State, 

 (

) (2023), explaining that a sentencing court is not

required to make “an explicit factual finding of permanent

incorrigibility” and/or “irreparabl[e] corrupt[ion]” before “imposing a

discretionary [life without parole sentence],” or to explain “its

reasoning for imposing” such a sentence. 

 (4).

     In Sillah, after determining that “youth [is] akin to a

mitigating circumstance,” we held that sentencing courts have “wide

discretion in determining the weight to give mitigating evidence

without having to make particular factual findings about those

mitigating circumstances.” Sillah, 315 Ga. at 752-753 (4) (citation

omitted). We further held that, “unless the record affirmatively

reflects otherwise, the trial court will be deemed to have considered

the relevant criteria, such as mitigating circumstances, enumerated

in the sentencing rules” in sentencing the defendant. Id. at 753 (4)

                                  26
(citation and punctuation omitted).

     Here, there is no evidence that the trial court “misapplied the

law,” “failed to understand its discretion[,] or failed to consider the

evidence presented to it” in imposing a sentence of life without

parole upon Garcia-Solis. Sillah, 315 Ga. at 751, 754 (4). To the

contrary, the record reflects that, during the sentencing hearing, the

trial court allowed Garcia-Solis to present mitigating evidence,

which the trial court explicitly considered in sentencing Garcia-

Solis, along with his age when he committed the crimes at issue.

The trial court also stated on the record that it had considered the

egregious nature of the crimes committed in this case, as well as

Garcia-Solis’s actions before, during, and after the commission of

those crimes, including “commit[ing] all these burglaries and []

kn[owing] it was hot”; “going in with a gun in his hand and a

bulletproof vest [] to those burglaries”; “gear[ing] back up and

roll[ing] with his boys to go do more burglaries”; “shoot[ing] and

kill[ing] a police officer”; and, at the hospital after the shooting,

“flipping off deputies, acting like he is shooting them with his finger

                                  27
[as a] gun, and groping nurses, kicking nurses, and spitting on

nurses.” The trial court further observed that, after Garcia-Solis

shot Deputy Dixon, he “didn’t change his behavior,” and “[i]f that is

not permanently incorrigible and irreparably corrupt, I don’t know

what is.”

     Accordingly, given that (1) the trial court was not required to

make the explicit findings it made regarding the “permanent

incorrigibility” and/or “irreparabl[e] corrupt[tion]” of Garcia-Solis

before “imposing a discretionary [life without parole sentence],”

Sillah, 315 Ga. at 752 (4); (2) the trial court was not required to

explain “its reasoning for imposing” such a sentence, id.; and (3) the

trial court has “wide discretion in determining the weight to give

mitigating evidence without having to make particular factual

findings about those mitigating circumstances,” id. at at 752-753 (4);

we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

sentencing Garcia-Solis to life without the possibility of parole in

this case, despite his age at the time he committed the crimes at

issue.

                                 28
     Based on the foregoing, we affirm Garcia-Solis’s convictions in

this case.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.




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