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In the Supreme Court of Georgia




                                                  Decided: June 10, 2025


                        S25A0406. JAMES v. THE STATE.


       LAGRUA, Justice.

       A jury found Sanchez James guilty of murder, aggravated

assault, and related charges for fatally shooting Roderick Billups

and seriously wounding Keisha Bussey. 1 At trial, James asserted a

claim of self-defense. James argues on appeal that the evidence was


       1The shootings occurred on June 17, 2017. On December 8, 2017, a
Fulton County grand jury indicted James for malice murder (Count 1); felony
murder (Count 2); one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
against Billups (Count 3); one count of aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon against Bussey (Count 4); and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (Count 5). The case was tried in October 2018, and a
jury convicted James on all counts. The trial court sentenced James to life in
prison on Count 1; twenty years to serve in prison on Count 4, to run
concurrently with Count 1; and five years to serve in prison on Count 5,
suspended, to serve consecutively to Counts 1 and 4. The remaining two counts
were merged or vacated by operation of law. James moved for a new trial on
November 2, 2018, amending the motion through new counsel on October 4,
2019. The trial court heard the motion on January 29, 2020, denying it on
October 1, 2024. James timely filed a notice of appeal on October 17, 2024. The
appeal was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2024 and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.
insufficient to convict him. James also argues that the trial court

erred by allowing a witness to improperly invoke her right against

self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, 2 purportedly in violation of James’s right to

confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, 3 thereby preventing James from establishing that

Billups was armed with a gun which another witness took from the

scene and refused to return. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

     The evidence presented at trial showed that James was

wheelchair-bound from a previous shooting. Bussey was James’s

former girlfriend who helped take care of James’s physical needs.

Bussey was in a relationship with Billups.

     Bussey testified that, on the night of June 17, 2017, she and

Billups walked to the corner market near her home to purchase




     2 The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part that “[n]o person . . .

shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]”
       3 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that,

“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him[.]”4 Miranda v. Arizona, 

 (

, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
                                      2
groceries. As they walked back home, Bussey heard “something

rattling” behind her. She turned around and saw James in his

wheelchair with a “purple and black gun” “in his lap in plain view.”

Bussey recognized the gun because she was with James when he

purchased it. Bussey asked James “what he was doing down there,”

whereupon James asked whether she and Billups were dating.

Bussey testified that she was “scared,” so she “told a lie,” saying that

Billups was “just walking [her] home.” She testified that James

“picked the gun up” and was “pointing it at [them],” “about to hurt

[them].” Bussey told Billups to “take the [grocery] bags to [her]

house and . . . leave.”

     Bussey said that as Billups “turned around and started to walk

off[,]” James told Billups, “[N]o, you better not move . . . . [W]hat

[are] you doing[?]”She said that James “just started shooting

[Billups].” Bussey saw Billups “fall,” and then James “turn[ed] to

[Bussey] and he point[ed] the gun at [her].” Bussey testified that

they were “[w]ithin feet” of her apartment, so she told James,

“[p]lease don’t shoot” because her kids were “right there in the

                                   3
house.” She testified that James responded, “b**ch, f**k you. Die,”

and then shot at Bussey three times, hitting her “right up under

[her] left breast.” She said that her body “went numb” and she “hit

the ground.” She heard “[s]ix or seven” shots in all. As James

“roll[ed]” away, Bussey called a family member and 911 to tell them

that she had been shot.

     According to Bussey, prior to the shooting, Billups did not

argue with James, threaten to shoot James, “get violent towards”

James, “raise his voice” towards James, have a gun “at all that day,”

or “reach into his pocket to get a gun.” Bussey further testified that

she did not threaten James, and that neither she nor Billups told

James that Billups had a gun.

     Glenda Williams testified that she was asleep in her bedroom

on the night of June 17, when she heard gunshots. She heard a

female “screaming and hollering.” Williams looked out the window

and saw Bussey, whom Williams knew, “back[ing] up” with “her

hands in the air,” saying “don’t do that. You know I got these kids.”

Williams heard a male voice respond, “f**ck you and your kids,” and

                                  4
then Williams heard two more shots. Williams “hollered out . . .

[Bussey], is that you?” to which Bussey responded, “[y]es, it is.”

Williams saw James “rolling past” with a “gray hoodie on his head.”

Williams woke up her boyfriend, Anthony Watt, and they both went

outside to help Bussey. Williams stayed with Bussey until

emergency responders arrived. Williams testified that she did not

see a gun at the scene, and did not see anyone take a gun from

Billups’s body or go through Billups’s pockets. Watt testified that he

watched Billups take “his last breath,” and that no one else was

“around” Billups and Bussey. Watt also said that he did not see a

firearm at the scene, and he did not see anyone go through Billups’s

pockets.

     James Sumlin testified that he was at the corner store on the

night of June 17, when he heard gunshots. Sumlin went to see if he

knew anyone involved. As soon as he arrived at the scene, he

“grabbed” a cell phone, later identified as Billups’s, “off the

sidewalk.” Sumlin left as soon as police arrived. Shatora Jones, who

was the mother of one of Billups’s children, called Sumlin on

                                  5
Billups’s cell phone later that night, and they agreed to meet the

next morning so he could give her the cell phone, which he did.

Sumlin testified that he did not see or remove any gun from the

scene, and thus did not tell Jones “you ain’t getting that fire back,”

or “you ain’t getting the gun back,” as James alleges.

     According to dispatch records, police arrived at the scene four

minutes after Bussey called 911. They found Billups lying on the

ground, showing no signs of life, with what looked like a gunshot

wound to the back of the head, and they found Bussey with an

apparent gunshot wound to the stomach. Police encountered James

about 50 yards from the scene, sitting in his wheelchair in a “fairly

dark area” of the driveway of a house, with his hoodie drawn up over

his head. Police searched James’s “immediate area” and found a

“purple and black” .380 gun “in a wooded area” “in the bushes.”

Police took the gun into evidence and transported James to

headquarters for questioning.

     At headquarters, James waived his Miranda4 rights and gave


     4 Miranda v. Arizona, 

 (

, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).

                                    6
a recorded statement to police, which the State played for the jury.

James said in his statement that he was coming from an apartment

“around the way” when he heard Billups call his name, so he

stopped. James and Billups “[got] to arguing” about whether James

was still dating Bussey. James said Bussey told Billups to “keep

walking” as she tried to stop them from arguing, that she “was

pulling [Billups] back,” and that “she was just really trying to split

[them] up.”

     James also said that Billups tried to “grab [him] out of [his]

chair.” According to James, Bussey told him Billups had a gun and

told Billups to shoot James. James said that as Billups was “going .

. . in his pocket” he “told [James] he was going to shoot [him],” so

James “just reacted back.” James said that he shot at Billups twice,

and when Billups “turned,” James shot “like one more time.” James

admitted that he did not see Billups with a gun, that Billups did not

shoot at him, and he was “in the wrong for shooting [Billups].” James

said Bussey was “just in the way, [he] didn’t try to shoot her.” James

admitted he threw the gun into the woods because he was “scared.”

                                  7
     A GBI firearms expert testified that James’s gun fired the .380

bullet and jacket fragments that the medical examiner recovered

from Billups’s body. The medical examiner testified that Billups had

gunshot entrance wounds to the back of his head, his left arm, the

side of his chest, and the left side of his back, which was “consistent

with [Billups] being turned [from] or not facing the person who shot

him.” The examiner opined that the cause of Billups’s death was

“gunshot wounds . . . of the head and trunk,” causing Billups to bleed

to death in “seconds to minutes.”

     After the State rested its case, James called Jones to testify.

Jones invoked her right against self-incrimination pursuant to the

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution in response to

many questions. However, Jones testified she was at the corner store

when the shooting occurred, and when she arrived at the scene, no

one was with Bussey. The ambulance arrived “a minute or two later”

and took Bussey, after which Jones stayed on the scene until

Billups’s body was removed. Jones testified that no one “messed

with” Billups’s body during that time, and she did not see any gun

                                    8
at the scene.

     After Jones testified, James called two detectives who

interviewed Jones, to try to establish what Jones said to them about

whether Billups had a gun. James did not testify at trial.

     1. James argues that the evidence was not sufficient to convict

him of murder and aggravated assault. When considering a

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of

constitutional due process, we consider the evidence “in the light

most favorable to the verdict,” and we “evaluate whether a rational

trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable      doubt   of    the   crimes     of   which     he    was

convicted.” Davenport v. State, 

 (1) (

)

(2020) (citation omitted). In so doing, we “put aside any questions

about conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight

of the evidence, leaving the resolution of such things to the

discretion of the trier of fact.” 

 (citation and punctuation omitted).

     A rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that

James murdered Billups and assaulted Bussey with a deadly

                                    9
weapon, and that James did not act in self-defense, based on (1)

Bussey’s testimony that neither she nor Billups threatened James,

Billups was unarmed, and James shot Billups as Billups “turned

around and started to walk off”; (2) testimony from the medical

examiner that Billups’s wounds were consistent with him being

“turned” away when he was shot; (3) testimony from several

eyewitnesses that they did not see another gun at the scene, and

they did not see anyone remove anything from Billups’s body; 4)

testimony that James shot Bussey as she said, “[p]lease don’t shoot,”

while Bussey was “back[ing] up” with “her hands in the air” (5)

expert testimony that James’s gun fired the .380 bullet and jacket

fragments recovered from Billups’s body; and (6) James’s admission

to police during his custodial interview that he did not see Billups

with a gun and that he was “in the wrong for shooting [Billups].”

Because the evidence was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due

process, this contention fails.

     2. James contends that the trial court improperly allowed

Jones to invoke her Fifth Amendment right against self-

                                  10
incrimination, which, according to James, prevented him from

establishing that Billups had a gun at the scene. More specifically,

James argues that, but for Jones’s improper invocation of her Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination, Jones would have

testified that Sumlin took Billups’s gun from the scene, and when

Jones asked Sumlin for the gun, Sumlin told her “you ain’t getting

the gun back” or “you ain’t getting that fire back.” James argues that

the trial court’s failure to compel Jones to testify to that effect

violated James’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment

pursuant to Lingerfelt v. State, 

 (

) (1975)

and Lawrence v. State, 

 (

) (1987).

     Jones claimed at trial that she was entitled to invoke her Fifth

Amendment protection because she had charges pending against

her for murder in another case, involving a child who allegedly found

a handgun in Jones’s home and shot another child, which occurred

after Billups’s death. A detective testified at James’s trial that Jones

told him, among other things, that the gun in her house belonged to



                                  11
Billups. 5 Jones claimed that she was asserting her Fifth Amendment

right against self-incrimination at James’s trial to avoid connecting

herself to the gun allegedly found in her home. 6

      Prior to Jones’s testimony in this case, Jones came to court with

her attorney, who announced that Jones “plan[ned] on taking the

Fifth Amendment” because “[t]here [was] a weapon that could come

up in conversation [in James’s trial] that would be the source of her

issue” in her homicide case. The trial judge offered to voir dire Jones

immediately and asked the parties how they wished to proceed.

James did not accept the offer to voir dire Jones, saying that he

would not ask Jones questions pertaining to Jones’s homicide case.

Instead, James said that he planned to elicit from Jones what she

“[told] the detective in this case,” that is, when she allegedly asked

Sumlin for Billups’s gun, Sumlin allegedly said “you ain’t getting the


      5 The detective testified that Jones gave conflicting statements about the

gun, telling him that: (1) the firearm in her home “belonged to a young [man]
named Roderick Billups”; (2) “she didn’t have [a firearm] in her house”; (3) she
“used to have a firearm in her home,” which she got “off the streets, but it had
been stolen weeks prior”; and (4) “she had a firearm in her closet,” which was
“given to her by . . . Billups . . . a week prior . . . to his murder.”
      6 James does not claim that the gun allegedly found in Jones’s home was

the same gun that Billups was purportedly carrying when James shot him.
                                      12
gun back.” James told the trial court that “there might be some side

issues of things she [said] in her statement to the detective at the

time,” but if the questions at trial became “an issue,” then Jones “can

plead the Fifth.” James pointed out that if Jones did assert her Fifth

Amendment right, James “could get her statements in other ways.”

The trial judge agreed and said that if Jones asserted her Fifth

Amendment right, the trial judge could evaluate her assertion

“question-by-question.” owever, when James called Jones to testify,

Jones repeatedly asserted her Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination without drawing any objection or motion from James.

     James’s failure to object means that we review James’s

contention for plain error. See Holmes v. State, 

 (b)

(ii) (

) (2024) (holding that failure to object to purported

constitutional violations allows only a plain-error review) (citation

omitted). For James to show plain error, he must show an error that

“(1) was not affirmatively waived, (2) was clear and obvious beyond

reasonable   dispute,   (3) likely    affected   the   outcome   of   the

proceedings, and (4) seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or

                                     13
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. State, 

 (1) (

) (2024) (citation omitted). Failure to

establish any one of these elements is fatal to James’s claim, ending

our inquiry. See 

 (1) (holding that “if an appellant fails to

satisfy any one prong of the plain error test, we need not consider

the other prongs”) (citation omitted). Pretermitting whether James

has shown any other elements of plain error, we conclude that James

has failed to show an error that was “clear and obvious beyond

reasonable dispute.” 

 (1)

     “An error cannot be plain where there is no controlling

authority on point.” McKinney v. State, 

 (2) (a) (

) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). James blames

the trial court for failing to conduct a hearing on Jones’s invocation

of her right against self-incrimination. But James points to no

authority – and we have found none – requiring a trial court to sua

sponte intervene after the trial court offered to voir dire a witness,

the complaining party tacitly declined the offer, and then the

complaining party made no motion or objection at any point during

                                  14
the disputed testimony. Both cases to which James points involved

the trial court’s denial of a defendant’s request for court intervention

in the face of the assertion of the right against self-incrimination.

See Lingerfelt, 

 (noting that the trial court overruled

the defendant’s objection “that it was incumbent on the [S]tate to

determine out of the presence of the jury what questions the witness

would or would not answer”); Lawrence, 

 (3) (noting

that the defendant “sought unsuccessfully to have the nature of the

questions and the propriety of [the witness’s] invoking the Fifth

Amendment considered out of the jury’s presence”).

     James also does not point to any authority requiring us to

determine the propriety of a witness’s failure to answer questions

when, as here, the complaining party never identified at trial, or on

appeal, the specific questions which that witness allegedly wrongly

declined to answer. See Roberson v. State, 

 (III) (

) (2017) (holding that “[i]t is well established that the

burden is on the party alleging error to show it by the record”)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

                                  15
     Finally, James does not point to any authority – and we have

found none – supporting the proposition that the Sixth Amendment

Confrontation Clause applies to a party’s own witness on direct-

examination. The Confrontation Clause provides that, “[i]n all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be

confronted with the witnesses against him[.]” (emphasis supplied).

But James called Jones as a witness, and she declined to answer

questions on direct-examination. This means that Jones was not a

witness against James and James was not cross-examining her. See

State v. Burns, 

 (2) (

) (2019) (“With

respect to the right to confrontation, the Sixth Amendment provides

two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right

physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to

conduct cross-examination”) (citation and punctuation omitted;

emphasis supplied); Johnson v. State, 

 (2) (

) (2021) (“The main and essential purpose of the right of

confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-

examination.”) (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis

                                 16
supplied). James points to no authority that the Confrontation

Clause applies here except Lingerfelt and Lawerence, which are

distinguishable because they turn on a witness’s refusal to answer

questions on cross-examination. Lingerfelt, 

(reversing the appellant’s conviction because he “was denied his

right to a fair and sifting cross[-]examination during his trial”);

Lawrence, 

 (3) (reversing the appellant’s conviction

because he “was effectively deprived of his opportunity to confront

and cross-examine the witness against him”).

     Thus, in the absence of controlling authority, James has not

shown an error that was “clear and obvious beyond reasonable

dispute,” so his contention fails. Johnson, 

 (1) (citation

omitted).

     Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, Warren, PJ, and Bethel,
Ellington, McMillian, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.




                                  17