In re Hatsuji Iwanaga
In re Hatsuji Iwanaga
Opinion of the Court
The question arises whether the clérk of court may not in bankruptcy cases make a charge for mailing notices to creditors. For several years from and after the institution of this court it was the practice here for the clerk to make such a charge. Somehow — for what reason I have been unable to ascertain, — the practice ceased and has not been followed for at least seven years. The practice, I am informed by ah examiner of the Department of Justice, is followed in all the Federal courts on the Pacific coast.
The authority now relied on for such charge, is General Order XXXV, section 1, adopted by the Supreme Court' of the United States, which reads:
"The fées allowed by the act to clerks shall be in full compensation for all services performed by them in regard to filing petitions or other papers required by the act to be filed with them, or in certifying or delivering papers of copies of records to referees or other officers, or in 'receiving or paying out moneys; but shall not include copies furnished to other persons, or expenses necessarily incurred in publishing or mailing notices or other papers.”
“Clerks shall respectively receive as full compensation for their services to each estate, a filing, fee of ten dollars, except when a fee is not required from a voluntary bankrupt.”
And to a view of this general order as too broad, Mr. Collier gives support in the following language:
“It is thought that General Order XXXV (1) is not in accord with section 52, a; if not, the latter must control.” Collier on Bankruptcy, 10th ed., 687, q. v. in extenso.
In my view of the statute, which makes-the filing fee of ten dollars the clerks’ “full compensation for their services to each estate”, it seems that a clerk’s services rendered in mailing notices are covered by and included within his “¡•¡enrices to each estate.” In re Durham, 2 N. B. N. Rep. 1104, cited by Brandenburg on Bankruptcy, 3d ed., section 801, to the effect that “the clerk is entitled to charge an additional fee for each notice of bankrupt’s application for discharge sent to creditors,” is no authority as against my view; for it is controlled by the broader provision of the bankruptcy statute of 1867, section 47, which reads:
“In each case there shall be allowed and paid, in addition to the fees of the clerk of the court as now established by law, or as may be established by general order for fees in bankruptcy, the following fees,” etc.
I do not go so far, however, as to express disapproval of the rule approved by the Supreme Court in section 1 of General Order XXXV, but rather express my disagreement with the application of this rule by the judges and clerks in other districts. When we 'regard' the phrase of the rule “expenses necessarily incurred'in publishing notices”, there is no difficulty in so dissenting,,, for it would be unreasonable, absurd, to burden the clerk,, who receives but ten dollars for all his “services”, with what is strictly and purely an “expense” incurred by the work of another, an indepen
Accordingly, the items of mailing notices' to creditors, submitted by the clerk as proper subjects of charge under General Order XXXV, are disallowed as such.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- IN THE MATTER OF HATSUJI IWANAGA, A BANKRUPT
- Status
- Published