Kelvin Simmons v. Judge Karin L. Holma, et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I KELVIN SIMMONS, Case No. 25-cv-00307-DKW-WRP Plaintiff, ORDER (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE vs. SUR-REPLY, (2) GRANTING DEFENDANTS KARIN HOLMA AND JUDGE KARIN L. HOLMA, et al., LISA CATALDO’S MOTION TO DISMISS, AND (3) DISMISSING Defendants. DEFENDANTS HOLMA AND CATALDO WITH PREJUDICE

On December 22, 2025, the Court dismissed with leave to amend certain claims asserted by Plaintiff Kelvin Simmons against the “State Defendants”, including Defendants Karin Holma and Lisa Cataldo (Holma and Cataldo, referred to herein as the “Moving Defendants”). In particular, the claims for monetary damages against the Moving Defendants were dismissed on the ground of judicial immunity because both Moving Defendants are judicial officers of the State of Hawai‘i and all of their alleged acts related to the judicial process. The Court further explained that, to the extent Simmons filed an amended complaint, he must advance plain statements concerning the specific action or inaction of a specific defendant and how the same violated a specific legal right.

On January 5, 2026, Simmons filed an Amended Complaint against an array of Defendants, including the Moving Defendants, other alleged judicial and State officers, and “private” actors. Dkt. No. 186. On January 20, 2026, the Moving Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, arguing, among other things, that any claims against them are barred by judicial immunity and/or fail to state a claim. Dkt. No. 202. Simmons opposes dismissal and also seeks leave to file a “sur-reply” in support of his opposition. Dkt. No. 219.

Upon review, the motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 202, is GRANTED because the claims against the Moving Defendants are clearly deficient in various respects.

First, any claim for monetary damages is barred by judicial immunity because, to the extent conduct can be construed from the vague allegations of the Amended Complaint, it relates to the judicial process pursued by Judges Holma and Cataldo.

Second, any claim for declaratory and/or injunctive relief is deficient because the Amended Complaint fails to allege any specific conduct of the Moving Defendants, as required. In fact, this deficiency—a failure to allege specific conduct committed by a specific Defendant—plagues all of the claims in the Amended Complaint. Further, because Simmons has been advised of the need to allege claims in compliance with the foregoing and failed to do so, leave to amend is not warranted here. Therefore, for the reasons discussed more fully below, the claims against the Moving Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Simmons’ motion for leave to file a sur-reply is DENIED.

BACKGROUND1 On December 22, 2025, the Court (1) granted in part and denied in part the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (2) dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend, and (3) denied a lengthy list of motions Simmons filed seeking various forms of non-dispositive relief. Dkt. No. 185. As pertinent here, the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted to the extent it sought dismissal of claims for monetary damages against the Moving Defendants, i.e., Judges Holma and Cataldo, on the ground that such claims were barred by judicial immunity.

Specifically, the Court found that, in the Complaint, all of the alleged acts of the Moving Defendants related to the judicial process. Nonetheless, the Court permitted Simmons, a litigant proceeding without counsel and without prior guidance, leave to amend the Complaint. The Court warned, however, that, should Simmons choose to amend, he must offer short and plain statements of, among other things, exactly what each defendant did or failed to do, the name of the specific defendant who so acted or failed to act, and how such action or inaction resulted in the violation of a legal right.

1The Court assumes the reader’s familiarity with the Background of this case, as set forth in the December 22, 2025 Order. Dkt. No. 185 at 2-7. This Order continues the Background from where the December 22, 2025 Order left-off.

On January 5, 2026, Simmons filed the Amended Complaint—the operative pleading in this case. Dkt. No. 186. The Amended Complaint names at least 13 Defendants, including the Moving Defendants, three other Judges of the State of Hawai‘i, the Attorney General and three Deputy Attorneys General of the State of Hawai‘i, and three “private” actors, along with up to 20 “Doe” Defendants.

According to Simmons, the “gravamen of this action is a defense-confirmed Poison Origin/Poison Tree sequence[,]” with the “poison origin” being an unidentified “jurisdictionally defective initiating act in the District Court of the First Circuit—Case No. 1DRC-23-0006533[.]” Id. at 3.2 From this, Simmons asserts five claims for (1) denial of due process, (2) disability discrimination, (3) violation of the Supremacy Clause, (4) civil conspiracy, and (5) retaliation.

Simmons also seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Although the Amended Complaint is unclear, arguably, these claims and forms of relief are asserted against all Defendants.

On January 20, 2026, the Moving Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint.3 Dkt. No. 202. They argue that the Amended Complaint

2Because the paragraphs and pages of the Amended Complaint are not sequentially or consecutively numbered, the Court cites to page numbers in the top-right corner of said document instead, e.g., “Page 3 of 31”. The Court does the same with Simmons’ other filings.

3As of this date, the docket for this proceeding does not reflect execution of service of the summons on many of the named Defendants. should be dismissed without further leave to amend because: (1) Simmons fails to offer short and plain statements of his claims in compliance with the December 22, 2025 Order and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) claims for monetary damages are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (3) claims for injunctive relief are barred by the Ex Parte Young doctrine, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); (4) claims are barred by qualified immunity; and (5) any claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 fails to state a claim.

Simmons has filed a response to the motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 216.

Liberally construing the same, Simmons argues that the motion to dismiss attempts to “[r]eopen issues” already litigated and “ignore[es]” the Amended Complaint. Id. at 8-9. Simmons further argues that the “poison origin” of a State litigation was “[tr]riggered” by a filing—identified only as “Dkt. 11”—that “[i]njected federal jurisdictional issues into the state proceeding”. Id. at 10. Simmons also argues that judicial immunity does not shield “non-judicial acts”, “administrative conduct”, and “actions taken without jurisdiction”. Id. at 15. Presumably as examples of these matters, Simmons appears to contend that Judge Holma is not protected by judicial immunity because a “judgment” and “writ of possession” she entered are “void”. Id. at 15-18. As for Judge Cataldo, Simmons asserts that she is not entitled to immunity because, in denying “reinstatement relief”, she “[p]reserve[ed] the effects of the void writ” and “[r]einforc[ed] the unlawful enforcement outcome”. Id. at 23-24. Simmons continues that his “claims target post-trigger conduct”, including unidentified “[p]rocedural obstruction”, “[r]ecord manipulation”, and “[a]dministrative interference”. Id. at 27.

On February 19, 2026, the Moving Defendants replied to Simmons’ response. Dkt. No. 218. The Moving Defendants argue that: the response asserts “new allegations and claims” that should be disregarded; such “new” matters, if considered, do not cure the deficiencies with the Amended Complaint; they are entitled to judicial immunity; and the Amended Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 2.

One day later, on February 20, Simmons moved for leave to file a sur-reply.

Dkt. No. 219. Simmons asserts that the Moving Defendants reply (1) “[c]haracterizes” the response as “introducing new allegations”, (2) “[r]eframes the structural posture established by EO 185, and (3) “[n]arrows” the “constitutional discussion….” Id. at 2. The motion for leave to file a sur-reply, Dkt. No. 219, is DENIED. Contrary to Simmons’ suggestions, the reply brief merely addresses arguments made in his opposition—many of which the Moving Defendants accurately describe as making “new” allegations or, at least, embellishing allegations made in the Amended Complaint. As a result, there is simply no basis to allow further briefing in this case.

With briefing, therefore, complete, the Court now addresses the motion to dismiss.

STANDARD OF REVIEW Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the Court to dismiss a complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with Rule 8(a), which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Pursuant to Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court “must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Interpipe Contracting, Inc. v. Becerra, 898 F.3d 879, 886-887 (9th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted).

When a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, leave to amend should be given when “justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Justice does not require leave to amend when (1) it would prejudice an opposing party, (2) it is sought in bad faith, (3) it would produce an undue delay in litigation, (4) it would be futile, or (5) there has been repeated failure to cure a deficiency. Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2008); AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006).

DISCUSSION As mentioned, the Moving Defendants request dismissal of the Amended Complaint on various grounds, including judicial immunity and the failure to follow pleading instructions in the December 22, 2025 Order. Because these matters are ones previously addressed and identified for Simmons to cure and/or follow, the Court begins its discussion below with the same.

A. Judicial Immunity In the December 22, 2025 Order, the Court explained to Simmons that his claims for monetary damages against the Moving Defendants were subject to dismissal because all of their alleged conduct was related to the judicial process.

Dkt. No. 185 at 13-14. The Amended Complaint does nothing to remedy this deficiency. Instead, if anything, the Amended Complaint takes a step back from the already deficient Complaint. Specifically, in the Complaint, Simmons at least, on occasion, alleged that a specific Defendant committed a specific act, such as “scheduling a hearing”, “refusing to rule”, and “issu[ing]” orders. Dkt. No. 1 at 4- 6. In the Amended Complaint, however, Simmons does not do even that.

Instead, he groups all five of the so-called “Judicial Defendants” and alleges that they acted. It is entirely unclear, however, which Defendant committed any particular act or committed no act. This is clearly deficient, especially as it relates to the Moving Defendants. Second, the acts alleged—“void assignment, record transmission, and docket activity”—are hopelessly vague. See Dkt. No. 186 at 12.

Even liberally construed, though, they concern acts related to the judicial process within the context of Simmons’ claims, given that “docket” activity, “assignment”, and “record” transmission clearly all relate to judicial matters, whether or not Simmons properly characterizes them as “administrative and ministerial”.

In his response, Simmons attempts to ameliorate the vague and unspecific allegations of the Amended Complaint by, at best, supplementing the same with further factual enhancement. For example, unlike in the Amended Complaint, Simmons contends that a specific Defendant—Judge Holma—committed a specific act—entering a “void” judgment. Dkt. No. 216 at 15. Similarly, he asserts that Judge Cataldo denied a “reinstatement” request. Id. at 22. As an initial matter, because these allegations were not made in the Amended Complaint, Simmons would need to seek leave to amend to pursue them further in this case.

Leave to amend, however, is unnecessary because the allegations are clearly insufficient as they are of the same “classic fare” that is barred by judicial immunity. See Dkt. No. 185 at 14 (citing In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002)). To the extent Simmons attempts to avoid this clear fact by contending that the judgment or denials entered by the Moving Defendants were “void”, and, thus, presumably, “in the clear absence of jurisdiction”, this too fails, given that Simmons provides not one factual allegation to support the suggestion that any act by the Moving Defendants in the course of the judicial process was “void” or committed in the absence of jurisdiction.4 Therefore, in light of the vague and grouped allegations in the Amended Complaint, and the clear deficiencies with Simmons’ allegations in the response, the Moving Defendants are entitled to judicial immunity from any claim arguably asserted against them for monetary damages. Simmons is also not entitled to further leave to amend any such claim(s) because he has had opportunities, both in the Amended Complaint and the response, to cure the identified deficiencies, and has failed to do so.

4Similarly, to the extent Simmons believes that the Moving Defendants’ acts were “void” due to the so-called “poison chain” he has concocted, see Dkt. No. 216 at 22, again, he provides not one factual allegation to support any such “poison[ous]” charge.

B. Basic Pleading Instructions In the December 22, 2025 Order, the Court explained to Simmons that, should he choose to file an amended complaint, he was required to follow basic pleading requirements by alleging short and plain statements of his claims. Dkt.

No. 185 at 16-17. Specifically, he was required to state the legal right violated, the name of the specific defendant(s) who violated a right, exactly what each defendant did or did not do and when, how the action or inaction violated a right, and the specific injury suffered as a result. As mentioned, Simmons elected to file an amended complaint. He did not, however, come close to following the above- mentioned pleading requirements with respect to any of his claims against any of the Defendants and, as pertinent here, with respect to the Moving Defendants.

Notably, in addition to claims for monetary damages, which have been discussed and dismissed above, Simmons also seeks injunctive and declaratory relief. Those requests and claims, though, are replete with generalized and conclusory allegations. For example, Simmons alleges that “Defendants’ post- notice conduct violated the Supremacy Clause” and that he seeks “injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants from continuing retaliatory, obstructive, or discriminatory conduct arising from the poison-origin foundation….” Dkt. No. 185 at 22-23.

Simmons also alleges that “Defendants engaged in non-judicial/administrative interference”, “Defendants engaged in deliberate indifference”, “state actors proceeded with post-jurisdiction actions”, “[s]tate and private actors coordinated post-notice to advance and enforce a defense-confirmed poisoned foundation”, and “Defendant retaliated through post-jurisdiction procedural maneuvers”. Id. at 14- 16.

The deficiencies with the foregoing are numerous. First, the Amended Complaint fails to state the name of any specific Defendant that violated Simmons’ rights. Instead, it is simply all “Defendants”, all “state actors”, and/or all “private actors”. Second, the Amended Complaint contains not one factual allegation of any “post-notice conduct”, or even the nature of the alleged “notice”. The same is true of the so-called “poison origin foundation”, “interference”, “deliberate indifference”, and “retaliat[ion]”. Therefore, other than through conclusory assertions, the Amended Complaint does not state what any specific Defendant did or failed to do and when, how any legal right was violated, or any injury Simmons suffered. In other words, the Amended Complaint fails on every one of the basic pleading requirements identified in the December 22, 2025 Order.5 As a result,

5So the record is clear, these failures are not cured by the allegations in Simmons’ opposition brief that Judges Holma and Cataldo committed certain specific acts, such as entering a “void” judgment. As discussed, there is no factual allegation, either in the Amended Complaint or the response, even suggesting how the judgment and orders could be considered “void”, other than Simmons’ apparent disagreement with the same. Basing any claim on such assertions, PagelD.160/1 beyond judicial immunity, a// claims and relief sought against the Moving Defendants must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Further, because Simmons was notified of the foregoing pleadings requirements and failed in every respect, he is not entitled to an additional opportunity to amend.

CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth herein, the motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 202, is GRANTED, and Defendants Holma and Cataldo are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this action.°® Simmons’ motion for leave to file a sur-reply, Dkt. No. 219, is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 30, 2026 at Honolulu, Hawat‘i.

De — a Derrick K. Watson Vp I Chief United States District Judge Kelvin Simmons v. Judge Karin L. Holma, et al; Civil No. 25-00307 DK W-WRP; ORDER (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUR-REPLY, (2) GRANTING DEFENDANTS KARIN HOLMA AND LISA CATALDO’S MOTION TO DISMISS, AND (3) DISMISSING DEFENDANTS HOLMA AND CATALDO WITH PREJUDICE therefore, would not bring the same to the level of plausibility required by federal pleadings rules. ’Because it is unnecessary, the Court does not address any other reason for dismissal raised by the Moving Defendants.