Keelikolani v. Manaku
Keelikolani v. Manaku
Opinion of the Court
Opinion of tbe Court by
The answer admits that defendant has set up* an exclusive life estate-in the land of Moanalua, subject to a charge- or rent styled “ Auhau ku i ba wa,” and to a right of the plaintiff to reside on the land whenever she may wish. His claims are founded on the instrument of which we here give the original Hawaiian and the translation which we adopt as giving the literal and true meaning in the English language:
[the document.]
E. ike auanei na mea a pau ma keia, owau, o Luka Keeli-kolani ka hooilina hookahi i koe- o na waiwai a pau o Kamehameha V i make, mamuli o ko’u pono,, a i kulike ai no hoi me ke ano o ka noho- ana a ko maua kahu i aloha nui ia, oia o' Kaleiluhiole, i make, ma ka aina o- Moanalua, Mokupuni o Oahu, ma ka haawi ana aku a ko’u kaikunáne Kamehameha
A ma keia no hoi, e like me na pono i hookoe ia mai e ko’u kaikunane Kamehameha Y, ma ua aina la, oia hoi, na auhau ku i ka wa a’u e makemake ai a me ko’u noho ana maluna o-ua aina la o Moanalua, i na wa a pau a’u e makemake ai, pela no hoi aue hookoe nei ia’u a me ko’u mau hooiliua e like me-ia i hahaiia ae la.
No ka oiaio o keia ke kakau nei au i ko’u inoa ma keia la 1 o Feberuari, makahiki 1875. K. Keelikolani.
[TRANSLATION.]
Know all men henceforth by these presents that I, Ruth Keelikolani, the only heir of all the property of Kamehameha Y, deceased, in consequence of my right and in accordance with the manner in which our beloved Kahu (care-taker) Kaleiluhiole, deceased, lived upon the- land of Moanalua, Island of Oahu, through the-appointment of my brother Kamehameha Y, deceased, which appointment- I continued to our Kahu Kaleiluhiole after the decease of my brother Kamehameha Y; therefore, in accordance with (just like) the manner of living of my brother Kamehameha Y with his Kahu, Kaleiluhiole, I myself now appoint and continue all the said rights and privileges to my Kahu (superintendent or caretaker), the child or nephew of Kaleiluhiole-, David Manaku, perpetually, from and after the 15th day of December, 1874, upon the land of Moanalua from the mountain to the sea; but indeed, if my Kahu (superintendent) shall die before I do,
For the truth of this I have hereunto set my name this 1st day of February, A. D. 1875.
(Signed) 14. Keelikolani.
It will be remai'ked at once that the- instrument is essentially native Hawaiian in its character, although having a resemblance in phraseology and form to a common deed or lease. It would be difficult, and perhaps not possible, to give a reasonable interpretation and one which would reconcile every part to the whole without taking the point of view from the mind of the native Hawaiian. And we deem it right to do this on the principle of construction that contracts are to be interpreted according to the intention of the parties, as they have expressed them, and because the- recitations of the instrument require us to consider the peculiar Hawaiian relation subsisting between the grantor and grantee in this instrument and between the predecessors of both of them. Furthermore, counsel on both parts have assumed that this must be the mode of interpretation, and have offered testimony and made argument upon the nature of the Hawaiian relation of the parties. We do not by this support the idea that a contract made between Hawaiians, o-r to- which a Hawaiian is one party, is free from the application of the settled principles of interpretation as known in Courts.
The first and controlling inference to be drawn from the instrument is that the plaintiff placed the defendant on her land of Moanalua in the same attitude and office as that held by one Kaleiluhiole towards the late Kamehameha Y, and subsequently toward his heir, until 1874, when Kaleiluhiole died.
We first observe that Kaleiluhiole had been preceded by Kilinahe in the charge of the land. All the testimony is that he had the same holding as Kilinahe, who was summarily discharged by the owner because he was not pleased with his management. Yet there is nothing to support the idea that a life tenure had been abrogated. There is- nothing to show that he was different from any other head man-, luna or kono-hiki in charge of a chief’s land.
As to Kaleiluhiole, the testimony of Lolua, w., Henry Ma-kanahoa, Henry Kahanu, Oku-le, Nalimu, Malao and Heu is to the effect that so far as the land was cultivated, the crop was the property of the owner, the landlord, who disposed of it by contract with the prison and the- barracks. The testimony of the Marshal is that in buying poi for the prison he dealt with Kamehameha and not with Kaleiluhiole.'
A part of the land was leased to Hr. Ford for planting rice, but there is no intimation that Kaleiluhiole leased it as the life tenant. A salt pond, supposed to be very valuable, was worked by and for account solely of Kamehameha. He employed Kaleiluhiole somewhat in this labor, but it is not set up that he required to get a concession from him, or that he made him any consideration whatever for the privilege of taking the salt.' This does not look as if Kaleiluhiole had a life estate in Moanalua.
The defendant offers testimony to show that Kaleiluhiole
Such a holding as we have above spoken of was the pono or privilege of Kaleiluhiole or any other head man in charge. We have seen that whenever the land yielded or promised a valuable product, such as rice, salt or taro, in a quantity beyond what was needed for the chief and his retainers, the chief took such product or the proceeds, without pretension of a partnership with his head man. The testimony regarding the fisheries in the ponds and sea is that the cash receipts were at the call of the chief — they did not belong to any persons in charge.
If the instrument had contained no other phrase, it is not likely the defendant would have claimed the exclusive estate (except the reservations) for life; but following the above quoted words, “hoomau aku,” is “ a mau loa,” which may be interpreted “perpetually,” and following is this sentence: “ Aka hoi, ina e make e aku kuu kahu, o David Manaku, mamúa o’u, alaila é hoi mai no ka aina o Moanalua me a’u a me ko’u mau hooilina,” which translated is: “But, nevertheless, if my kahu, David Manaku, shall die before I do, then the land of Moanalua is to revert to me and my heirs.” But we have seen that no life estate has been granted. The words used are of appointment, and not of grant, and this provision for reversion is therefore repugnant or senseless. The strongest construction which could be claimed for them is that they intend an appointment as an agent irrevocable. But an agent is not the owner of a life estate, without obligation to account for rents and profits.
It is urged that the defendant’s predecessors did not keep accounts nor render account. This is an inference not well supported by the evidence. They appear to have paid on demand the cash receipts of the fisheries and to have given up
It is to be observed that the times have changed and the mode of doing business since the death of Kaleiluhiole. The income of the land was then what might be produced by the labor of the kanakas or men living on it, who rendered koele labor. But the present manager has made cash leases to foreigners cultivating rice. The receipts have risen to more than •three thousand dollars per year, which he claims for himself, under his appointment. This is something obviously unreasonable, without consideration, and not supported by the terms of the instrument.
Upon these views of the facts and the legal aspect of the case, we come to the same conclusion as that reached by the Chief Justice in the first instance.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- R. Keelikolani v. D. Manaku
- Cited By
- 2 cases
- Status
- Published