Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by

I concur in the majority’s opinion except as to that part of the opinion holding that Hutch made a showing of a colorable claim that he was illegally or unconstitutionally confined in the Special Holding Unit for assisting other inmates with legal matters, thereby entitling him to a hearing under Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40(f) (2002).1 Majority Opinion (Majority) at 419, 114 P.3d at 925. Inasmuch as Hutch’s HRPP Rule 40 petition fails to establish a “colorable claim” sufficient for habeas relief, and his fourteen-day disciplinary segregation punishment for possessing other inmates’ legal documents and making duplicate copies for them was an ordinary incident of prison life and fell within the range of confinement to be normally expected for such prison infraction, I do not believe the circuit court was wrong to deny Hutch’s HRPP Rule 40 petition without a hearing. Therefore, in this regard, I must respectfully dissent.

This court reviews a trial court’s denial of a HRPP Rule 40 petition without a hearing de novo. Dan v. State, 76 Hawai'i 423, 427, 879 P.2d 528, 532 (1994). Under de novo review, this court must discern whether the trial court’s records demonstrate that a petitioner’s application for post-conviction relief made such a showing of a “colorable claim” to warrant a hearing before the lower court. See Stanley v. State, 76 Hawai'i 446, 448, 879 P.2d 551, 553 (1994); see also Dan, 76 Hawai'i at 427, 879 P.2d at 532. “To establish a colorable claim, the allega*421tions of the petition must show that if taken as true the facts alleged would change the verdictf.]” Dan, 76 Hawai'i at 427, 879 P.2d at 532 (citation omitted). Accordingly, in reviewing Hutch’s present HRPP Rule 40 petition, we must ascertain whether Hutch established a “colorable claim” that his fourteen-day disciplinary segregation punishment allegedly resulting from a violation of Hawai'i Administrative Rules (HAR) § 17-202-1(b), a repealed prison rule, was illegal.

Initially, I note that, contrary to Hutch’s allegation in his HRPP Rule 40 petition, his fourteen-day disciplinary segregation punishment resulted solely from his refusal to obey the orders of prison staff members with respect to his unauthorized possession of the legal documents of fellow inmates — a prison infraction subject to discipline.

Nevertheless, presuming that Hutch was punished under the repealed HAR § 17-202-1(b) for assisting inmates with legal matters, we must determine whether Hutch’s punishment was unconstitutional. I do not believe it was.

The majority relies on Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969), to conclude that Hutch “made a showing of a colorable claim that he was illegally punished for providing assistance to other inmates.” Majority at 415-416, 418-419, 114 P.3d at 921-922, 924-925. In Johnson, the petitioner, a “jailhouse lawyer” or “writ writer” who helped inmates prepare legal documents, was transferred to a maximum security building for violating a prison regulation that prohibited prisoners from advising, assisting, or contracting to aid other inmates in legal matters. Id. at 484, 89 S.Ct. at 748. Recognizing the fundamental importance of a writ of habeas corpus and acknowledging the high percentage of illiterate and poorly educated prisoners incarcerated in jails and penitentiaries’, the United States Supreme Court held that, “unless and until the State provides some reasonable alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief, it may not validly enforce a regulation such as that here in issue, barring inmates from furnishing such assistance to other prisoners.” Id. at 490, 89 S.Ct. at 751 (emphasis added). The crux of Johnson turned on the adequacy of the alternatives available to inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief, namely, legal assistance and access to legal materials and/or a law library.2 See, e.g., Sizemore v. Lee, 20 F.Supp.2d 956, 958 (W.D.Va. 1998) (“[The Marion Correctional Treatment Center] has satisfied the primary *422concerns of Johnson by providing inmates with a law library and inmate legal assistants.”)- The majority, however, fails to appreciate as much.

The majority essentially conjures a piecemeal construction of Johnson to conclude that Hutch “made a showing of a colorable claim that he was illegally punished for providing assistance to other inmates[.]” Majority at 419, 114 P.3d at 925. The majority posits that Hutch was entitled to habeas relief under Johnson, based on the allegation made in his HRPP Rule 40 petition that “the prison was still enforcing the repealed HAR § 17-202-1(b) and that he was confined to the Special Holding Unit for assisting other inmates with legal matters where he had obtained warden permission to do so.” Majority at 417, 114 P.3d at 923. In holding as much, the majority employs the following reading of Johnson:

[pjrohibiting the “jailhouse lawyer” from “possessing” the legal documents of the inmate he has been authorized to “assist,” means that the inmate must be able to read and convey what is written in the papers to the “jailhouse lawyer” in order to obtain assistance. If the statement in the adjustment committee report is accurate, such a policy, standing alone, may “effectively” “forbid[] illiterate or poorly educated prisoners to file habeas corpus petitions!,]” running afoul of Johnson.

Majority at 418, 114 P.3d at 924 (some brackets in the original) (citation omitted). The majority’s application of Johnson is unavailing. First, unlike Johnson, there is no blanket prohibition against “mutual assistance” at the Halawa Correctional Facility. Second, Hutch has not established that he was “actually” injured by the prohibition against the unauthorized possession of the legal materials of his fellow inmates. Thus, the majority’s attempt to reconcile Johnson’s mandate to support its conclusion that Hutch made a showing of a colorable claim sufficient for habeas relief is ill-advised.

In distinct contrast to the majority’s interpretation of Johnson, Johnson teaches that prison officials can regulate the scope and frequency of assistance that “jailhouse lawyers” provide to other inmates, so long as meaningful alternatives are available. Inasmuch as Hutch and the other inmates have access to the law library, and are permitted to “assist” each other in legal matters through discussion and correspondence, Johnson instructs that these alternative avenues of access to the courts validate the regulation Hutch claims formed the basis of his illegal and unconstitutional punishment.3

Accordingly, assuming that Hutch was punished under the repealed HAR § 17-202-1(b), as alleged in his HRPP Rule 40 petition, it cannot be said that Hutch’s fourteen-day disciplinary segregation punishment was “illegal” under Johnson. As such, Hutch’s HRPP Rule 40 petition alleging that he was “illegally punished” fails to establish a “color-able claim” sufficient for habeas relief.4 Therefore, the circuit court did not err in *423denying Hutch’s HRPP Rule 40 petition without a hearing.

Finally, I highlight that the sole basis for Hutch’s fourteen-day disciplinary segregation punishment resulted from his unauthorized possession of the legal materials of fellow inmates — a prison infraction subject to disciplinary action:

The committee wants to make it very clear to [Hutch] that he is not being charged with assisting inmates with legal matters. He is charged with being in possession of thefr legal documents and making duplicate copies for them. It is not [Hutch’s] responsibility to make these copies and retain the actual legal documents of other inmates for the purpose of mailing these documents to the courts. It is the responsibility of inmate Genaro Gualdarama. [Hutch] should only be assisting in legal issues by discussion and .correspondence with the inmate.

(Emphasis in the original.) Despite Hutch’s contention to the contrary, the record supports that Hutch’s punishment was an ordinary incident of prison life and fell within the range of confinement to be normally expected for such prison infractions.5 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2301, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (“Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.”). Habeas relief does not lie for this discipline. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in ruling that Hutch’s HRPP Rule 40 petition “[was] without merit, [was] patently frivolous, and [was] without support in either the record or evidence submitted by [H]itch].”

Opinion of the Court by

Petitioner-Appellant pro se Eugene Hutch (Appellant) appeals from a March 13, 2003 order of the circuit court of the first circuit (the court)1 denying his Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 petition for post-conviction relief to vacate, set aside, or correct judgment or to release Appellant from custody. We vacate that part of the order relating to Appellant’s “lockdown” in a special holding facility, and remand that aspect of the petition to the court for hearing. As to Appellant’s claim that he was improperly refused access to a prison guidebook and medically prescribed shoes, we affirm the court’s denial of a Rule 40 hearing but remand that part of the petition for disposition under the civil rules.

I.

In the course of Appellant’s incarceration at Halawa Correctional Facility, several inmates filed paperwork requesting approval for Appellant’s legal assistance. On April 5, 2002, prison staff confiscated “unauthorized property” from Appellant’s cell that consisted of legal size envelopes with the names of other inmates listed on them. These inmates allegedly did not follow the procedures established by prison staff for requesting assistance from a fellow inmate. Appellant was sentenced to fourteen days’ lockdown in the Special Holding Unit of the facility for failure to obtain proper authorization prior to helping these inmates in their legal matters.

On June 10, 2002, Appellant filed the first of a series of requests to the warden that he be allowed to receive gym shoes delivered for him on the grounds that the shoes were medically necessary. In support of his request, Appellant produced a prison medical staff memo dated May 29, 2002, stating that he may wear the shoes “for medical reasons.”

On June 24, 2002, Appellant received a letter from Deborah Bezilla, an administrative assistant at a private law office, stating that the 2002 edition of the Federal Prison Guidebook (Federal Prison Guidebook) that had been ordered, paid for, and sent for delivery to Appellant in prison, had been returned to the law office because it had been refused delivery, at the address given.

Appellant has filed numerous claims and appeals against Respondent-Appellee State of Hawai'i (the State) while incarcerated.

On July 8, 2002, Appellant filed his Rule 40 petition,2 seeking relief on the grounds of (1) *413illegal punishment resulting from (a) the application of a repealed prison rule and (b) an unconstitutional restriction against “helping inmates,”3 (2) denial of access to the courts,4 and (3) retaliatory conduct on the part of prison staff.5 Appellant requested that the court (1) order the prison staff to release him from the Special Holding Unit and (2) expunge all alleged instances of misconduct for helping inmates “gain adequate, effective, and meaningful access to the courts.”

On March 13, 2003, the court issued an order denying the petition. The court determined that “[Appellant’s] claims are without merit, [are] patently frivolous, and [are] without support in either the record or evidence submitted by [Appellant].” The court did not file any findings of fact or conclusions of law.6 Appellant filed a notice of appeal on March 21, 2003.

On appeal, Appellant challenges the court’s decision as “allow[ing] the [pjrison [sjtaff to hinder[ his] access to the courts by denying [him] up-to-date [l]aw [b]ooks, [g]ym [s]hoes required by the [f]oot [d]octor, and us[ing] retaliation against [him] to enforce ... HAR § 17-202-l(b).” He also emphasizes that he “is now in- the Special Holding Unit” and reiterates general arguments on “the right of access to the courts.”7

II.

HRPP Rule 40(a)(1) (2002) describes the grounds upon which relief from judgment may be sought. It states:

(1) From Judgment At any time but not prior to final judgment, any person may seek relief under the procedure set forth in this rule from the judgment of conviction, on the following grounds:

(i) that the judgment was obtained or sentence imposed in violation of the eonsti-*414tution o'f the United States or State of Hawaii;

(ii) that the court which rendered the judgment was without jurisdiction over the person or subject matter;

(iii) that the sentence is illegal;

(iv) that there is newly discovered evidence; or

(v) any ground which is a basis for collateral attack on the judgment.

HRPP Rule 40(a)(2) (2002) outlines the grounds upon which challenges to custody may be made. It states:

From Custody. Any person may seek relief under the procedure set forth in this rule from custody based upon a judgment of conviction, on the following grounds:

(i) that the sentence was fully served;

(ii) that parole or probation was unlawfully revoked; or

(iii) any other ground making the custody, though not the judgment, illegal.

(Emphasis added.) Additionally, HRPP Rule 40(f) (2002) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Hearings. If a petition alleges facts that if proven would entitle the petitioner to relief the court shall grant a hearing which may extend only to the issues raised in the petition or answer. However, the court may deny a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and is without trace of support either in the record or from other evidence submitted by the petitioner. The court may also deny a hearing on a specific question of fact when a full and fair evidentiary hearing upon that question was held during the course of the proceedings which led to the judgment or custody which is the subject of the petition or at any later proceeding.

(Emphases added.) Accordingly, a hearing on a Rule 40 petition is required whenever the allegations in a petition, if taken as true, (1) would change the verdict rendered or (2) would establish the illegality of custody following a judgment. HRPP Rules 40(a) and (f); see Turner v. Hawai'i Paroling Auth., 93 Hawai'i 298, 310, 1 P.3d 768, 780 (App. 2000).

III.

The standard of review in determining whether a court erred in denying a petition for post-conviction relief without a hearing is de novo. Dan v. State, 76 Hawai'i 423, 427, 879 P.2d 528, 532 (1994). Under de novo review, “the appellate court steps into the trial court’s position, reviews the same trial record, and redecides the issue[,]” determining whether the court’s decision was right or wrong. Id. This court has held that de novo review is appropriate because a denial of a petition for post-conviction relief presents a question of law. Id. As this court has said,

[a]s a general rule, a hearing should be held on a Rule 40 petition for post-conviction relief where the petition states a color-able claim. To establish a colorable claim, the allegations of the petition must show that if taken as true the facts alleged would change the verdict, however, a petitioner’s conclusions need not be regarded as true. Where examination of the record of the trial court proceedings indicates that the petitioner’s allegations show no color-able claim, it is not error to deny the petition without a hearing. The question on appeal of a denial of a Rule 10 petition without a hearing is whether the trial record indicates that [a pjetitioner’s application for relief made such a showing of a colorable claim as to require a hearing before the lower couH.

Id. (quoting State v. Allen, 7 Haw.App. 89, 92-93, 744 P.2d 789, 792-93 (1987)) (some emphasis added and some in original).

IV.

A.

Appellant’s first argument is two-fold. He argues that he was illegally punished for (1) violating HAR § 17-202-l(b), a rule that has been repealed, and (2) for assisting inmates in gaining meaningful access to the courts. HAR 17-202-l(b) stated that “[m]u-tual assistance between inmates or wards on legal matters is permitted on a ease by case basis at the facility administrator’s discretion. There is no absolute right of inmates to mutual assistance.” The rule was re*415pealed on April 15, 2000. Appellant contends that the prison staff (1) applied the rule inasmuch as it confined him in the Special Holding facility and (2) created an illegal note of misconduct on his prison record which will adversely impact his future chances of parole. In response, the State argues that Appellant cannot demonstrate that the repealed rule was applied to him, and that even assuming some evidence that the facility was following the repealed rule, the rule “in and of itself is not unconstitutional or illegal because prisons have the authority to regulate mutual assistance” and “there is no requirement that prisons regulate by administrative rule.”

B.

The United States Supreme Court case, Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969), is supportive of Appellant’s first argument. The petitioner in Johnson was transferred to a maximum security building for violating a prison regulation that prohibited inmates from advising, assisting, or otherwise contracting to aid another inmate in legal matters.8 Id. at 484, 89 S.Ct. 747. He sought relief from the disciplinary confinement by filing a “motion for law books and a typewriter” in federal district court. Id. The district court “treated this motion as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and, after a hearing, ordered [the petitioner] released from disciplinary confinement and restored to the status of an ordinary prisoner.” Id. The district court “held[, in part,] that the regulation was void because it in effect barred illiterate prisoners from access to federal habeas corpus.” Id. The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding “that the regulation did not unlawfully conflict with the federal right of habeas corpus.” Id. at 485, 89 S.Ct. 747.

The Supreme Court began its opinion by reaffirming the importance of the writ of habeas corpus, observing that “[s]ince the basic purpose of the writ is to enable those unlawfully incarcerated to obtain their freedom, it is fundamental that access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints may not be denied or obstructed.” Id. (emphasis added). Based on this tenet, the Court stated that “[t]here can be no doubt that [a state] could not constitutionally adopt and enforce a rule forbidding illiterate or poorly educated prisoners to file habeas corpus petitions.” Id. at 487, 89 S.Ct. 747. But, said the Court, the state regulation at issue “effectively [did] just that.” Id.

Accordingly, it was determined that the record supported the district court’s conclusion “that for all practical purposes, if such prisoners cannot have the assistance of a ‘jailhouse lawyer,’ their possibly valid constitutional claims will never be heard in any court.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court observed that

the initial burden of presenting a claim to post-conviction relief usually rests upon the indigent prisoner himself with such help as he can obtain within the prison walls or the prison system. In the case of all except those who are able to help themselves — usually a few old hands or exceptionally gifted prisoners — the prisoner is, in effect, denied access to the courts unless such help is available.

Id. at 488, 89 S.Ct. 747 (emphasis added).

However, the Supreme Court also recognized that a state

may impose reasonable restrictions and restraints upon the acknowledged propensity of prisoners to abuse both the giving and the seeking of assistance in the preparation of applications for relief: for example, by limitations on the time and location of such activities and the imposition of punishment for the giving or receipt of *416consideration in connection with such activities. But unless and until [a state] provides some reasonable alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief, it may not validly enforce a regulation such as that here in issue, barring inmates from furnishing such assistance to other prisoners.

Id. at 490, 89 S.Ct. 747 (emphases added) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit decision was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Id.

V.

A.

Pursuant to Johnson, a prisoner may not be punished for violating a regulation or restriction that unreasonably obstructs the right of access to the courts.9 Preliminarily, however, it should be noted that our obligation on this appeal is not to decide the ultimate question, resolved in Johnson, of whether Appellant was indeed illegally held in the Special Holding Unit based upon an unreasonable regulation. Rather, we need only determine whether Appellant made a showing of a colorable claim, thereby entitling him to an HRPP Rule 40(f) hearing.10

As stated previously, a Rule 40 hearing should be held if the petitioner states a color-able claim by “show[ing] that if taken as true the facts alleged [in the petition] would” entitle the petitioner to be released from custody. Dan, 76 Hawai'i at 427, 879 P.2d at 532. See Turner, 93 Hawai‘i at 310-11, 1 P.3d at 780 (holding that a Rule 40 hearing was required where the appellant “established] a ‘colorable claim’ that the alleged prolonged physical custody resulting from denial of his parole request was illegal”); Preiser v. Rod*417riguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the unit is to secure release from illegal custody.” (Emphasis added.)) In his Rule 40 petition, Appellant alleged, in relevant part, that the prison was still enforcing the repealed HAR § 17-202-1(b) and that he was confined to the Special Holding Unit for assisting other inmates with legal matters where he had obtained warden permission to do so. Taking these facts “as true,” Dan, 76 Hawai'i at 427, 879 P.2d at 532, Appellant would be entitled to the habe-as corpus relief granted by the district court in Johnson and released from the Special Holding Unit.

B.

However, as previously mentioned, pursuant to HRPP Rule 40(f), “the court may deny a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and is mthout trace of support either in the record or from other evidence submitted by the petitioner.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover, “[w]here examination of the record of the trial court proceedings indicates that the petitioner’s allegations show no colorable claim, it is not error to deny the petition without a hearing.” Dan, 76 Hawai'i at 427, 879 P.2d at 532. Thus, we must also consider the record before overturning the court’s denial of the petition without a hearing.11

In support of his petition, Appellant provided numerous exhibits, including two “NOTICE[S] OF REPORT OF MISCONDUCT AND HEARING” and ten “INMATE COMPLAINT/GRIEVANCE” forms. According to the May 9, 2001 notice, Appellant was found “Guilty” of “Refusing to obey an order of any staff member[,]” by “assisting] several inmates with legal matters uñthout proper authorization.” (Emphasis added.) This same notice also provided that Appellant was issued a “SANCTION” of “14 days lockdown to be served in Special Holding pending the availability of space.” According to the June 27, 2002 notice, Appellant was found “Guilty to all charges” for, inter alia, “failing to follow facility directives regarding mutual assistance [.]” (Emphasis added.)

Appellant was again issued the “SANCTION” of “14 days lockdown to be served in special holding pending space availability.” As for the ten grievance forms submitted, all of them indicated, under the heading “RESOLUTION,” that the prison had a policy of requiring inmates to obtain warden approval before assisting another inmate with legal matters.12 One of the ten grievance forms further indicated that the prison may have continued to operate under the repealed HAR Title 17.13

*418In his February 2, 2001 grievance, Appellant stated that he submitted several^ inmate request forms to his counselor, David Voyles, to give to the warden for approval to help several inmates and that those requests were ignored. The “RESOLUTION” in this grievance stated that the warden never received the requests. The Ninth Circuit has determined that a state did not satisfy its burden of demonstrating meaningful access where the record indicated that requests for library access were “lost or ignored” or arbitrarily denied. Gluth v. Kangas, 951 F.2d 1504, 1508 (9th Cir. 1991) (“It is the state’s burden to provide meaningful access and to demonstrate that its chosen method is adequate.”).

Appellant also submitted a “FOUND PROPERTY REPORT,” documenting that envelopes addressed to other inmates, including one Aua Pedro, were confiscated from Appellant’s cell during a “random shakedown” on April 5, 2002. According to a “HCF [ (Halawa Correctional Facility) ] INMATE REQUEST FORM,” Aua Pedro’s request that Appellant be allowed to help him with legal matters was approved by prison staff on June 22, 2001. In the exhibit entitled “RESULTS FOR ADJUSTMENT COMMITTEE HEARING FOR INMATE EUGENE HUTCH[,]” the committee sanctioned Appellant to fourteen days’ segregation in the Special Holding Unit for being in possession of and making copies of legal documents for other inmates as follows:

The committee wants to make it very clear to the subject that he is not being charged with assisting inmates with legal matters. He is charged with being in possession of their legal documents and making duplicate copies for them. It is not the subject’s responsibility to make these copies and retain the actual legal documents of other inmates for the purpose of mailing these documents to the courts. It is the responsibility of inmate Genaro Gualdara-ma. The Subject should only be assisting in legal issues by discussion and correspondence with the inmate.

(Some emphases added and some in original.) From what we can glean, HAR § 17-202-1(b) aside, this is the most specific description of the mutual assistance policy being-enforced against Appellant.

The State has not provided the rules or policy by which the prison decides whether to authorize mutual assistance between inmates, but continues to assert that in sanctioning Appellant, the prison did not implement the repealed HAR § 17-202-(b).14 However, the reason given in the aforementioned adjustment committee report for sending Appellant to the Special Holding Unit is cause for concern. The scope of the prison’s statement that Appellant “should only be assisting in legal issues by discussion and correspondence with the inmate” is questionable. (Some emphasis added and some in original.) Prohibiting the “jailhouse lawyer” from “possessing” the legal documents of the inmate he has been authorized to “assist,” means that the inmate must be able to read and convey what is written in the papers to the “jailhouse lawyer” in order to obtain assistance. If the statement in the adjustment committee report is accurate, such a policy, standing alone, may “effectively” “forbid[] illiterate or poorly educated prisoners to file *419habeas corpus petitions[,]” running afoul of Johnson. 393 U.S. at 487, 89 S.Ct. 747. The foregoing exhibits, then, constitute more than a “trace of support” that Appellant was illegally and/or unconstitutionally confined to the Special Holding Unit.15

Therefore, we hold, based upon Appellant’s Rule 40 petition and an independent examination of the record, that Appellant has made a showing of a colorable claim that he was illegally punished for providing assistance to other inmates and, accordingly, the court should have held a hearing on the petition as to this claim.16

VI.

Appellant’s final two arguments are that he has been denied access to the courts and that prison staff have retaliated against him for attempting to exercise his rights. Appellant’s claims rest on the contentions that prison staff prevented him from receiving the Federal Prison Guidebook and intentionally denied him access to his medically required shoes. In response, the State maintains that Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the absence of the book injured his ability to access the courts, citing numerous legal claims filed by Appellant. Furthermore, the State contends that Appellant did not demonstrate that he had followed proper procedures for delivery approval and, therefore, failed to show that the refusal to accept delivery was retaliatory.

In the instant case, Appellant does not establish a Rule 40(a)(1) claim challenging the judgment for which Appellant is currently incarcerated. The lack of access to the Federal Prison Guidebook and his shoes does not demonstrate that the judgment against him was unconstitutional, lacking in jurisdictional foundation, illegal, made in the absence of key evidence, or that there is a new basis for a collateral attack. HRPP Rule 40(a)(1). In addition, Appellant’s allegations fail to demonstrate any claims under Rule 40(a)(2) *420such as an assertion that the sentence was fully served, parole or probation was unlawfully revoked, or any other ground making the custody illegal.

However, Appellant may be entitled to relief on these claims through a civil claim and not a petition under Rule 40. HRPP Rule 40(c)(3) (2002) states, in relevant part, that

if a post-conviction petition alleges neither illegality of judgment nor illegality of post-conviction “custody” or “restraint” but instead alleges a cause of action based on a civil rights statute or other separate cause of action, the court shall treat the pleading as a civil complaint not governed by this nde.

(Emphasis added.) Since Appellant’s claims do not meet the grounds outlined in Rules 40(a)(1) or 40(a)(2), and these claims seemingly fit under the “[sjeparate [cjause of action” under Rule 40(c)(3), the court should “treat the pleading as a civil complaint” as to these matters. In the absence of a colorable claim, the court did not err by not convening a hearing as to these issues. See Dan, 76 Hawai‘i at 427, 879 P.2d at 532. However, these claims should be “transferred by the court for disposition under civil rules.” HRPP Rule 40(e)(3).17

VII.

In summary, Appellant has made a showing of a colorable claim that he was illegally or unconstitutionally confined in the Special Holding Unit and, therefore, he should have been granted an HRPP Rule 40(f) hearing as to that claim. Appellant’s remaining claims relating to denial of access to the courts and retaliatory behavior do not fall within the domain of HRPP Rule 40 and should have been appropriately classified and disposed of as civil claims. Therefore, the March 13, 2003 order denying Appellant’s petition without a hearing is vacated and the case remanded to the court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.