State of Iowa v. James Leroy Huls
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 15-0467 Filed March 9, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JAMES LEROY HULS,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sioux County, Jeffrey A. Neary, Judge.
A defendant appeals the court’s summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence. AFFIRMED.
Michael J. Jacobsma of Jacobsma & Clabaugh, P.L.C., Sioux Center, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Potterfield, JJ.
VOGEL, Judge.
James Huls was convicted after a bench trial of lascivious acts with a minor, a serious misdemeanor. Huls was sentenced to a suspended 365 days in jail, and the court imposed the special sentence of ten years of supervision under Iowa Code section 903B.2 (2005). Huls appealed his conviction, which was affirmed by our court, though we remanded the case to correct the amount of the civil penalty. State v. Huls, 08-0110, 2009 WL 398456, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2009). Huls’s probation was revoked in 2012, and the original jail sentence was imposed. On July 25, 2013, Huls began his special ten-year sentence under section 903B.2. In October 2014, Huls’s parole was revoked, and he was sent to prison. Huls then filed a motion to correct illegal sentence claiming, among other things,1 that the imposition of the special sentence under section 903B.2 amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the United States and Iowa Constitutions.2 The State filed a resistance, and the district court summarily denied the motion without a hearing. Huls claims on appeal he should have been given a hearing at which he could have presented the challenge to his sentence. We review constitutional claims de novo. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 639.
In State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 884 (Iowa 2009), our supreme court concluded “at least in some instances, defendants who commit acts of lesser culpability within the scope of broad criminal statutes carrying stiff penalties should be able to launch an as-applied cruel and unusual punishment challenge.” However, the court made clear that an individual assessment should be permitted only in a “relatively rare case” that involves “an unusual combination of features that converge to generate a high risk of potential gross disproportionality.” Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 884. The defendant in Bruegger was permitted to make such a challenge because his case involved the convergence of three factors that presented a substantial risk the sentence could be grossly disproportionate.3 Id. “If the sentence does not create an inference of gross disproportionality, then ‘no further analysis is necessary.’” Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 650 (citation omitted).
In Huls’s motion, there is no assertion that his case involved any factors that created an inference of gross disproportionality between the underlying crime and his sentence. The motion itself was a fill-in-the-blank form with the offender adding in only information regarding his conviction. Huls failed to demonstrate that his case is one of the relatively rare cases that involves “an unusual combination of features that converge to generate a high risk of potential gross disproportionality.” Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 884. Without more, we cannot say the court should have permitted Huls an evidentiary hearing. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence.
AFFIRMED.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.