Charles Chadwick, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 14-1922 Filed June 15, 2016

CHARLES CHADWICK,

Applicant-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, James M. Richardson, Judge.

A defendant brings an action for postconviction relief and requests a new trial. AFFIRMED.

Susan R. Stockdale, Windsor Heights, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle P. Hanson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Mullins, J., and Eisenhauer, S.J.* *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015). EISENHAUER, Senior Judge.

Charles Chadwick appeals the district court’s summary dismissal of his application for postconviction relief (PCR). In 1982, Chadwick was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. Those convictions were affirmed on appeal. See State v. Chadwick, 328 N.W.2d 913, 918 (Iowa 1983).

Chadwick filed this, his fourth PCR action, on June 10, 2013. In it, he contends the supreme court’s holding in State v. Smith, 739 N.W.2d 289, 295 (Iowa 2007) has retroactive effect and he should be granted a new trial as a result.1 Our threshold question in considering whether due process requires a judicial decision be applied to PCR proceedings is whether the decision is substantive or procedural. Goosman v. State, 764 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Iowa 2009). Chadwick argues Smith is substantive. “[F]ederal due process only requires retroactive application of clarifications to existing substantive law, not changes to substantive law.” Nguyen v. State, __ N.W.2d __, __, 2016 WL 920320, at *9 (Iowa 2016).

PCR actions are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See Iowa Code § 822.3 (2013). Chadwick’s action is untimely, unless he can show “a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time period.” Id. Presumably, Chadwick believes the Smith holding satisfies this requirement.2

Smith, to Chadwick, is thus both Scylla and Charybdis. If Smith is a clarification of existing substantive law, it may be applied retroactively, but it is not a new ground of fact or law, and his claim is time-barred. If Smith is a change to substantive law, it may be a new ground of fact or law, but we are not required to apply it retroactively to Chadwick’s case.3 What Chadwick does not explain is how Smith can be both a clarification of the law and a ground he could not have raised within the three-year time bar. See Perez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 354, 361 (Iowa 2012). Given that internal contradiction, he cannot prevail.

We agree with the decision of the district court and affirm its dismissal of Chadwick’s PCR application without further opinion pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 21.26(1)(d) and (e).

AFFIRMED.