James Mark Taylor v. State of Iowa
James Mark Taylor v. State of Iowa
Opinion
In 2001, James Taylor pled guilty to three counts of second-degree murder and one count of first-degree arson. He was sentenced to 150 years in prison with a mandatory sentence of 42.5 years. He did not file a motion in arrest of judgment, nor did he file an appeal. Nearly fourteen years later, Taylor filed pro se motions deemed by the district court to be an application for postconviction relief (PCR). Taylor's appointed PCR counsel filed amendments to the application. All of his claims were based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. The State resisted, asserting the application was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations provided under Iowa Code section 822.3 (2015). 1 The PCR court concluded Taylor's claims did not fall within an exception to the section 822.3 statute of limitations, nor did they extend the limitations period. The PCR court dismissed Taylor's claims as time-barred. Taylor appeals.
On appeal, Taylor contends his PCR counsel was ineffective in failing to assert the equitable estoppel doctrine as a basis for tolling the three-year section 822.3 statute of limitations. Taylor acknowledges his application is untimely unless this court adopts equitable tolling-a concept recognized and available in federal PCR proceedings in some instances.
See
Holland v. Florida
,
Taylor also asserts his PCR counsel was ineffective in failing "to obtain an expert to evaluate him with respect to his mental state between the time of the plea and when he finally filed for postconviction relief." He contends, "Without this evidence, [he] would have had no opportunity to establish a ground for equitable estoppel." Taylor requests a "do-over" with new PCR counsel so a record can be developed. Even if his PCR counsel had obtained such evidence, Taylor cannot establish that the district court would have adopted an equitable-tolling exception to the statute of limitations provision found in Iowa Code section 822.3 because, as stated above, the doctrine has not been recognized in Iowa.
See
Rieflin v. State
, No. 11-1044,
AFFIRMED.
Iowa Code section 822.3 requires that individuals seeking PCR file their application within three years from issuance of procedendo, unless the application is supported by a new ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the limitation period. We note, although not applicable to the case at hand, our supreme court recently held
that where a PCR petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel has been timely filed per section 822.3 and there is a successive PCR petition alleging postconviction counsel was ineffective in presenting the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, the timing of the filing of the second PCR petition relates back to the timing of the filing of the original PCR petition for purposes of Iowa Code section 822.3 if the successive PCR petition is filed promptly after the conclusion of the first PCR action.
Allison v. State
, --- N.W.2d ----, ----,
The Sixth Circuit found a petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether mental incompetence prevented him from filing a habeas petition, and if so, whether that entitles him to equitable tolling in
Ata v. Scutt
,
See
James v. State
,
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.