This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s resisted motion for remand, filed July 7, 1980. Granted.

This action, involving a claim on a fire insurance policy, was originally commenced in Webster County District Court. Defendant United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company (USF&G), a corporation, received its copy of the original notice and petition on June 5, 1980, and on June 25, 1980, it filed a petition for removal with this court based on diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff now seeks remand for several reasons, one of which was the failure of USF&G to specifically allege in its removal petition the state of its principal place of business, a failure USF&G acknowledged in its responsive pleadings and memoranda to this motion. USF&G now requests permission to amend its petition for the purpose of adding an allegation that its principal place of business is not Iowa. Alternatively, USF&G suggests that the court can take judicial notice of the fact that Iowa is not its principal place of business.

The removal of a lawsuit to federal court is a creature of statute and as such must strictly comply with the applicable statutes. Alabama ex rel. Flowers v. Robinson, 220 F.Supp. 293 (N.D.Ala. 1963); Arkansas v. Howard, 218 F.Supp. 626 (E.D.Ark. 1963). Section 1446(a) of Title 28, United States Code, requires that a petition for removal contain a “short and plain statement of the facts which entitle” the defendant to removal. One of the required allegations in the removal petition of a corporate defendant is the corporation’s state of principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1332(c); Teeter v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co., 237 F.Supp. 961 (N.D.Iowa 1964). Where removal is based on diversity of citizenship and this allegation is missing, a federal district court does not have jurisdiction of the case and must either dismiss it or remand it. Id.

USF&G’s suggestion that the court take judicial notice of its principal place of business is rejected as inconsistent with the rules of strict compliance with jurisdictional statutes. Likewise, USF&G’s request for permission to amend its removal petition is denied; the court lacks jurisdiction to grant this request. If the time for filing the removal petition had not already expired, the court would be of a different mind in this regard. See William Kalivas Constr. Co. v. Vent Control of Kansas City, Inc., 325 F.Supp. 1008 (W.D.Mo. 1970).

It is therefore

ORDERED

Granted.