Burton v. Hintrager
Cases that cite this one
24 later published cases cite this decision.
- Witt v. Mewhirter (Iowa 1881)
- Adams v. Beale (Iowa 1865)
- Trustees of Iowa College v. Baillie (Iowa 1945)
- Bates v. Pabst (Iowa 1937)
- Smith v. Hughes (Okla. 1929)
- Byington v. Carlin (Iowa 1910)
- Ashenfelter v. Seiling (Iowa 1909)
- Smith v. Thornton (Ark. 1905)
- Busch v. Hall (Iowa 1903)
- Swan v. Harvey (Iowa 1902)
- McGee v. Bailey (Iowa 1892)
- Pearsons v. American Investment Co. (Iowa 1891)
- Harding v. Vaughn (U.S. Circuit Court for the Southern District of Iowa 1888)
- Lilly v. Dunn (Ind. 1884)
- Stevens v. Cassady (Iowa 1882)
- Foster v. Bowman (Iowa 1880)
- Corning Town Co. v. Davis (Iowa 1876)
- Lloyd v. Bunce (Iowa 1875)
- Tallman v. Cooke (Iowa 1874)
- Jacobs v. Porter (Iowa 1872)
- Gower v. Winchester (Iowa 1871)
- Rice v. Nelson (Iowa 1869)
- Crum v. Cotting (Iowa 1867)
- Penn v. Clemans (Iowa 1865)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
It will be seen, by reference to the statement, that the mortgage by Smith to Burton, the ancestor of plaintiff, was made prior to the taking effect of the Code of 1851, section 1210 of which provided that the mortgagor of real estate retains the legal title and right of possession. (See also Revision, § 2217.) But at the date of the mortgage the legal title vested in the mortgagee. 1 Hill. Mort., 104, and authorities there cited; Blackw. Tax Titles, 2d ed., 883, 384. We refer to this difference, because it was discussed at some length by counsel; but in our view, the rights of the plaintiff in this case would be the same if the mortgage had been executed after the Code of 1851 took effect, as they are under the mortgage executed before. We concede, for the purposes of this case, what appellant’s counsel claims, that it is requisite under our statutes (Law's of 1852, p. 226, and Revision, §779), in order to entitle the minor to an extension of the time of redemption beyond the three years that the minor should be the owner of the property at the time of the sale. A subsequently acquired ownership would not entitle the minor thus acquiring it to the one year after removal of disability for
Affirmed,
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.