Nugent v. Bates
Cases that cite this one
24 later published cases cite this decision.
- Ruth & Clark, Inc. v. Emery (Iowa 1943)
- Ludlow, Clark & Co. v. Szold (Iowa 1894)
- Farmers Grain Dealers Ass'n of Iowa v. Woodward (Iowa 1983)
- Julson v. Julson (Iowa 1963)
- Griswold Land & Credit Co. v. County of Calhoun (Iowa 1924)
- McDonald v. Clarke County (Iowa 1923)
- Collins v. City of Keokuk (Iowa 1902)
- State ex rel. Killpack v. Hemsworth (Iowa 1900)
- Dickerson v. Utterback (Iowa 1926)
- Duhaime v. Rowe (Iowa 1917)
- Barhydt v. Cross (Iowa 1912)
- Tally v. Brown (Iowa 1910)
- Glotfelty v. Brown (Iowa 1910)
- Reed v. City of Cedar Rapids (Iowa 1908)
- Nixon v. City of Burlington (Iowa 1908)
- Cover v. Hatten (Iowa 1907)
- Stevens v. Carroll (Iowa 1905)
- City Council of Marion v. National Loan & Investment Co. (Iowa 1904)
- Crawford v. Polk County (Iowa 1900)
- Smith v. McQuiston (Iowa 1899)
- State ex rel. Jennings Bros. Investment Co. v. Armstrong (Utah 1899)
- Smith v. City of Marshalltown (Iowa 1892)
- Remey v. Board of Equalization (Iowa 1890)
- Powers v. Bowman (Iowa 1880)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The family continued to reside at Osceola after September, 1875, there being no change in this respect except that the plaintiff was absent. ' He was in Osceola with his family at least once. This was in December, 1875, and how long he remained, or for what purpose he returned, does not appear.
Affidavits were filed by the plaintiff which, in terms, state that he‘was a resident of Chicago from September, 1875, until after January, 1876. Such affidavits are not entitled to consideration because they state mere legal conclusions. The affidavits in effect merely state what, in their judgment, the law is.
The plaintiff states that he was a resident of Chicago at the time the assessment was made, and that he had been such since September, 1875, and further states: “I had at said time permanently located, as I supposed; had sold out my business in Clarke county, and was doing business in Chicago and no other place; that at the time I was assessed •had all my arrangements made to move my family to Chicago, where I at that time was in business, and had purchased property; but owing to the failure of the bank at Osceola I was unable to carry out the plans. I had to let the trade go, as the bank was my security. ”
“The place where a married man’s family resides is generally to be deemed his domicile. But the presumption'from this circumstance may be controlled by other circumstances; for if it is a place of temporary establishment only for his family, or for transient objects, it will not be deemed his domicile.” If his “family is fixed in one place, and he does business in another, the former is considered the place of his domicile.” Story’s Conflict of Laws, § 46. ■
When a residence is once acquired it is presumed to continue until there is satisfactory evidence of abandonment. In Matter of Nichols, 54 N. Y., 62. The only evidence of
The fact that plaintiff had no knowledge of the assessment until after the board-adjourned makes no difference. The law has provided a tribunal, time and place for the correction of erroneous assessments, and this every person is bound, to know, and he must attend before such tribunal or whatever rights he may have will be deemed waived.
There is no reason for continuing the temporary injunction to the hearing. There is not the slightest evidence of fraud, and as to the question of residence we have only considered the undisputed facts and the showing made by the plaintiff.
Affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.