Smith v. Osburn
Cases that cite this one
15 later published cases cite this decision.
- Isbell v. Board of Supervisors (Iowa 1952)
- City of Dubuque Bridge Commission v. Board of Review of Dubuque (Iowa 1942)
- Washington University v. Baumann (Mo. 1937)
- Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co. (5th Cir. 1936)
- In re Willis (District Court, N.D. Texas 1923)
- Seattle & Puget Sound Packing Co. v. City of Seattle (Wash. 1908)
- Coll Watlington v. Picó (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1960)
- Coll Watlington v. Picó (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico 1960)
- Baker v. Maxwell (Iowa 1918)
- Bednar v. Carroll (Iowa 1908)
- Security Savings Bank v. Carroll (Iowa 1905)
- Ft. Dodge Electric Light & Power Co. v. City of Ft. Dodge (Iowa 1902)
- Collins v. City of Keokuk (Iowa 1902)
- Smith v. McQuiston (Iowa 1899)
- Second Nat. Bank of Titusville v. Caldwell (District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania 1882)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
It has uniformly been held by this court that where the assessment was merely irregular or erroneous equity will not interfere to correct the same, but that application must be made to th& board of equalization. Macklot v. Davenport, 17 Iowa, 37 9, and other cases. But where a tax is imposed under an unconstitutional law, or levied without authority of law upon property exempt from taxation, the same cases hold that the jurisdiction of the board of equalization is not exclusive. It is claimed that the property described in the petition is under the law exempt from taxation. If this position be correct, as the petition avers grounds for equitable relief, the action may be maintained. This we deem a sufficient answer to the argument of appellee upon this question, and the effect thereof is to overrule the motion to dismiss the appeal, although the ruling on the demurrer sustained the same generally. That the demurrer was in fact sustained on but one ground appears from the fact that the court below certified but the one question upon which the opinion of this court is sought.
The petition avers that the plaintiffs are printers, and that as such they are mechanics. 'That the art of printing is a mechanical trade, and that a printer is a mechanic, it seems to us can admit of no question. We believe it is usually recognized as such. Webster defines the word mechanic as “one who works with machines or instruments: 'a person whose occupation is to construct machines or goods, wares, instruments, furniture and the like: one skilled in a mechanical occupation or art.”
We think that the term tools may properly include the press, types, imposing stones, and other implen^nts necessary for a printer to carry on his business. That the statute did not contemplate that the costly machinery now in use in large printing establishments, such as power presses operated by steam, should be exempt, is evident from the fact that the-limit of exemption is fixed at $300. But that the ordinary hand press of a printer should be included in making up the amount of the exemption, is just as evident as that the hand-loom of a weaver, the bellows of .a blacksmith, or the workbench of a carpenter, should be held to be exempt under the statute.
We think the demurrer should have been overruled.
Reversed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.