First National Bank v. Baker
Cases that cite this one
14 later published cases cite this decision.
- Hawkeye Bank & Trust Co. v. Michel (Iowa 1985)
- Crail v. Jones (Iowa 1928)
- Harm v. Hale (Iowa 1928)
- Dolan v. Newberry (Iowa 1925)
- Schaffner v. Campbell (Iowa 1924)
- Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Shaffer (Iowa 1915)
- State ex rel. Schneider v. Hull (Mo. Ct. App. 1903)
- Kinzer v. Stephens (Iowa 1903)
- Robinson v. Charleton (Iowa 1897)
- Boot v. Brewster (Iowa 1888)
- Garmoe v. Windle (Iowa 1888)
- Paine v. Means (Iowa 1885)
- First National Bank v. Baker (Iowa 1882)
- Randal v. Elder (Kan. 1873)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
If the defendant’s position is correct, then strictly the plaintiff should have averred the negative fact that the premises were not purchased with the proceeds of a former homestead, which would have been exempt if retained, and inasmuch as such negative fact was not averred, the petition should upon their theory be regarded as demurrable. But in our opinion the defendants’ position cannot be maintained. They do not,
There was, it is true, a practice in equity of introducing into the bill what was called the charging part, wherein the plaintiff would set out the defenses which he anticipated that the defendant would make, and deny the truth of the supposed matters, or set up facts in avoidance. Story’s Eq. Pleadings, section 31. That was never, however, the correct practice at law (1 Chitty’s Pleading, 222), and under Code practice the practice in equity has in this respect been assimilated to practice at law. Bliss on Code Pleading, section 200. Our Code, section 2646, sub. 3, makes one provision for the statement necessary to be made in a petition, whether it be at law or in equity, and that is that it shall be a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action. When the plaintiff in the case at bar had set out its judgment in its petition, and averred that the premises in question, although the homestead of the defendants, were liable because they were purchased since the contraction of the debt, it showed a prima facie cause of action; and that was all that was necessary. Where a person as payee of a promissory note brings an action thereon against the maker, and avers the execution, delivery and non-payment of the note, he shows only a prima facie cause of action. But that is sufficient. He is not bound to aver that the maker was not an infant, nor that the note was not obtained by duress, nor anticipate any one of the defenses which if made and proven would be sufficient to avoid the note.
The general rule is that the debtor’s homestead is not liable to execution. To this there is the exception that it may be sold for a debt contracted prior to its puachase. The plaintiff by its averment brought itself within the exception, and show
The point upon which the defendants seem principally to rely is that as the plaintiff averred that the premises were liable to execution, and the defendants denied it, an issue was thereby formed which involved the whole merits of the case, and of that issue the plaintiff had the affirmative.
But it is plain to be seen that both the averment and the denial involved mere conclusions of law. That the defendants cannot rely upon their denial becomes clear by considering that the plaintiff averred facts which supported its conclusion in regard to the liability of the premises, which facts the defendants admitted. With these facts admitted by the defendants, their denial went for nothing.
It appears to us that upon the pleadings the plaintiff was entitled to judgment, and that the court erred in dismissing its petition.
Reversed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.