Tuffree v. Incorporated Town
Cases that cite this one
8 later published cases cite this decision.
- Jackson ex rel. Moore v. City of Jamestown (N.D. 1916)
- City of Tulsa v. Harman (Okla. 1931)
- Wheat v. City of St. Louis (Mo. 1904)
- Davis v. City of Dubuque (Iowa 1930)
- Buchholtz v. Incorporated of Radcliffe (Iowa 1905)
- Bender v. Incorporated Town of Minden (Iowa 1904)
- Barce v. City of Shenandoah (Iowa 1898)
- Yahn v. City of Ottumwa (Iowa 1883)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The jury made certain special findings which were in substance that the swing was at the side of the street near the sidewalk, and between the sidewalk and the traveled portion of the street; that it was daylight at the time, and the swing was in plain view in front of the plaintiff’s horse, and only a few feet ahead when she started; that she had seen the swing but drove so close to it that it caught upon the buggy, whereby the buggy was stopped and partly overturned.
Notwithstanding these findings the jury rendered a general verdict for the plaintiff
They must have done so, we think, under the supposition that there was some circumstance which was sufficient to ex
It cannot be said of course that she was excusable because the swing was not apparently a dangerous object. If it was not apparently dangerous, then the town was not guilty of negligence in suffering the swing to be there.
It seems probable that the jury must have found that the plaintiff’s attention was diverted at the time she drove against the swing, and that she was excusable upon that ground.
Upon looking into the charge of the court, we find an instruction given upon the theory that the jury might find that the plaintiff’s attention was diverted when she drove against the swing, and that she was not, therefore, guilty of contributory negligence.
The jury were instructed that they might consider the presence of other ladies with whom the plaintiff was conversing, and all the surrounding circumstances, and that if she knew that the swing was there, or might have known it by the exercise of ordinary care, under all the circumstances, and she negligently drove into the swing, she could not recover. One of the circumstances which the court seems to have thought might have been sufficient to excuse the plaintiff, or at least which was to be considered with that view, was the presence of other'ladies with whom she was talking. The instruction was excepted to and the giving of it is assigned as error. The question presented is as to whether the presence of other ladies with whom the plaintiff was talking had any tendency to excuse her. In our opinion it had not.
It was held, it is true, in Greenleaf v. Dubuque & Sioux City R. R. Co., 33 Iowa, 59, that an employe of a railroad company is not necessarily guilty of contributory negligence in not avoiding a known and plainly visible danger. It was thought that the jury might find that he was not, if the service which he was performing at the time required his exclusive attention. But in our opinion we could not sanction the
Eevbrsed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.