C. & N. W. R'y Co. v. Dunn
Cases that cite this one
14 later published cases cite this decision.
- Chicago & North Western Railway Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad (District Court, N.D. Iowa 1959)
- Peters v. Lyons (Iowa 1969)
- White v. McKenzie Electric Cooperative, Inc. (District Court, D. North Dakota 1964)
- Great Northern Railway Company v. Bartlett & Company, Grain (8th Cir. 1962)
- Slechta v. Great Northern Railway Company (District Court, N.D. Iowa 1961)
- Weidert v. Monahan Post Legionnaire Club, Inc. (Iowa 1952)
- Rozmajzl v. Northland Greyhound Lines (Iowa 1951)
- Kittleson v. American Dist. Telegraph Co. (District Court, N.D. Iowa 1948)
- Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Southern Railway Co. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) 1931)
- City of Des Moines v. Barber Asphalt Co. (District Court, S.D. Iowa 1913)
- Alaska Steamship Co. v. Pacific Coast Gypsum Co. (Wash. 1912)
- Horrabin v. City of Des Moines (Iowa 1924)
- Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. Washington & Berkeley Bridge Co. (District Court, N.D. West Virginia 1912)
- Manwell v. Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Northern Railway Co. (Iowa 1890)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Under the allegation of the petition, the defendant was guilty of an active wrong. Eor the purpose of protecting him from injury the company owed him no duty, and was under no obligation. If the defendant’s horse had strayed upon the railway through the gate and been injured, he could not, except in a case of gross negligence upon the part of the company, recover therefor. Russell v. Hanly, 20 Iowa, 219 (221). The defendant having by his willful act removed the gate, and enabled Engle’s horse to pass upon the railroad track and be injured, Engle might have maintained an action directly against the defendant for the injury. See Russell v. Hanly, supra. But the railway company was passively guilty of a wrong, as to a third person, in permitting the gate to remain down so long a period; hence, the company was under legal obligation to compensate the owner of the horse for the injury. It is claimed that the plaintiff cannot recover of the defendant because the plaintiff is a joint wrongdoer, and because the liability of the plaintiff to pay for the
That the plaintiffs negligence did not constitute the omission of any duty which the plaintiff owed the defendant is apparent from the fact that, if the defendant’s horse had escaped through the gate upon the track of the railway and been injured, the defendant would have been without remedy. The ease falls fully within the principle of those cases in which it has been held that a municipal corporation, which has been compelled to pay damages to a party injured because of an obstruction upon or excavation in a street, may recover from the party causing the excavation or obstruction. See City of Chicago v. Robins, 2 Black., 418; s. c., 4 Wall., 657; Town of Lowell v. B. L. Ry. Co., 23 Pick., 24; City of Ottumwa v. Parks, 43 Iowa, 119; City of Souix City v. Weare, 95 ante.
The demurrer was improperly sustained.
Beveesed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.