Archer v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R'y Co.
Cases that cite this one
16 later published cases cite this decision.
- Charles Furnald v. Anthony Hughes and Emcasco Insurance Company (Iowa 2011)
- William Davis and Regina Davis v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. And Gina M. Benzshawel (8th Cir. 1995)
- In re Workers' Compensation Refund (D. Minn. 1994)
- Michael Trask v. Amar F. Ahmed, M.D.; Sandro Younadam, M.D.; Shellie O'Brien-Perry, A.R.N.P.; Kimberly A. Willich, A.R.N.P.; and Oforbuike C. Ewelukwa, M.D. (Iowa 2026)
- Weisz v. Moore (Iowa 1936)
- Hutchings v. Royal Bakery (Or. 1913)
- Pennsylvania Co. v. Good (Ind. Ct. App. 1913)
- Pardey v. Inc. Town of Mechanicsville (Iowa 1897)
- Dianna Ellis, as Wrongful Death Representative for the Estate of Burke Henry Mccarthy v. Wesley Hiser, M.D., an Individual (Wyo. 2025)
- Ryan v. Phoenix Insurance (Iowa 1927)
- McCoy v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Co. (Mo. Ct. App. 1908)
- Pardey v. Town of Mechanicsville (Iowa 1900)
- Larwill v. Burke (Cuyahoga Circuit Court 1900)
- Larwill v. Burke (Ohio Circuit Courts 1900)
- Harrison v. Hartford Fire Insurance (Iowa 1897)
- New York, Lake Erie & Western R. R. v. Siegfried (Mahoning Circuit Court 1892)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
It will be observed that the statute provides that if the plaintiff fails in the action another may be brought. Is the voluntary dismissal of the action such a failure as is contemplated by the statute? A voluntary dismissal under compulsion may be. For instance, it is possible that the plaintiff, without negligence on his part, may not be ready to try the case, and yet be unable to obtain a continuance; and in such
The plaintiff in the case at bar dismissed his action because he believed that he could not obtain a fair trial in the federal court. This is not a traversable fact. It cannot be tried and determined. The demurrer only admits such facts as are well pleaded. Suppose the plaintiff had proceeded to trial in the federal .court, and a jury had been impaneled, and the plaintiff then concluded that he could not obtain a fair trial before such jury, and therefore dismissed his action, and then commenced this suit, could the question be determined in this action whether the plaintiff’s conclusion at the time he dismissed the former action was well grounded or not? We think not; because what the plaintiff' may have believed is entirely immaterial and not traversable. In our opinion, public policy would prevent such an inquiry. We deem it proper to say that it is not alleged that there was any fraud or corruption on the part of the federal court; but because of the existence of matters which, if brought to the attention of the court, could and would have been corrected or punished as a contempt, the plaintiff conceived the belief that a fair trial could not be had in such court. If it be conceded that he was correct, it is simply his misfortune. The ease was legally in the federal court for trial, and the defendant-had the legal right to have it tried in such court. If the plaintiff can be permitted to say that he believes he cannot have a fair trial in that court, the defendant, with equal propriety, could say that it could not obtain a fair trial in the state court. And
Affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.