1 2 I. Some of the assignments of error are merely stated in appellants’, brief, — not argued. These will not, therefore, be considered. It is said the court erred, in the sixth division of its charge, in submitting to the jury the matter of the difference between the amount of rent agreed to be paid by plaintiff, under his lease from Craig, from April 28, 1890, to November 1, 1891, and the actual rental value of the property, because there was no evidence touching that matter. Without entering into a discussion of the evidence as to this matter, we may say that, although it was not as definite in this particular as it should have been, we think it was sufficient to warrant the submission of the question to the jury. It clearly showed the rental value at the time defendants took possession of the premises, and the form of the question may be construed to call for such value during the period from April 28,1890, to November 1, 1891, though not so expressed in terms. Besides, it appears, from letters of the defendants in evidence, that the hotel was well filled with guests, and, as the letters say, it was “having a big run” during a portion, at least, of the period mentioned. It is also shown that it had been doing about the same business for two years prior to April 80,1890. Under such circumstances it is fair to presume that, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, the rental value after April 28, 1890, would not be less than it was shown to be at that date, if we treat the evidence as limited to that date. Furthermore, defendants introduced evidence of value of such use of the property, and the witness Higgens testified to having paid seventy-five dollars per month therefor for some time after June, 1890. Clearly, there was evidence to justify the giving of the instruction.

*493 4 5 II. Error is also assigned upon the giving of the sixth paragraph of the court’s charge, wherein he directed the jury to find the reasonable value of the use of said hotel and furniture from April 28, 1890, to November 1, 1891. It is urged that plaintiff’s rights as to said furniture, had already been adjudicated, and he had been paid for whatever interest he had in said furniture, and it is claimed that paragraph 7 of the court’s charge, is in conflict with paragraph 6. Construing these instructions together, there is no conflict, when the facts to which they are applicable, are considered. The second count of the petition charged the conversion of certain furniture by defendants, and sought to recover its value. As to that, the court instructed that there could be no recovery. Under paragraph 6, recovery was permitted for the value of the use of the hotel and furniture. Defendants plead that the furniture put into the hotel, by Mathews, after the execution of the lease with Craig, was no more than an equivalent for articles of furniture in the house when the lease was made, and which were thereafter worn out or destroyed. By the terms of the lease, Mathews agreed to keep and return the original furniture in as good repair as the same was at the time the lease was executed, or make an equivalent therefor. It therefore appears, that this furniture is to be treated as a substitute for other furniture which had become worn out or destroyed. In legal effect, then, it was the same as the old furniture, subject to the rights of the parties under the lease, which gave the plaintiff the right to its use. If, then, the defendants deprived plaintiff of such use, they were liable. In the replevin case, in which it is claimed plaintiff’s rights to the furniture were adjudicated, certain furniture was claimed by him as the head of a family. That case did not determine *50the right of possession to, or use of other property of the same class in the hotel. Instruction 6 permits recovery for use of furniture, while instruction 7 denies recovery for the value of certain furniture. Plaintiff, as we have seen, was, under the lease, entitled to the use of the furniture, and that in no wise conflicts with paragraph 6 of the charge.

6 III. It is said the court erred in admitting in evidence certain pages of plaintiff’s book of accounts. The argument is that the book was offered and admitted for the purpose of proving ■ the payment of certain notes, and claim is made that cash items in a book account of one not a broker or banker cannot be thus proven. By turning to the record we discover that the real objection made to this book was that proper preliminary proof had not been made to permit its admission. The objection now made, as we read the record, was not then made, nor does it appear to have been called to the attention of the trial court. We cannot, therefore, consider it.

IY. Claim is made that the verdict is contrary to the evidence. There is much conflict in the evidence, but we cannot say that it did not warrant the finding of the jury. Upon the whole record we discover no error, and the judgment below is affirmed.

Supplemental Opinion on Re-hearing.

7 We were induced to grant are-hearing in this case because of a claim that in the foregoing opinion we had misapprehended the record, in declining to consider an assignment of error based on the admission of certain books of account in evidence, as shown by the third division of the opinion. In arguing the assignment on the *51former submission, as well as now, the objection urged to the books of account was that they were allowed in evidence to show the payment of the notes involved in the suit, by cash payments therein shown, which could not be done by books of account. It will be seen, by a reference to the former opinion, that we then thought the objection to the books as evidence went only to the foundation laid for their introduction, so that the objections urged in argument could not be considered. The doubts created by the petition for re-hearing led us to open that question for further consideration, and to give it more particular notice. We are still of our former opinion, as to the import of the objection, taken as a whole, with perhaps the modification that we should determine whether the reference to items is sufficiently definite to warrant us in considering the particular question urged in argument. The offer was of the book, and especially certain pages thereof. The objection was as follows: “To which offer the defendants object as incompetent, immaterial, as to each and every item in said testimony, and to each and every item on the book and on the pages referred to as incompetent and immaterial. The proper foundation has not been laid for the introduction of the testimony offered.” It will be seen that the objection is just as applicable to any other as to cash items. The court could not know from the objection .that it meant any particular item, or any particular class of items. Had it sustained the objection, it would have excluded the book, and the last words of the objection indicate that such was the purpose. The objection states no more to us than that the items were objected to as incompetent and immaterial because no proper foundation was laid for their admission. There is no claim made now that the proper foundation was not laid for the book, if the items were proper matters to be *52proven in that way. Some items in the book in question were proper for such proof. In such a case, if the purpose is merely to exclude particular items, the book may be properly admitted, and the objection should specify the items particularly, or by classification. When such books are offered, with a proper showing, they stand, in an important sense, as a witness or a deposition offered. If competent to give evidence of any fact, the objection should be to the offer of the objectionable evidence and not to the witness. When the objection was made to include each and every item, if sustained it would have excluded proper evidence, and that would have been error. It was not the duty of the court to sift out so as to save a ruling from error, but the objector should so present his objection that a favorable ruling would be free from error. With the proper foundation laid (and we think it was), if the book contained any items competent to be shown by it (and we think it did), then it was properly admitted, subject to objections to items, if any, that could not be so proven. No such objections were made in this case, and there was no error in the ruling. We adhere to our former conclusion, and the judgment will stand affirmed.