State ex rel. Attorney General v. Fidelity Loan & Trust Co.
Cases that cite this one
11 later published cases cite this decision.
- Peoria Engraving Co. v. Streator Cold Storage Door Co. (Iowa 1936)
- Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co. of Davenport (Mont. 1933)
- Kosman v. Thompson (Iowa 1927)
- Vulcan Materials Company v. United States (5th Cir. 1971)
- McDonald v. Pacific States Life Insurance (Mo. 1939)
- Clark v. Williard (Supreme Court of the United States 1934)
- United States ex rel. Colonial Brick Corp. v. Federal Surety Co. (4th Cir. 1934)
- Clinton v. Coppedge (United States District Court, Oklahoma Northern 1933)
- Watts v. Southern Surety Co. (Iowa 1933)
- Coon v. District Court (Iowa 1922)
- United States Gypsum Co. v. Hoxie (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Iowa 1909)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The defendant resisted the appointment of a receiver on various grounds, but not its dissolution as a corporation, and to that part of the court’s decree ordering that “the Fidelity Loan & Trust Company be and is hereby dissolved” no exception was taken. The appeal is “from the judgment of the district court appointing II. Gr. Whitney receiver.” Indeed, the officers authorizing an appearance for defendant indicated their’ wish that resistance in the action be limited to that part of the petition asking for the appointment of a receiver. That this might be made during life of the corporation is not questioned, but was its status such after the decree as that it might prosecute an appeal ? Undoubtedly, a corporation may continue in existence for the purpose of appealing from and testing an order dissolving it, for its life is then the issue. Until the final adjudication, no one may say it has ceased to exist. So a person may appeal from an order adjudging him insane. In connection therewith is the right to appeal from orders such as the appointment of a receiver, which are incidental to and dependent on the dissolution. See Kelsey v. Fermentation Go., 45 Hun, 10. But here there was no such appeal. The defendant, by acquiescing in the decree, conceding the termination of itself as a legal entity. The appeal from a part of the decree in no way affected the portion not appealed from. Section 4113, Code. The order of dissolution was as complete and final as it will be in a thousand years. The court was-empowered1 by section 1640 of the Code to make it, and all have acquiesced in it as made. From the time of that entry the corporation has been dead, all its agencies ended, its employes, including attorneys, discharged; and it put, without exception or notice of appeal, beyond all future corporate activity. The effect was to “put an end to its existence for all purposes whatsoever, and to d'estroy every one of its faculties, so that thereafter it can neither make nor take contracts, nor sue nor be sued, and so that all debts to or from it became extinguished, and all actions by and against it abated.’!
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.