Farmers' National Bank v. Updegraf
Farmers' National Bank v. Updegraf
Opinion of the Court
The following is a copy of the written contract sued on: “Oskaloosa, Iowa, March 27, 1907. Farmers’ National Bank, City — Gentlemen: We, the undersigned, directors of the Iowa Mfg. Co., indorse the credit or obligations of the Iowa Mfg. Co., to the extent of six thousand ($6,000) dollars. [Signed] A. Updegraf, F. J. Page, E. R. Hatcher, Frank E. Baker.”
This written guaranty was delivered to the plaintiff on March 30, 1907. Evidence of the circumstances under which the guaranty was executed and delivered was introduced by both sides. The trial court was justified in finding under the evidence that the Iowa Manufacturing Company, a corporation, by its manager, Frank E. Baker, had solicited a loan from the plaintiff bank for a sum of $6,000. There was some uncertainty at the time as to whether so great a sum would be needed. At the time of the delivery of the guaranty in question, the plaintiff bank had agreed to loan such amount. At the time of the delivery, $4,000 was loaned and the note of the corporation taken therefor. On April 12th following, the further sum of $1,000 was loaned, and on April 20th the remaining $1,000 was loaned and the notes of the corporation taken for such amounts. No further sums were ever loaned by the plaintiff bank to the corporation. In November, 1909, one of the $1,000 notes was fully paid by the corporation, leaving a balance of $5,000 of the principal indebtedness due. In May, 1911, the defendants herein paid, in pursuance of their guaranty, the remainder, of the principal debt 'of $5,000, with $416.65 interest thereon making a sum total of $5,416.65.
The argument of the plaintiff is that the written guaranty sued on was a general and continuing guaranty of any balance Avhieh might become due the plaintiff from the Iowa Manufacturing Company at any subsequent time and out of any subsequent transaction, to the full extent of $6,000.
It is made to appear also from the record that the construction adopted by the trial court was the construction which the plaintiff bank itself put upon this writing both at the time of its delivery and subsequently. When such guaranty was first tendered to the plaintiff, it refused to accept the same because it was not in the form which it desired and because it did not purport to be a continuing guaranty for future loans. It caused another guaranty contract to be prepared by its attorney for the signature of the defendants. The second guaranty contract was signed by some of the defendants. The defendant Page refused to sign the same. A copy of such written guaranty will be set forth in the second division of this opinion. Both guaranties were delivered to the plaintiff on March 30th.
It further appears that the defendant Page became a resident of Colorado. On December 13, 1909, he wrote to the plaintiff bank asking for a statement of the “amount borrowed and the amount paid. ’ ’ The plaintiff wrote -in reply as follows: “In reply to your letter of recent date will say that the amount borrowed by the Iowa Mfg. Co. was $6,000, of which $1,000 has been paid.” The plaintiff bank was at the time of this correspondence the holder of the Billings Company note. It made no reference thereto in its correspondence. It is true, as contended by the appellant, that the reply of the bank to the letter of Page was strictly responsive. The manifest purpose of Page’s letter of inquiry was to ascertain the amount of his remaining liability. And we think the reply of the plaintiff fairly indicated its view that the liability of Page was $6,000, less $1,000 paid. The reply letter makes no claim to any other liability.
The plaintiff introduced this contract in evidence upon the trial. It will be noted that the plaintiff did not sue upon this contract. It made no reference thereto in its petition. It will be -noted also that Page did not sign such contract. The contention of the plaintiff now is that such contract should be deemed as expressing the true construction which the parties intended to put upon the first contract. The contention cannot be sustained. Exhibit 1 does not purport to construe the other contract. It purports only to be an independent undertaking on the part of the signers thereto. If it was not binding on Page as an independent contract, how could it be binding upon him as a construction of the first contract? If Page escaped liability thereunder by refusing to sign it, how could a liability be created by reading the same contract into the previous contract which Page did sign? ¥e have no,occasion herein to put a construction upon the second contract nor to determine the liability of the signers thereunder.
It is urged by the appellant that judgment ought to have been entered in any event against the three defendants who were signers of the second contract. It is sufficient to say that no judgment was asked against them as signers of such contract. The four defendants were sued jointly upon the first contract alone. The nature and extent of the liability of each under such contract was precisely the same. Under the pleadings and the evidence, all were liable under the first
The judgment below must therefore be Affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.