State ex rel. Nunn v. Koons
State ex rel. Nunn v. Koons
Opinion of the Court
1. In the latter part of 1917, Daisy Nunn filed her petition for the appointment of a guardian for the child Wilma. That petition recites that she was a resident of Lee County; that the child Wilma, then 16 months old, and a resident of said county, was a dependent and neglected child, for that the child was not supported by its mother, and that the father is an inmate of the penitentiary; that said child had been cared for by said petitioner since November 4, 1916; that the said child was then in the custody of said Daisy Nunn. Notice of this application was served on the petitioner herein, William Koons, and on February 23, 1918, the court, by appropriate order, found that the child Wilma was a neglected child, and that the whereabouts of its mother were unknown, although she was duly and legally served with notice of said action; that Mr. and Mrs. Nunn are proper persons to have the care and custody of said child. They were duly appointed guardians of the person and property of the said Wilma. On November 10, 1920, appellant, William Koons, filed his petition herein, reciting the appointment of the Nunns as guardians, under the order before referred to, and alleging that under said guardianship the child was under the care, custody, and control of the Nunns, since said order. The petition alleges that the Nunns are unfit persons to have charge of the said child, and that the. child is kept in an unfit place, and under surroundings and conditions improper and detrimental to the physical and moral welfare of the said Wilma. The petition asks that the court
The principal question in the case is, as we view it, dne of fact; and this question is whether the Nunns are suitable and proper persons to act as guardians, and to have the custody of’the child, and whether the surroundings and conditions in
Appellant cites us to cases in regard to the natural right of the parent to the custody of his minor child;. but we have held that* the natural parents may, by agreement or conduct, deprive themselves of this natural right. Smidt v. Benenga, 140 Iowa 399. Appellee cites Sections 254-al4 and 254-a20, Code Supplement, 1913, which provide, in substance, that, if a child under 16 years of age shall be found to be neglected, the court may make an order committing the child to the care of some suitable state institution, or to the care of some reputable citizen, or to some industrial school, etc.
2. Appellant assigns as error the admission in evidence of letters written by petitioner to Mr. and Mrs. Nunn. The first is dated July 8, 1917, and is written on prison stationery, and addressed to Mrs. Nunn. In it he says, among Otner tilings :
am truly pleased to hear of my little darling getting along so well; and mere words cannot express how I appreciate your kindness to my little darling. But I pray that God may grant me to live until I show you how much I appreciate your kindness.”
This was followed by a letter addressed to the child. Another letter is dated August 25, 1917, on prison stationery, addressed, “My Dear Friends.” In it he states that he enjoyed the short time they had the baby to see him, and that he can hardly wait until visiting day comes again, and:
“You do not realize how much I appreciate all you have
, The objection to the letters was that they were incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. The argument now is that they were not admissible, because petitioner, being in prison, did not then know the conditions as he now claims them to be. This would not render the letters inadmissible. "We see no reason why they were not admissible, being written by petitioner himself, a party to the proceedings.
3. It is next contended that the court erred in ordering petitioner to pay the guardians $15 per month for the support of the child. It appears that petitioner had contributed to the child’s support theretofore. We do not understand appellant to challenge the authority of the court to render such a judgment “in a proceeding of this kind. We do not pass upon that question. The objections to the allowance are that no such relief was asked in the pleadings; that it is contrary to the undisputed written contract between petitioner and Mrs. Nunn. The petitioner testifies:
“I arranged with Mrs. Nunn when she took the child. We had a written contract with her. She destroyed it. It was in my box of letters in her care,- and when the box came back, the contract was missing. I was to pay $2.25 per week, and I have paid that, and more.”
Another objection to such allowance is that Mrs. Nunn testified that she told petitioner to keep his money; that she did not want it; that she wanted the baby and nothing else, and did not want any of his money. Mrs. Nunn did so testify. And further, that he ought not to be compelled to support the child elsewhere, since he is willing to take her and support her himself, or in the home of a new guardian, selected by him. Appellees do not now seriously contend for the allowance.
Considering these, and all the other circumstances in the case, we think the trial court erred in making the allowance of $15 per month. The order appealed from is modified to that extent. In other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The larger part of the 94 pages of printing is in regard to the prior pro-
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.