The mortgagois take the position that by their conveyance of the mortgaged premises the grantee assumed to pay t he mortgage when due; that mortgagee, with knowledge of such agreement, extended the time of payment of the mortgage and note secured thereby without mortgagors' knowledge or consent, and thereby rnortgagors were released. This question is in this jurisdiction stare dec~sis, adverse to moitgagors' contention. Corbett v. Waterman, 11 Iowa 86; Massie v. Mann, 17 Iowa 131; James v. Day, 37 Iowa 164; Robertson v. Stuhlmiller, 93 Iowa 326; Iowa Loan & Trust Co. v. Haller, 119 Iowa 645; Herbold v. Sheley, - Iowa - (224 N. W. 781) Iowa Title & L. Co. v. Clark Bros., -Iowa - (224 N. W. 774). The rnortgagors further contend that the extension agreement operated as a material alteration o~ the note and mortgage sued upon, and therefore invalidated them. This contention is untenable. Cresco Union Sav. Bank v. Terry & Terry, 202 Iowa 778. The mortgagors further urge that the exteii~ion agreement operated as a novation. The rnortgagors were not I)alties to the extension agreement. As there was no

express agreement to extinguish their obligation and substitute a new one, or to release them, and as in this jurisdiction such an agreement is not implied, there was no novation. Richardson v.

Short, 201 Iowa 561; Shult v. Doyle, 200 Iowa 1; Davis v. Hardy, 76 Ind. 272, 276; 46 Corpus Juris 600 et seq.; Hopkins v. Jordan, 201 Ala. 184 (77 So. 710); Fish v. Glover, 154 Ill. 86 (39 N. E. 1081). Compare Nelson v. Hudson, 221 Mo. App. 211 (299 S. W. 1111); Gallaham v. Ridgeway, 138 S. C. 10 (135 S. E. 646). Affirmed.

J. (dissenting) .-As a basis of my dissent, I *404 tbe reasons stated in a dissent filed in Iowa Title & L. Co. v. Clark Bros., --- Iowa -- (224 N. W. 774), cited in the majority opinion herein. The facts in the instant case are quite analogous to the facts in the Iowa Title & L. Co. case, supra.