Idaho Court of Appeals, 2010

State v. Calvin Knight

State v. Calvin Knight
Idaho Court of Appeals · Decided June 8, 2010

State v. Calvin Knight

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 36727 STATE OF IDAHO, ) 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 504 ) Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Filed: June 8, 2010 ) v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk ) CALVIN KNIGHT, ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT Defendant-Appellant. ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY ) Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin Falls County. Hon. Randy J. Stoker, District Judge.

Order revoking probation and requiring execution of unified eight-year sentence, with three-year determinate term, for second degree arson, affirmed.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. ______________________________________________ Before GUTIERREZ, Judge; GRATTON, Judge; and MELANSON, Judge PER CURIAM Calvin Knight pled guilty to an amended charge of second degree arson. I.C. § 18-803.

In exchange for his guilty plea, another charge was dismissed and the state agreed not to pursue an allegation that Knight was a persistent violator. The district court imposed a unified eight- year sentence with a three-year determinate term, but after a period of retained jurisdiction, suspended the sentence and placed Knight on probation. Subsequently, Knight admitted to violating several terms of the probation, and the district court consequently revoked probation and ordered execution of the original sentence. Knight filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of his sentence, which the district court denied. Knight appeals, contending that the

district court abused its discretion in revoking probation, that the sentence is excessive, and that the district court should have sua sponte reduced his sentence.

It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328.

Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871- (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).

When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. Id. Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering execution of Knight’s original sentence without modification. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing execution of Knight’s previously suspended sentence is affirmed.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.