Kathleen Ann Blanc v. PWCC

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 38318

KATHLEEN ANN BLANC, ) 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 335

) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Filed: January 26, 2012

) v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

) POCATELLO WOMEN’S ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED CORRECTIONAL CENTER, BETH ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT CRONIN, ROSS CASTELTON, JENNIFER ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY ALDER, and BRIAN UNDERWOOD, ) individually and under color, )

) Defendants-Respondents. )

) Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. David C. Nye, District Judge.

Judgment of dismissal, affirmed.

Kathleen Ann Blanc, Pocatello, pro se appellant.

Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge, & Bailey, Chartered; Jonathan M. Volyn, Pocatello, for respondents.

________________________________________________ GUTIERREZ, Judge

Kathleen Ann Blanc appeals from the district court’s judgment of dismissal, dismissing her amended complaint to recover damages for civil rights violations allegedly sustained during her incarceration. Specifically, she appeals the district court’s order granting the Respondents’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

While incarcerated at the Pocatello Women’s Correctional Center in March 2008, Blanc filed a prisoner civil rights complaint in Bannock County alleging various issues relating to the appointment of a guardian for her baby born while she was incarcerated and her treatment by prison personnel. In April 2008, she filed an amended complaint setting forth the same allegations. The Respondents filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court interpreted Blanc’s amended complaint as advancing two general issues--that she had been denied access to the courts regarding the guardianship of her baby because Respondents failed to provide her with the requisite “guardianship form” and notarization, and that she had been retaliated against by prison personnel upon her threat to file suit against them regarding the guardianship issue. The district court granted the motion to dismiss as to both issues and entered a judgment of dismissal. Blanc now appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

As an appellate court, we will affirm a trial court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion where the record demonstrates there are no genuine issues of material fact and the case can be decided as a matter of law. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 398, 987 P.2d 300, 310 (1999). When reviewing an order of the district court dismissing a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the non-movant is entitled to have all inferences from the record and pleadings viewed in its favor, and only then may the question be asked whether a claim for relief has been stated. Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 398, 987 P.2d at 310. The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561, 563 (1995). In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it is not enough for a complaint to make conclusory allegations. Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm’n, 141 Idaho 129, 136, 106 P.3d 455, 462 (2005). Although the non-movant is entitled to have her factual assertions treated as true, this privilege does not extend to the conclusions of law the non-movant hopes the court to draw from those facts. Id.

Blanc pursues this appeal, as she pursued her claim below, pro se and, thus, we encounter some difficulty in ascertaining her claims of error. However, after reviewing the amended complaint, the district court distilled her allegations as generally advancing two claims: that Blanc was denied access to the courts in regard to the guardianship of her baby and that she suffered retaliation by the Respondents due to the guardianship issue. We address each claim in turn. 1 1. Access to the Courts

In her amended complaint, Blanc contended prison personnel violated her constitutional rights by intentionally depriving her of documents and the notarization of forms regarding the guardianship of her baby while she was pregnant. 2 The district court interpreted this as a claim that Blanc had been denied access to the courts and concluded that she had failed to state a valid claim for relief in this regard. Therefore, dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) was appropriate.

It is well settled that prisoners are afforded the constitutional right of limited access to the courts for purposes of directly or collaterally challenging their convictions, sentences, or conditions of confinement and to pursue actions for violations of their civil rights. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354-55 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); Drennon v. Hales, 138 Idaho 850, 853, 70 P.3d 688, 691 (Ct. App. 2003); Bureau of Child Support Services v. Garcia, 132 Idaho 505, 510, 975 P.2d 793, 798 (Ct. App. 1999). This right is grounded in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11 n.6 (1989); Drennon, 138 Idaho at 853, 70 P.3d at 691. Access to the courts must be adequate, effective, and meaningful. Madison v. Craven, 141 Idaho 45, 48, 105 P.3d 705, 708 (Ct. App. 2005). Specifically, where a prisoner is indigent and unrepresented, this right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to facilitate inmates’ preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate prison law libraries, adequate assistance from persons trained in the law, or reasonable alternative means to ensure meaningful access. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-52; Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828-29.

We conclude the district court did not err in finding that Blanc failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 3 As noted above, a prisoner’s constitutional right to access to the courts is not unlimited--it applies only to suits directly or collaterally challenging an inmate’s conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement or to pursue actions for violations of their civil rights. Drennon, 138 Idaho at 853, 70 P.3d at 691. Here, by attempting to file guardianship documents, Blanc was not attempting to challenge her underlying conviction, her sentence, or a condition of her confinement. Nor are we aware of any authority that interfering with an inmate’s ability to file guardianship documents implicates a civil right. As the United States Supreme Court has stated:

[The right of access to the courts] does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. Accordingly, even if Blanc’s allegations of interference with her attempt to file guardianship documents are accepted as true, she has stated no constitutional claim for which relief may be granted. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing this claim. 2. Retaliation

Blanc’s amended complaint also alleged that several of the Respondents retaliated against her after she threatened to file suit over their alleged interference with her attempt to place her baby with the guardian of her choice and/or after she refused to comply with their demands pertaining to the guardianship. 4 She contends prison personnel did so by, among other things, indigent persons who are challenging termination of their parental rights or seeking a divorce). Madison, and the cases it relies on, merely recognized that this fee waiver requirement applicable to indigents in general also applies to indigent prisoners, not that inmates have the right to unfettered access to the courts in parental termination and divorce suits. In this sense, it appears the district court erroneously conflated the case law regarding what types of civil suits prisoners must be allowed to file in general with case law regarding requiring what types of civil suits indigent prisoners must be allowed to file without the accompanying filing fees. However, we may affirm the district court’s conclusion upon an alternate, correct theory, which we proceed to do. In re Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 1093, 793 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Ct. App. 1990). refusing to allow her to graduate from a cognitive self-change class, threatening her baby’s guardian resulting in the guardian not bringing the baby to visit Blanc, 5 interfering with Blanc’s ability to obtain a job in prison, refusing to answer grievance forms, threatening her with disciplinary action, and moving her into a cell with a known violent inmate.

To state a claim for retaliation due to the exercise of First Amendment rights, a prisoner must allege that (1) the type of activity she engaged in was protected under the First Amendment, (2) the State impermissibly infringed on her right to engage in the protected activity, and (3) the retaliatory action was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Drennon v. Craven, 141 Idaho 34, 39, 105 P.3d 694, 699 (Ct. App. 2004). In this case, the district court dismissed what it interpreted to be Blanc’s retaliation claim because Blanc failed to allege that the purported retaliatory action was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest and, therefore, she had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

We conclude the district court did not err in finding that Blanc failed to state a claim as to this issue because she failed to specifically allege that the purported retaliatory action was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Rather, her claim consists of conclusory assertions that her alleged mistreatment occurred as a result of her threat to file suit over the guardianship issue. In other words, she merely states that this perceived ill treatment occurred because of her actions pertaining to the guardianship issue, but makes no allegation that such treatment was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Although the court, for personnel’s requirements as to who she could appoint as guardian and whether she was required to proceed through the Department of Health and Welfare or could utilize a private agency. To the extent the latter is true, the grant of the Respondents’ motion to dismiss would also be proper on the ground that Blanc did not allege she was engaged in “protected activity,” as is required to state a claim for retaliation. No authority has been brought to our attention, nor are we aware of any, that being allowed to choose a guardian and the agency through which a child’s placement will be handled are “protected” activities. Cf. Drennon v. Craven, 141 Idaho 34, 39, 105 P.3d 694, 699 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the type of activity Drennon was engaged in--suing state officials and helping other inmates to do the same--is recognized as protected under the First Amendment). the purposes of examining the Respondents’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, was required to accept as true the facts alleged in Blanc’s complaint (e.g., that Respondents refused to allow her to graduate from a cognitive self-change class, interfered with her ability to obtain a job, refused to answer grievance forms, etc.), it was not required to accept her conclusory statement that these were “retaliatory” as opposed to legitimate penological actions. See Owsley, 141 Idaho at 136, 106 P.3d at 462 (noting that in order to survive a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, it is not enough for a complaint to make conclusory allegations because while a non-movant is entitled to have her factual assertions treated as true, this privilege does not extend to the conclusions of law the non-movant hopes the court to draw from those facts). Accord Lightner v. Hardison, 149 Idaho 712, 720, 239 P.3d 817, 825 (Ct. App. 2010) (concluding the appellants failed to make a sufficient showing that terminating visiting privileges was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological purpose and, thus, failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of their retaliation claim in order to survive summary judgment). Cf. Drennon, 141 Idaho at 39-40, 105 P.3d at 699-700 (holding that Drennon’s allegation of retaliation survived summary judgment where he sufficiently alleged the required factors, including that the parole commission’s alleged retaliatory parole denial was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest where he submitted evidence that he was extensively questioned at his parole hearing as to his previous litigation and the minutes of the parole hearing mentioned prior disciplinary actions against him for his litigative activities but otherwise did not provide insight into the commission’s decision to deny parole). Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err in granting the Respondents’ motion to dismiss relative to the retaliation claim.

III. CONCLUSION

The district court did not err in granting the Respondents’ motion to dismiss because Blanc failed to allege facts which, if true, would entitle her to relief on either claim advanced in her amended complaint. Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal is affirmed.

Judge LANSING and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.