51394/51395 State v. Jackson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket Nos. 51393/51394/51395 STATE OF IDAHO, ) ) Filed: January 27, 2025 Plaintiff-Respondent, ) ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk v. ) ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED KEVIN CHARLES JACKSON, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. Barbara Duggan, District Judge.

Orders revoking probation and execution of original sentences, affirmed; judgment of conviction and unified sentence of five years, with a minimum period of confinement of two years, for malicious injury to property, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. ________________________________________________ Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; LORELLO, Judge; and TRIBE, Judge ________________________________________________ PER CURIAM In Docket Nos. 51393 and 51394, Kevin Charles Jackson pled guilty to felony driving under the influence (DUI), Idaho Code § 18-8005(6). The district court imposed concurrent sentences of ten years with five years determinate in both cases and retained jurisdiction, but after a period of retained jurisdiction, suspended the sentences and placed Jackson on probation for a period of three years.

In Docket No. 51395, Jackson pled guilty to one count of malicious injury to property, I.C.

§ 18-7001(2)(a), and agreed to admit to violating his probation in the DUI cases. The district court consequently revoked probation and ordered execution of the original, concurrent sentences of ten years with five years determinate in the DUI cases and imposed a consecutive sentence of five years with two years determinate for malicious injury to property.

On appeal, Jackson contends that the district court imposed an excessive sentence in Docket No. 51395 and abused its discretion in revoking his probation in Docket Nos. 51393 and 51394.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014- (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the district court. State v. Biggs, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150, 154 (Ct. App. 2020).

It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. I.C. § 19-2601(4). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal. Id. When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment.

State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. Id. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record on appeal and are relevant to the defendant’s contention that the trial court should have reduced the sentence sua sponte upon revocation of probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012).

Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion. Therefore, the orders revoking probation and directing execution of Jackson’s previously suspended sentences are affirmed; Jackson’s judgment of conviction and sentence are also affirmed.