UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

JERRY DWAINE BELUE, Case No. 1:21-cv-00449-DCN Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,

Defendant.

The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Jerry Dwaine Belue’s initial complaint as a result of Plaintiff’s status as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. Plaintiff later filed an Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint “supersedes the original” complaint; thus, Plaintiff’s initial complaint must be “treated … as non- existent.” Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1997) overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County,

, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Plaintiff later attempted to file two additional amended complaints in a single filing. See Dkt. 13, 13-1. However, in violation of Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff did not seek leave of Court to file these two amended complaints— one of which actually appears to have been intended to be filed in state court, as it bears a caption reading, “In the District Court for the 4th Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada.” See Dkt. 13 at 1. Therefore, the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 6) remains the operative pleading in this case. The Court now reviews the Amended Complaint to determine whether it or any of the claims contained therein should be summarily dismissed under

and

1915A. Having reviewed the record, and otherwise being fully informed, the Court enters the following Order dismissing this case with prejudice. 1. Pleading Standards and Screening Requirement A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under modern pleading standards,

Rule 8 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). The Iqbal/Twombly “facial plausibility” standard is met when a complaint contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.”

(citing Twombly,

). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but a plaintiff must offer “more than ... unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation[s].”

(internal quotation marks omitted). If the facts pleaded are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,” or if there is an “obvious alternative explanation” that would not result in liability, the complaint has

not stated a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Bare allegations that amount to a mere restatement of the elements of a cause of action, without adequate factual support, are not enough. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)1 requires that the Court review complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, as well as complaints filed in forma pauperis, to

determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate.

& 1915A. The Court must dismiss any claims that do not have adequate factual support or are frivolous or malicious.

(e)(2) & 1915A. The Court also must dismiss claims that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

These last two categories—together with claims that fall outside a federal court’s narrow grant of jurisdiction—encompass those claims that might, or might not, have factual support but nevertheless are barred by a well-established legal rule. The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for

the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona,

(9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith,

(9th Cir. 2000) (stating that Rule 12(b)(6) authority to dismiss claims was

expanded by the PLRA, giving courts power to dismiss deficient claims, sua sponte, before or after opportunity to amend).

1

Stat. 1321, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq. 2. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction (“IDOC”). Plaintiff sues the IDOC, alleging that his property was damaged when he was

placed in segregation. In addition, some of Plaintiff’s property, such as his flat screen television, was stolen. Plaintiff asserts violations of his constitutional rights. Am. Compl., Dkt. 6, at 2–3. 3. The Amended Complaint Fails to State a Plausible Claim Plaintiff brings claims under

, the civil rights statute. Am. Compl. at 1. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights

protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates,

(9th Cir. 1991). To be liable under § 1983, “the defendant must possess a purposeful, a knowing, or possibly a reckless state of mind.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson,

(2015). Negligence is not actionable under § 1983, because a negligent act by a public

official is not an abuse of governmental power but merely a “failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person.” Daniels v. Williams,

(1986). States and state entities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

(1989). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the IDOC—a state entity and the only Defendant named in the Amended Complaint—are

implausible. Further, even if the IDOC were a “person” for purposes of § 1983, it would be immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. Hans v. Louisiana,

, 16–18 (1890); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

(1984); see also Quern v. Jordan,

, 342–44 (1979) (holding that § 1983 does not waive state sovereign immunity); Esquibel v. Idaho, No. 1:11-cv-00606-BLW,

, at *6 (D. Idaho Apr. 23, 2012) (holding that Idaho itself has not waived state sovereign immunity for constitutional claims). For these reasons, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 4. Further Amendment Would Be Futile The Court now considers whether to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to further amend

the Amended Complaint. Amendments to pleadings are governed by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule states that the Court “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit has explained the reasoning behind allowing the opportunity to amend: In exercising its discretion with regard to the amendment of pleadings, a court must be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15—to facilitate decision on the merits rather than on the pleadings or technicalities. This court has noted on several occasions that the Supreme Court has instructed the lower federal courts to heed carefully the command of Rule 15(a) ... by freely granting leave to amend when justice so requires. Thus Rule 15’s policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied with extreme liberality.

Eldridge v. Block,

(9th Cir. 1987) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). “In the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.,” it is appropriate for a court to grant leave to amend. Foman v. Davis,

(1962). This liberal amendment policy is even more important with respect to pro se

plaintiffs, who generally lack legal training. Courts must liberally construe civil rights actions filed by pro se litigants so as not to close the courthouse doors to those truly in need of relief. Eldridge,

. A pro se litigant bringing a civil rights suit must have an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome deficiencies unless it is clear that those deficiencies cannot be overcome by amendment.

. Although several

factors contribute to the analysis of whether a plaintiff should be allowed an opportunity to amend, futility alone can justify denying such an opportunity. Johnson v. Buckley,

(9th Cir. 2004). The Court concludes that additional amendment in this case would be futile. Plaintiff’s claims are barred because, as explained above, it is clear from the face of the

Complaint that the only Defendant is not subject to suit under § 1983. Therefore, the claims in the Amended Complaint are implausible and will be dismissed without leave to amend. ORDER IT IS ORDERED: 1. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See

(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1). If Plaintiff intends to assert claims against potential defendants other than the IDOC, he may file a new, separate action against such defendants. 2. Plaintiffs Motion for Actual Compulsion (Dkt. 8) DENIED as MOOT. 3. Plaintiff's “(Amended) Motion to Vacated Judgement Render Cancel, Annul, Order on Claims” (verbatim) (attached to Dkt. 13-1) bears a state court caption and, thus, does not appear to have been intended to be filed in this Court. To the extent Plaintiff did intend to file the Motion in this Court, it is DENIED AS MOOT.

Le DATED: January 24, 2022 fs □ won ° / dee > diibf } | ~-- pw As David Nye a Chief U.S. District Court Judge

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 7