Bruck v. Ada County Sheriff's Office

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

SCOTT C. BRUCK, Case No. 1:24-cv-00198-BLW Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE ADA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; ZACH HELBACH; SARA HILL; M.

HUDSON; C. MORGAN; J.

THORNDYKE; S. BONAS; S.

KELCH; M. PLAISTED; M. NAVEST; T. HAYNES; MATT CLIFFORD; RON WINEGAR; LAUREN MCLEAN; GREATER IDAHO FUGITIVE TASK FORCE; BOISE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; ADA COUNTY CRISIS NEGOTIATION TEAM; CLIFF LOGSDON; PATRICK AVELLA; SGT. SANTUCCI; TERRY STENGER; and TERRY LAKEY, Defendants.

The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Scott C. Bruck’s Complaint because of Plaintiff’s status as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. A “conditional filing” means that a plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. Upon screening, the Court must dismiss claims that state a frivolous or malicious claim, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).

Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed.

1. Standards of Law for Screening Complaints A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

To state an actionable claim, a plaintiff must provide “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that the defendant committed the unlawful act, meaning that sufficient facts are pled “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [activity].” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 US. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

2. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is an inmate currently incarcerated at the North Idaho Correctional Institution. Though it is not entirely clear from the Complaint, it appears Plaintiff’s claims arose during a police investigation before Plaintiff was incarcerated. Plaintiff alleges that defendant police officer Cliff Logsdon shot Plaintiff in the thigh with a nonlethal round. Compl., Dkt. 3, at 2. Plaintiff was not provided medical treatment at the time.

The officer who shot Plaintiff with the nonlethal round, as well as all other officers present, then left the scene—apparently without arresting Plaintiff. The officers later secured a warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest, and he was then arrested. Id. at 9.

Plaintiff asserts that the nonlethal round caused nerve damage and loss of feeling in his leg. Plaintiff brings his claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

3. Discussion Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff 28 days to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should take into consideration the following.

A. Section 1983 Claims Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).

Governmental officials generally are not liable for damages in their individual capacities under § 1983 unless they personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“[E]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”). Section 1983 does not allow for recovery against an employer or principal simply because an employee or agent committed misconduct. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.

However, “[a] defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists . . . a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). A plaintiff can establish this causal connection by alleging a defendant (1) set in motion a series of acts by others that violated the Constitution, or knowingly refused to terminate a series of such acts, which the supervisor “knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury”; (2) knowingly failed to act or acted improperly “in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates”; (3) acquiesced in the constitutional deprivation; or (4) engaged in conduct showing “a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Id. at 1205-09 (internal quotation marks omitted).

A claim that a supervisor or training official failed to adequately train subordinates ordinarily requires that, “in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees[,] the need for more or different training [was] so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the [supervisor or training official] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). That is, to maintain a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing a “pattern of violations” that amounts to deliberate indifference. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 72 (2011).

Likewise, “a failure to supervise that is sufficiently inadequate may amount to deliberate indifference” that supports a § 1983 claim, but there generally must be a pattern of violations sufficient to render the need for further supervision obvious.

Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, if a supervisory or training official had “knowledge of the unconstitutional conditions” through such a pattern of violations—including knowledge of the “culpable actions of his subordinates”—yet failed to act to remedy those conditions, that official can be said to have acquiesced “in the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates” such that a causal connection between the supervisor and the constitutional violation is plausible. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208.

To bring a § 1983 claim against a local governmental entity such as the Ada County Sheriff’s Office or the Boise Police Department, a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff complains, as required by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Under Monell, the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim against such an entity are the following: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the entity had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2001). An entity also “may be held liable under § 1983 when the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority” or when “such an official ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled in part on other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).

An unwritten policy or custom must be so “persistent and widespread” that it constitutes a “permanent and well settled” practice. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)). “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996).

A plaintiff cannot simply restate these standards of law in a complaint. Instead, a plaintiff must provide specific facts supporting the elements of each claim and must allege facts showing a causal link between each defendant and Plaintiff’s injury or damage. Alleging “the mere possibility of misconduct” is not enough. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. i. Excessive Force Claims Plaintiff first claims that Defendant Logsdon used excessive force against Plaintiff by using the nonlethal round. Plaintiff also claims that the other individual defendants are liable as supervisors or trainers and that the municipal entity defendants are liable for having unconstitutional policies or practices authorizing such excessive force.

Claims of excessive force by police officers are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. That amendment requires that officers use only an amount of force that is “objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).1 “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment,” and whether an officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable is based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 396 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

This “reasonableness” standard requires “balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion on a person’s liberty with the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”

Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1053–54 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the “quantum of force” must be assessed. Second, the governmental interests at stake must be analyzed

1 Although the excessive force reasonableness standard is an objective test, it must not be confused with the standard for negligence claims under state law, as negligence is not actionable under § 1983. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015) (“[L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Error! Main Document Only.Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986). in light of the following factors: (1) the severity of the crime for which the plaintiff was arrested; (2) whether the plaintiff posed a threat to the safety of the officers or others; (3) whether the plaintiff was actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee; and (4) the availability of alternative methods of subduing the plaintiff. Id. The Supreme Court has emphasized that courts must not rely on their own hindsight in determining whether an officer’s use of force was reasonable. Rather, the “calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.

The only Defendant alleged to be personally involved in shooting the nonlethal round is Officer Logsdon. However, Plaintiff includes no allegations about the surrounding circumstances, such as the crime for which Plaintiff was being investigated, whether Plaintiff was attempting to flee or was resisting the officers, and whether Logsdon could have reasonably perceived a threat to his or other officers’ safety. See Davis, 478 F.3d at 1053–54. Therefore, the Complaint fails to state a plausible excessive force claim against Defendant Logsdon.

Additionally, there is nothing in the Complaint to suggest that any other individual Defendant either personally participated in the application of force against Plaintiff or may be liable on a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise basis. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208; City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390; Connick, 563 U.S. at 72; Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900. The Complaint simply does not contain any allegations against any of these other Defendants.

As for Plaintiff’s claims against the Ada County Sheriff’s Department, the Boise Police Department, or other entity Defendants, the Complaint does not plausibly allege that any of these entities had a policy or practice amounting to deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be protected against excessive force by police officers. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Thus, the Complaint fails to state a colorable excessive force claim against any Defendant.

ii. Medical Treatment Claims Plaintiff also claims that Defendants should have ensured that Plaintiff received medical treatment after he was shot with the nonlethal round. Although pretrial detainees and convicted inmates have a right to government-provided medical care while confined in a government facility, see Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), no such right exists for free citizens who are not so confined. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (“The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.”).

Because Plaintiff was not taken into custody after the allegedly excessive force was applied, it was his responsibility—not that of the officers or a governmental entity— to ensure that he obtained medical treatment. Therefore, the Complaint fails to state a plausible medical treatment claim.

B. State Law Claims In addition to § 1983 claims, Plaintiff purports to assert state law claims, though Plaintiff does not specifically identify any such claims. See Compl. at 1. Because the Complaint fails to state a federal claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any such state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, and if the amended complaint identifies and states a plausible state law claim, the Court will reconsider the issue of supplemental jurisdiction.

4. Standards for Amended Complaint If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the actions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). Plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” or to survive screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

Rather, for each cause of action against each defendant, Plaintiff must state the following: (1) the name of the person or entity that caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) facts showing the defendant is a state actor (such as state employment or a state contract) or a private entity performing a state function; (3) the dates on which the conduct of the defendant allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; (5) the particular constitutional or statutory provision Plaintiff alleges has been violated; (6) facts alleging the elements of the violation are met—for example, Plaintiff must allege facts satisfying the elements of excessive force claim; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered; and (8) the particular type of relief Plaintiff is seeking from each defendant. In addition, Plaintiff must include facts showing that he can meet the Monell requirements, if applicable (explained above).

Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon, attach, or incorporate by reference other pleadings or documents. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 (“Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as amended. The proposed amended pleading must be submitted at the time of filing a motion to amend.”); see also Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by entering judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint).

Plaintiff must set forth each different factual allegation in a separate, numbered paragraph. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as an “Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff’s name and address should be clearly printed at the top left corner of the first page of each document filed with the Court.

If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must also file a “Motion to Review the Amended Complaint.” If Plaintiff does not amend within twenty-eight days, or if the amendment does not comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant simply cannot state a claim.”).

ORDER IT IS ORDERED: 1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Plaintiff has 28 days within which to file an amended complaint as described above. If Plaintiff does so, Plaintiff must file (along with the amended complaint) a Motion to Review the Amended Complaint.

Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal if Plaintiff no longer intends to pursue this case.”

2. If Plaintiff does not file a timely amended complaint, this case may be dismissed with prejudice and without further notice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, failure to prosecute, or failure to comply with a Court order. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

3. Because an amended complaint is required for Plaintiff to proceed, Plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel (contained in the Complaint) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may renew the request for counsel in an amended complaint.

ie Tr DATED: August 7, 2024 Reg) Oye we) B. Lynn Winmill 4 o> . Lynn Winmi RiCTOS US District Court Judge A voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) is not a dismissal for frivolity, for maliciousness, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, does not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 13