UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

DWAYNE TALLEN HOUSTON, Case No. 1:24-cv-00500-AKB Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE

KOOTENAI COUNTY,

Defendant.

The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Dwayne Tallen Houston’s Complaint because of Plaintiff’s status as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. A “conditional filing” means that a plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. Upon screening, the Court must dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed. 1. Standards of Law for Screening Complaints A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). To state an actionable claim, a plaintiff must provide “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that the defendant committed the unlawful act, meaning that sufficient facts are pled “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [activity].” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 US. at 678

(quoting Twombly,

). The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona,

(9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith,

(9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, even if a complaint meets the pleading requirements, dismissal under §§ 1915 and 1915A is still appropriate if an affirmative defense is an “obvious bar to securing relief on the face

of the complaint.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,

(9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction. The events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred before he was arrested and incarcerated. Plaintiff alleges that he was criminally charged in Kootenai County with malicious harassment for his use of the word, “boy.” (Compl., Dkt. 3, at 2). Though the Complaint contains little detail, Plaintiff explains in another of his cases that the malicious harassment charge stemmed from a verbal altercation Plaintiff had with a police officer with the Post Falls Police Department; the officer claimed the word was a racial epithet; the situation escalated; and Plaintiff was charged with harassment. See Houston v. Mackabee, No. 2:24-cv-00456-DCN (D. Idaho) (Dkt. 3). 3. Discussion Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff twenty-eight (28) days to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should

take into consideration the following. A. Section 1983 Claims Plaintiff brings his claim under

, the civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates,

(9th Cir. 1991). A defendant causes a constitutional deprivation within the meaning of § 1983 “if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation.” Johnson v. Duffy,

(9th Cir. 1978). To bring a § 1983 claim against a local governmental entity such as Kootenai County, a

plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff complains, as required by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York,

(1978). Under Monell, the requisite elements of a § 1983 claim against such an entity are the following: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the entity had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty.,

, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001). An entity also “may be held liable under § 1983 when the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority” or when “such an official ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa,

(9th Cir. 2010), overruled in part on other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Plaintiff claims that the malicious harassment charge violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment. However, it appears Plaintiff’s claims may be barred by the Supreme

Court’s decision in in Heck v. Humphrey,

(1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that a civil rights claim “is not cognizable under § 1983”—meaning the claim cannot be maintained—if the plaintiff’s success on the claim would “render a conviction or sentence invalid.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. That is, if a favorable verdict in a civil rights action “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of the plaintiff’s conviction, the plaintiff must first show that “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 487. As the Supreme Court later clarified, “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent

prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson,

, 81–82 (2005). In this case, Plaintiff is incarcerated, which implies he was convicted of the malicious harassment charge. The website of the Idaho Department of Correction lists Plaintiff as having been convicted of malicious harassment. See IDOC Resident/Client Search, https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/prisons/resident-client-search (accessed Dec. 4, 2024). If Plaintiff was indeed convicted of the malicious harassment charge, then his First Amendment claim is barred by Heck unless Plaintiff establishes that the conviction has been invalidated. In any amended complaint, Plaintiff should explain the status of the malicious harassment charge and explain how that charge relates to his current incarceration. 4. Standards for Amended Complaint

If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the actions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

(9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehrler,

(1991). Plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Johnson,

. “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” or to survive screening under

and 1915A. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska,

(9th Cir. 1982); see also Iqbal,

(“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

Rather, for each cause of action against each defendant, Plaintiff must state the following: (1) the name of the person or entity that caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) facts showing the defendant is a state actor (such as state employment or a state contract) or a private entity performing a state function; (3) the dates on which the conduct of the defendant allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; (5) the particular constitutional or statutory provision Plaintiff alleges has been violated; (6) facts alleging the elements of the violation are met; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered; and (8) the particular type of relief Plaintiff is seeking from each defendant. In addition, Plaintiff must include facts showing that his claims are not barred by Heck v. Humphrey, as set forth above. Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon, attach, or incorporate by reference other pleadings or documents. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 (“Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as amended. The proposed amended pleading must be submitted at the time of filing a motion to amend.”); see also Forsyth

v. Humana, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty.,

, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by entering judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint). Plaintiff must set forth each different factual allegation in a separate, numbered paragraph. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as an “Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff’s name and address should be clearly printed at

the top left corner of the first page of each document filed with the Court. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must also file a “Motion to Review the Amended Complaint.” If Plaintiff does not amend within twenty-eight (28) days, or if the amendment does not comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See Knapp v. Hogan,

(9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant simply cannot state a claim.”). ORDER IT IS ORDERED: 1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has twenty-eight (28) days within which to file an amended complaint as described above. If Plaintiff does so, Plaintiff must file (along with the amended complaint) a Motion to Review the Amended Complaint. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal if Plaintiff no longer intends to pursue this case.! 2. If Plaintiff does not file a timely amended complaint, this case may be dismissed without further notice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, failure to prosecute, or failure to comply with a Court order. See 28 U.S.C. $$ 1915 and 1915A; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 3. Because an amended complaint is required for Plaintiff to proceed, Plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel (contained in the Complaint) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may renew the request for counsel in an amended complaint.

i rT DATED: December 9, 2024 if], Amanda K. Brailsford Qineon U.S. District Court Judge

I A voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) is not a dismissal for frivolity, for maliciousness, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, does not count as a “strike” under

(g).

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 7