UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

DYLAN HAMILTON, Case No. 1:25-cv-00122-AKB Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE

ADA COUNTY SHERIFF MATTHEW CLIFFORD,

Defendant.

The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Dylan Hamilton’s Complaint because of his status as an inmate and his in forma pauperis request. A “conditional filing” means that a plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. Upon screening, the Court must dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Having reviewed the record, the Court enters the following Order permitting Plaintiff to proceed on the Complaint. 1. Standards of Law for Screening Complaints A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). To state an actionable claim, a plaintiff must provide “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that the defendant committed the unlawful act, meaning that sufficient facts are pled “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [activity].” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 US. at 678

(quoting Twombly,

). The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona,

(9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith,

(9th Cir. 2000). 2. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee held in the Ada County Jail. He alleges that, on many occasions over about a year, inmates at the jail have been slipping and falling because of the jail-

issued black foam shoes. According to Plaintiff, Ada County Sheriff Matthew Clifford is aware of these many incidents and the dangers those shoes pose but has failed to change the shoes that are issued to inmates. Plaintiff slipped and fell in February 2025, suffering serious pain and headaches. Compl., Dkt. 3, at 1–3. Plaintiff claims that the jail-issued shoes constitute a serious danger in violation of the Due Process Clause.

at 3–4. 3. Discussion Plaintiff brings his claim under

, the civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates,

(9th Cir. 1991). A defendant causes a constitutional deprivation within the meaning of § 1983 “if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation.” Johnson v. Duffy,

(9th Cir. 1978).

Pretrial detainees have a right to adequate conditions of detention while they are awaiting trial. A due process violation occurs when the conditions to which the detainee is subjected amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish,

(1979). Conditions-of-detention claims are analyzed using a standard of “objective deliberate indifference.” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange,

(9th Cir. 2018). Under that standard, a detainee must establish the following elements: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries.

The application of this standard “will necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”

(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Although an objective standard must be used in evaluating conditions-of-confinement claims of pretrial detainees, this standard must not be confused with the objective standard used for evaluating claims of negligence under state law. This is because negligence—the “mere lack of due care” by a governmental official—“does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,

(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Daniels v. Williams,

(1986) (stating that negligence and ordinary negligence are not actionable under § 1983, because such actions are not an abuse of governmental power but merely a “failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person”). Therefore, a pretrial detainee complaining of unconstitutional conditions of detention must “prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Castro,

.

A plaintiff cannot simply restate these standards of law in a complaint. Instead, a plaintiff must provide specific facts supporting the elements of each claim and must allege facts showing a causal link between each defendant and plaintiff’s injury or damage. Alleging “the mere possibility of misconduct” is not enough. Iqbal,

. Plaintiff’s Complaint, liberally construed, appears to state a colorable due process claim against Sheriff Clifford based on the alleged danger posed by the jail-issued shoes. Therefore, Plaintiff will be permitted to proceed past the screening stage. 4. Conclusion Plaintiff may proceed as outlined above. This Order does not guarantee that Plaintiff’s due process claim will be successful. Rather, it merely finds that the claim is plausible, meaning that

the Complaint will not be summarily dismissed at this time but will proceed to the next stage of litigation. This Order is not intended to be a final or a comprehensive analysis of Plaintiff’s claim. Defendant may still file a motion for dismissal or motion for summary judgment if the facts and law support such a motion.1 Because (1) prisoner filings must be afforded a liberal construction, (2) governmental officials often possess the evidence prisoners need to support their

1 The standards for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) are the same standards that the Court has used to screen the Complaint under §§ 1915 and 1915A. Therefore, motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are disfavored in cases subject to §§ 1915 and 1915A and may be filed only in extraordinary circumstances. claims, and (3) many defenses are supported by governmental records, an early motion for summary judgment—rather than a motion to dismiss—is often a more appropriate vehicle for asserting procedural defenses such as non-exhaustion or entitlement to qualified immunity. ORDER IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff may proceed on his due process claim against Defendant Clifford. Defendant Clifford will be allowed to waive service of summons by executing, or having counsel execute, the Waiver of Service of Summons as provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) and returning it to the Court within thirty (30) days. If Defendant chooses to return the Waiver of Service of Summons, the answer or pre-answer motion will be due in accordance with Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(ii). Accordingly, the Clerk of Court will forward a copy of the Complaint (Dkt. 3), a copy of this Order, and a Waiver of Service of Summons to the following counsel: Jan M. Bennetts, Ada County Prosecutor, 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho, 83702.

2. Should any entity determine that the individual for whom counsel for the entity was served with a waiver is not, in fact, its employee or former employee, or that its attorney will not be appearing for a former employee, it should file a notice within the CM/ECF system, with a copy mailed to Plaintiff. 3. If Plaintiff receives a notice indicating that service will not be waived, Plaintiff will have an additional ninety (90) days from the date of such notice to file a notice of physical service addresses of Defendant, or Plaintiff’s claims may be dismissed without prejudice without further notice. 4. The parties must follow the deadlines and guidelines in the Standard Disclosure and Discovery Order for Pro Se Prisoner Civil Rights Cases, issued contemporaneously with this Order. 5. Any amended pleadings must be submitted, along with a motion to amend, by the later of (a) 150 days after entry of this Order or (b) 150 days after entry of an order

denying all or part of a preliminary Rule 12(b) or Rule 56 motion. 6. Dispositive motions must be filed by the later of (a) 300 days after entry of this Order or (b) 300 days after entry of an order denying all or part of a preliminary Rule 12(b) or Rule 56 motion. 7. Each party must ensure that all documents filed with the Court are simultaneously served upon the opposing party (through counsel if the party has counsel) by first- class mail or via the CM/ECF system, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5. Each party must sign and attach a proper mailing certificate to each document filed with the court, showing the manner of service, date of service,

address of service, and name of person upon whom service was made. 8. The Court will not consider ex parte requests unless a motion may be heard ex parte according to the rules and the motion is clearly identified as requesting an ex parte order, pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Practice before the United States District Court for the District of Idaho 7.2. (“Ex parte” means that a party has provided a document to the court, but that the party did not provide a copy of the document to the other party to the litigation.) 9. All Court filings requesting relief or requesting that the Court make a ruling or take an action of any kind must be in the form of a pleading or motion, with an appropriate caption designating the name of the pleading or motion, served on all parties to the litigation, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7, 10 and 11, and Local Rules of Civil Practice before the United States District Court for the District of Idaho 5.1 and 7.1. The Court will not consider requests made in the form of letters. 10. No party may have more than three pending motions before the Court at one time, and no party may file a motion on a particular subject matter if that party has another motion on the same subject matter currently pending before the Court. Motions submitted in violation of this Order may be stricken, summarily denied, or returned to the moving party unfiled. 11. ‘Plaintiff must notify the Court immediately if Plaintiff's address changes. Failure to do so may be cause for dismissal of this case without further notice. 12. Pursuant to General Order 324, this action is hereby RETURNED to the Clerk of Court for random civil case assignment to a presiding judge, on the proportionate basis previously determined by the District Judges, having given due consideration to the existing caseload.

oo DATED: May 13, 2025 if], Amanda K. Brailsford Qineon U.S. District Court Judge

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 7