UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

JOSHWA AARON WINTRODE, Case No. 1:24-cv-00197-DCN Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE

ANITA M. E. MOORE; PIERRE CARNESI; CRAIG CANNON; and ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE,

Defendants.

The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Joshwa Aaron Wintrode’s Complaint because of Plaintiff’s status as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. A “conditional filing” means that a plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. Upon screening, the Court must dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed. 1. Standards of Law for Screening Complaints A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009).

To state an actionable claim, a plaintiff must provide “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that the defendant committed the unlawful act, meaning that sufficient facts are pled “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [activity].” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 US. at 678 (quoting Twombly,

). The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v.

Arizona,

(9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith,

(9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, even if a complaint meets the pleading requirements, dismissal under §§ 1915 and 1915A is still appropriate if an affirmative defense is an “obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the complaint.” Washington v.

Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,

(9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2. Factual Allegations At the time Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this case, he was an inmate in the Twin Falls County Jail. Plaintiff has since been released from jail. Plaintiff alleges that his three public defenders, who represented him in his state criminal proceedings, conspired with the prosecutor to get Plaintiff to plead guilty without a sufficiently beneficial plea

agreement. Plaintiff also alleges that his state public defenders did not provide him with the effective assistance of counsel. Plaintiff sues each of these three attorneys, as well as the Ada County Public Defender’s Office. 3. Discussion Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will,

however, grant Plaintiff 28 days to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should take into consideration the following. A. Section 1983 Claims Plaintiff brings claims under

, the civil rights statute. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting

under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates,

(9th Cir. 1991). Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for purely private conduct, “no matter how unfair that conduct may be.” NCAA v. Tarkanian,

(1988). It is well-established that “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal

proceeding.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson,

(1981). Indeed, a defense attorney “is not acting on behalf of the State; he is the State’s adversary.”

at 322 n.13 (emphasis added). Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are implausible for lack of state action. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims also appear to be barred by Heck v. Humphrey,

(1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that, if success on a civil rights claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s

criminal conviction, the plaintiff must first show that the conviction has already been overturned, invalidated, or otherwise called into question.

at 486–87 (“We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on

direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ….”). To overcome the Heck bar, a plaintiff must show either that (1) the action, if successful, would not necessarily “demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment” or (2) “the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Lemos

v. Cnty. of Sonoma,

(9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (quoting Heck,

). Here, it appears that Plaintiff was convicted in the very matter he challenges in this action. If Plaintiff were to succeed on his claims that he was denied adequate representation or that Defendants conspired against him in his state court criminal case, such success

would necessarily imply or demonstrate that Plaintiff’s conviction is invalid. Therefore, to proceed on his civil rights claims in this case, Plaintiff must establish that his conviction has already been overturned. Because the Complaint does not do so, Plaintiff’s claims appear barred by Heck. Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a plausible civil rights claim on this basis, as well. B. Section 2255 Claims Plaintiff also asserts claims under

. That section permits a federal

criminal defendant to file a motion for reduction of sentence to collaterally attack his federal conviction. It does not apply to individuals convicted in state court on state criminal charges. Therefore, the Complaint fails to state a plausible § 2255 claim. C. State Law Claims In addition to § 1983 claims, Plaintiff purports to assert state law claims. However, Plaintiff does not specifically identify any such claims. See Compl. at 1. Moreover, because

the Complaint fails to state a federal claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, and if the amended complaint identifies and states a plausible state law claim, the Court will reconsider the issue of supplemental jurisdiction. 4. Standards for Amended Complaint

If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the actions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

(9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehrler,

(1991). Plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045;

Johnson v. Duffy,

(9th Cir. 1978). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” or to survive screening under

and 1915A. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska,

(9th Cir. 1982); see also Iqbal,

(“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

Rather, for each cause of action against each defendant, Plaintiff must state the following: (1) the name of the person or entity that caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) facts showing the defendant is a state actor (such as state employment or a state contract) or a private entity performing a state function; (3) the dates on which the conduct of the defendant allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct

or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; (5) the particular constitutional or statutory provision Plaintiff alleges has been violated; (6) facts alleging the elements of the violation are met; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered; and (8) the particular type of relief Plaintiff is seeking from each defendant. In addition, Plaintiff must include facts showing that the defendants are state actors and that Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by

Heck. Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon, attach, or incorporate by reference other pleadings or documents. See Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-

existent.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty.,

, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc.,

(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by entering judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint). Plaintiff must set forth each different factual allegation in a separate, numbered paragraph. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as an “Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff’s name and address

should be clearly printed at the top left corner of the first page of each document filed with the Court. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must also file a “Motion to Review the Amended Complaint.” If Plaintiff does not amend within 28 days, or if the amendment does not comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See Knapp

v. Hogan,

(9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant simply cannot state a claim.”). ORDER IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has 28 days within which to file an amended complaint as described above. If Plaintiff does so, Plaintiff must file (along with the amended complaint) a Motion to Review the Amended Complaint. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal if Plaintiff no longer

intends to pursue this case.1

1 A voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) is not a dismissal for frivolity, for maliciousness, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, does not count as a “strike” under

(g). Spencer v. Barajas,

(9th Cir. 2025). 2. If Plaintiff does not file a timely amended complaint, this case may be dismissed with prejudice and without further notice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, failure to prosecute, or failure to comply with a Court order. See

and 1915A; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 3. Because an amended complaint is required for Plaintiff to proceed, Plaintiff’ □ request for appointment of counsel (contained in the Complaint) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may renew the request for counsel in an amended complaint.

aa DATED: August 19, 2025

Mail =— i Chiet US District Court Judge

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 8