(Consolidated with 150024 & 150025)

Opinion filed June 23, 2015 _____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

A.D., 2015

In re L.B., S.B., & K.B., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, Minors ) Peoria County, Illinois. ) (The People of the State of ) Illinois, ) Appeal Nos. 3-15-0023, 3-15-0024 & ) 3-15-0025 Petitioner-Appellee, ) Circuit Nos. 12-JA-312, 12-JA-313 & ) 12-JA-314 v. ) ) Amanda B., ) ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Albert L. Purham, Jr., ) Judge, Presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Carter and Lytton concurred in the judgment and opinion _____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶1 The minors, L.B., K.B., and S.B. were adjudicated neglected by reason of an injurious

environment. The respondent mother, Amanda B., was found dispositionally unfit, and she was

ordered to complete certain tasks before the minors could be returned to her care. However, the

State filed a petition for termination of the mother's parental rights as to all three minors, alleging that she failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors. The circuit court

found the petitions to be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and it found that it was in the

best interests of all three minors that the mother's parental rights be terminated. The mother

appealed, challenging: (1) the finding of unfitness with respect to L.B.; and (2) the best interests

finding with respect to L.B. and K.B.

¶2 FACTS

¶3 On December 26, 2012, the State filed juvenile petitions alleging that the minors, L.B.,

K.B., and S.B., were neglected due to an injurious environment because the mother left the

minors in the care of her own mother, who had serious mental health issues. The minors were

placed in the temporary custody of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), and

they were all placed with the same nonrelative foster family. On March 13, 2013, the minors

were adjudicated neglected. On April 24, 2013, the mother, and the fathers of K.B. and S.B.,

were found to be dispositionally unfit. The minors were made wards of the court and DCFS was

named guardian of the minors with the right to place. The father of L.B., Jim F., was found to be

fit. The order gave DCFS discretion to return L.B. to Jim F. The mother was ordered to perform

certain tasks in order to correct the conditions that led to the adjudication of neglect: (1) execute

all necessary releases; (2) cooperate fully with DCFS; (3) obtain a drug and alcohol assessment

and complete any recommended treatment; (4) perform two random drug drops per month; (5)

submit to a psychological examination; (6) participate in and successfully complete counseling;

(7) participate in and successfully complete a parenting course; (8) obtain and maintain stable

housing; (9) visit with the children as scheduled; (10) successfully complete homemaker

services; and (11) cooperate with notifying DCFS of any changes in living arrangements within

three days.

2 ¶4 After the dispositional hearing, in August 2013, DCFS placed L.B. with her father, Jim.

F. At the same time, K.B. was placed with her paternal grandparents. The October 2, 2013,

permanency review order indicates that the permanency goal with respect to L.B., which was 22-

return home within one year, had been achieved because she was with her father. L.B. remained

a ward of the court, but guardianship of L.B. was returned to Jim F. The goal for S.B. and K.B.

was changed to 23-return home pending status, with guardianship remaining with DCFS.

¶5 On June 2, 2014, the State filed petitions to terminate the mother’s parental rights for

failing to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors during two overlapping nine-

month time periods, March 13, 2013, to December 13, 2013, and August 1, 2013, to May 1,

2014. The petition with respect to S.B. also sought to terminate the parental rights of her father,

David S.

¶6 At the hearing on the petition, the State asked the circuit court to take judicial notice of

various petitions and orders in the files. Those were all admitted without objection, except that

the circuit court limited the judicial notice to not include findings in the permanency review

orders. The State then offered Exhibit 1-5, which included, among other things, certified records

from Fortes Laboratory and the mother's counseling records. All were admitted without

objection.

¶7 Joan Pegues, a child welfare specialist with DCFS, testified that she was the caseworker

for the mother and the minors from the beginning of the case until June 2014. She testified that

between March 13, 2013, and September 19, 2013, the mother missed two meetings with her.

The mother did successfully complete a parenting class, and her attendance at visits with the

minors was good. The mother also completed a psychological evaluation. However, the mother

was not compliant with her ordered drug drops. Exhibit 1 showed that the mother only did 3 of

3 her 21 drug drops during the two relevant time periods, and 2 of those tested positive for drugs.

As of March 6, 2014, she had not yet scheduled a drug and alcohol assessment. She was also

discharged from counseling for failing to attend, even though DCFS provided the mother with a

bus pass and homemaker services. Exhibit 2 contained the records from the counselor, which

indicated that the mother only attended the initial appointment.

¶8 At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found that the State had proven by clear

and convincing evidence that the mother was unfit because she had not made reasonable progress

toward the return of the minors during the relevant nine-month periods. At the best interest

hearing, the mother testified that she attended visits with the minors and the visits went well.

The mother testified that she was engaged in counseling, and she was going to begin more

intensive counseling on January 8, 2015. She was prepared to complete any remaining services

in order to have her fitness restored. The circuit court found that it was in the best interest of the

minors to terminate the mother’s parental rights. David S.'s parental rights were also terminated.

Jim F. was named guardian of L.B., and that wardship was terminated. The mother appealed.

¶9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 The mother argues that the circuit court erred in finding her unfit as to L.B., contending

that the State was not authorized to bring a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights. The

mother does not challenge the factual basis for finding her unfit. 1 The mother also contends

that the return home permanency goal was already achieved with L.B., before the petition for the

termination of the mother’s parental rights was filed, because L.B. had been returned to her

1 The mother does argue that, as of the permanency review hearing on November 12, 2014, DCFS was no longer paying for her services and her visits with the minors had been reduced because the termination petitions had been filed. The State asks us to strike some of this argument as irrelevant. This court is fully aware of the relevant time periods in this case, and will only consider evidence relevant to that time frame.

4 father. Thus, the mother argues that permanency had been achieved with respect to L.B. and any

reasonable progress on her part was illusory.

¶ 11 As the State correctly points out, the mother failed to raise the pleading issue in the

circuit court. Pleading defects generally must be raised in the trial court, or the defect is waived.

In re Andrea D.,

(2003). However, since termination of parental rights

affects a fundamental liberty interest, we will consider the issue for plain error.

¶ 12 We find no error. Section 2-13(4.5) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 does not limit the

State’s power to commence a termination proceeding. 705 ILCS 405/2-13(4.5)(a) (West 2012);

In re Brandon A.,

(2009). Rather, it imposes a duty on DCFS to

request that the State file a petition for termination of parental rights under certain circumstances.

The State may file a petition requesting termination of parental rights any time after the entry

of the dispositional order. 705 ILCS 405/2-13(4) (West 2012); Brandon A.,

.

¶ 13 Section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act provides that a parent is unfit for failing “to

make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month period

following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West Supp.

2014). When the evidence supports a finding that one parent is unfit, and it is in the best interest

of the minor to terminate that parent’s parental rights, the circuit court may enter that order –

even though the other parent may not be subject to a termination petition. In re S.M.,

(1991). The fitness of the other parent is merely a factor that the circuit court

may consider at a best interest hearing.

¶ 14 Once a parent is found to be unfit, the focus shifts to the minor, and the circuit court must

determine whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the minor. In re D.T.,

5

(2004). The circuit court focuses on the minor's welfare and whether

termination would improve the minor's future, including his financial, social, and emotional

well-being. In re Daphnie E.,

(2006).

¶ 15 In determining whether termination of a parent's rights is in a minor's best interest, the

circuit court considers the following factors: (1) the minor’s physical safety and welfare; (2)

development of his identity; (3) his background and ties, including familial, cultural, and

religious; (4) the minor’s sense of attachments; (5) the minor’s wishes; (6) the minor’s ties to his

community; (7) the minor’s need for permanence, including the need for stability and continuity

of relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8), the uniqueness of every family and child;

(9) risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of individuals available to care for the

minor. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(a) to (j) (West 2012). The State must prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that termination is in the minor's best interest. In re D.T.,

. We

will not reverse a circuit court's finding regarding termination unless it is against the manifest

weight of the evidence. In re Deandre D.,

(2010).

¶ 16 The mother argues that the circuit court terminated her parental rights as to L.B. for the

sole purpose of making things convenient for L.B.’s father. As evidence of this, the mother

points to the fact that the circuit court discharged the wardship of L.B. right after it found that it

was in L.B.’s best interest to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The mother also argues that

the termination of her parental rights was unnecessary because L.B. had permanence with her

father. The mother does not address any of the other best interest factors.

¶ 17 We find that the circuit court’s determination that it was in the best interest of L.B. to

terminate the mother’s parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. As

stated above, the fact that L.B.’s father was a fit parent was a factor for the circuit court to

6 consider. The circuit court also considered the other best interest factors. It found that the

mother had been unable to provide for any of the minors’ basic needs, such as physical safety,

welfare, shelter, health, and clothing. The circuit court also noted that L.B. was developing an

identity with her father and her stepmother, and she was developing community ties, school, and

friends with her father. The circuit court also found that all the minors’ need for permanence

favored termination.

¶ 18 As for K.B., the mother argues that the State failed to prove it was in K.B.’s best interest

to terminate the mother’s parental rights. She argues that the fact that she failed to complete her

services was used against her, even though it was unclear what services were being provided as

of the date of the best interest hearing. She also contends that the circuit court failed to give

appropriate weight to the best interest factors. Finally, the mother argues that the circuit court’s

latest permanency review order, changing K.B.’s permanency goal to guardianship, reflected the

circuit court’s determination that guardianship was in K.B.’s best interest.

¶ 19 As noted above, once a parent has been found to be unfit, the focus shifts to the minor. In

re D.T.,

. Thus, the mother’s argument that it was unclear whether services

were available to her at the time of the best interest hearing was not relevant to the determination

of whether it was in the best interest of K.B. to terminate the mother’s parental rights. There is

no evidence, nor does the mother argue, that services were unavailable to the mother during the

overlapping nine-month periods relevant to the mother’s unfitness.

¶ 20 The circuit court’s determination that it was in K.B.’s best interest to terminate the

mother’s parental rights was also not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The circuit

court considered K.B.’s age, the length of time that she was in foster care, and her bond with her

foster parents, her paternal grandparents. It acknowledged that K.B. enjoyed her visits with the

7 mother, but did not ask about her between visits. As noted above, the circuit court found that the

mother had been unable to provide for any of the minors’ basic needs, such as physical safety,

welfare, shelter, health, and clothing. The circuit court sufficiently considered the statutory best

interest factors, including the potential ability of K.B.’s father to provide permanence for K.B, in

concluding that it was in K.B.’s best interest to terminate the mother’s parental rights. See In re

Jaron Z.,

(2004) (a circuit court is not required to specifically

discuss each best interest factor in support of its determination).

¶ 21 CONCLUSION

¶ 22 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.

¶ 23 Affirmed.

8