No. 1-15-0520 Opinion filed December 11, 2015

FIFTH DIVISION

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

KENNETH MASCHEK, Individually ) Appeal from the Circuit Court and on Behalf of All Other Similarly ) of Cook County. Situated, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 13 L 014527 ) THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal ) The Honorable Corporation, ) Mary Lane Mikva, ) Judge, presiding. Defendant-Appellee. )

JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice Palmer concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 In this appeal, plaintiff Kenneth Maschek appeals the trial court's grant of

defendant City of Chicago's (City's) motion to dismiss. In this case, plaintiff No. 1-15-0520

challenged a traffic ticket, on the ground that the ticket was the result of an

automated speed enforcement (ASE) camera operating near Lane Tech College

Prep High School (Lane Tech) and that the law governing ASE cameras

prohibited the City from operating an ASE camera near a school on that day.

625 ILCS 5/11-208.8(a-5) (West 2012) (ASE law).

¶2 The ASE law governs the conduct of the City but not the driver. The

ASE law dictates when the City can and cannot operate ASE cameras.

However, drivers must still conform to the law, whether or not an ASE camera

is running. The speed limit for a vehicle in this City is 30 miles per hour, 1 and

plaintiff does not contest the fact that he was 11 miles per hour over this limit.

¶3 In addition, plaintiff paid the ticket and did not challenge the underlying

speeding violation. Thus, he waived for our consideration whether he was or

was not violating the law. On this appeal, he does not argue that he was

1 Under Illinois state law, unless some other speed restriction is established, "the maximum speed limit in an urban district for all vehicles is: 30 miles per hour[.]" 625 ILCS 5/11-601(c)(1) (West 2014). The Chicago Municipal Code states: "The provisions of Section 11-601 of the Illinois Vehicle Code shall be applicable on all streets within and under jurisdiction of the city. The absolute statutory urban speed limit shall be 30 miles per hour in streets[.]" Chicago Municipal Code, § 9-12-070(a) (amended Apr. 26, 2006). The Illinois Vehicle Code defines an "urban district" as: "The territory contiguous to and including any street which is built up with structures devoted to business, industry or dwelling houses situated at intervals of less than 100 feet for a distance of a quarter of a mile or more." 625 ILCS 5/1-214 (West 2014). Plaintiff does not contest that Lane Tech was in an urban district with a speed limit of 30 miles per hour, and that he was traveling 11 miles over this limit. 2 No. 1-15-0520

obeying the law, but argues only that, even if he was violating the law, the City

was not allowed to use an ASE camera to catch him. 2

¶4 Plaintiff argues that ASE cameras are allowed to operate only on school

days, that summer school days are not school days, and thus the City was not

allowed to issue an ASE-based ticket on June 26, 2014, the day he was

speeding. Plaintiff does not contest that this day was a scheduled class day for

special needs children at Lane Tech.

¶5 Special needs children have an extended school year, such that a

regularly scheduled school day for them included June 26, 2014, at Lane Tech.

See infra ¶¶ 74-76; 105 ILCS 5/14-13.01(b) (West 2014) (providing for up to

"235 school days"). Although plaintiff raises arguments about the "school year"

and the "school calendar," the operative phrase in the ASE law is "school

day[]", and a school day for a special needs child is defined as a day that he or

she is "in attendance at school for instructional purposes."

. 11

(c)(1), (2) (2014); 23 Ill. Admin. Code 226.75 (2007) (adopting this definition

for Illinois).

¶6 Plaintiff engages in a number of hypotheticals–what if at another school,

the math team was meeting on a Saturday–would that count as a school day?

2 This is a question which he has standing to raise, for reasons we explain below. 3 No. 1-15-0520

However, that is not the case in front of us. In the case in front of us, plaintiff

was issued a ticket near a school where special needs children were attending

regularly scheduled classes.

¶7 Plaintiff argues how will a driver be on notice when he or she should

slow down. The ASE law, as applied to and argued by plaintiff, concerns

enforcement only, ie., when may the City use automatic cameras to catch

violators. However, the violation occurred whether or not the ASE camera was

operating. The law governing plaintiff's behavior was still in effect, whether or

not the ASE camera was running, and that law provided for a 30-mile per hour

speed limit. A driver does not have to be on notice about when he is most

likely to be caught.

¶8 Since the days of the horse and buggy, long before there were ASE

cameras, drivers knew to slow down near a school. Society benefits if drivers

have an automatic, knee-jerk reaction–see a school, slow down. Even when

classes are not in session, children have a tendency to gather and play on the

amenities which schools often provide, such as basketball courts and open

spaces. Encouraging drivers to slow down furthers the safety of children,

whether or not the drivers are caught. This "slow down" is specifically what the

sponsor of the ASE bill claimed as a safety benefit, which benefits society as a

whole. See 97th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Nov. 9, 2011, at 131.

4 No. 1-15-0520

¶9 Plaintiff argues that there were only 70 students at the school, and 70

children is not enough to matter, when you consider the overall population of

that particular school. However, he does not state how many children it does

take to matter, and neither did the legislature. The law is phrased in terms of a

school day, not in terms of numbers of children or percentages at a particular

school. The law applies to even the smallest primary school in Chicago.

¶ 10 For these reasons and the reasons which we discuss below, we find that

"school days" includes the special education classes which were in session at

Lane Tech on June 26, 2014, and we affirm. Since special needs children were

in school on June 26, 2014, at Lane Tech, we need not make a determination

with respect to the other classes in session.

¶ 11 BACKGROUND

¶ 12 I. The Complaint

¶ 13 On October 31, 2014, plaintiff filed a complaint which alleged that he

received a $100 speeding ticket as the result of the operation of an ASE camera

on June 26, 2014, and that he paid the fine. Plaintiff alleged that the camera

was located in a "School Safety Zone at 2549 W. Addison St. which is adjacent

to Lane Tech College Prep High School," and that he was "the registered owner

of the vehicle." Plaintiff alleged that, on September 18, 2014, the City of

Chicago issued a press release stating that ASE " 'enforcement hours will be 5 No. 1-15-0520

limited from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. in safety zones around schools on school days

(Monday through Friday).' " Plaintiff claimed that the regular academic year

had already ended and would not begin again until September 2, 2014, and thus

the City was not allowed to operate an ASE camera on Thursday, June 26,

2014. Plaintiff sought class certification and brought counts for declaratory

judgment, injunction, unjust enrichment and fraud.

¶ 14 II. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

¶ 15 On December 17, 2014, defendant City of Chicago moved to dismiss

plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil

Procedure on the ground that plaintiff's claims were barred by an "affirmative

matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim." 735 ILCS 5/2-

619(a)(9) (West 2014).

¶ 16 Defendant argued: "In short, Plaintiff challenges the authority of the City

to cite his vehicle for travelling 41 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone

adjacent to Lane Tech *** at 5:26 p.m. on June 26, 2014, using [ASE] cameras

because Plaintiff believes that June 26, 2014, was not a 'school day.' The City

is only authorized to use ASE cameras adjacent to schools on 'school days.' "

¶ 17 Defendant further argued: "All of Plaintiff's claims fail because it is an

easily proved issue of fact that classes were in session at Lane Tech on June 26,

2014, and accordingly June 26, 2014, was a school day at Lane Tech." 6 No. 1-15-0520

¶ 18 Defendant also argued (1) that plaintiff lacked standing to claim that he

had been issued a ticket not authorized by law, since that had not happened to

him; (2) that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, since he

voluntarily paid the ticket; and (3) that the Tort Immunity Act barred plaintiff's

fraud claim. 745 ILCS 10/2-107 (West 2014).

¶ 19 Defendant attached exhibits which included a copy of the ticket mailed to

plaintiff. The ticket, which was entitled an "Automated Speed Enforcement

Violation," informed plaintiff that he had 14 days, or until July 27, 2014, to pay

$100, or contest the ticket by mail, or request an in-person hearing. The ticket

listed the "Violation Code" as "9101020**," which the City's website explains

is for speeding 11 miles per hour or more over the speed limit and is subject to a

$100 fine. http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/fin/supp_info/revenue/

general_ parking_ticketinformation/violations.html (from a list of "speed

violations that can be issued," current as of April 2014). The ticket listed the

"Description" of the violation as a "Speed Violation 11+," for traveling 11 miles

or more over the speed limit, and it stated that the vehicle was traveling 41

miles per hour. The ticket also described the violation as occurring on July 26,

2014, at 5:26 p.m., in a "School Safety Zone." 3

3 The Chicago Municipal Code authorizes a fine of $500 for traveling more than 20 miles per hour in a school safety zone on "a school day." However, 7 No. 1-15-0520

¶ 20 Defendant's attached exhibits also included the affidavit of Nancy

Quintana, the Executive Director of Instructional Support for the Board of

Education of the City of Chicago who swore, in relevant part, that:

"5. During the summer of 2014, classes were held and students were

present at Lane Tech on Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and

Thursdays from June 23, 2014 until July 31, 2014.

6. June 26, 2014, was a Thursday and classes were in session [at]

Lane Tech on that day.

7. Classes offered at Lane Tech in the summer of 2014 included

extended school year ('ESY') classes for students with special needs and

virtual learning credit recovery classes. Both types of classes were in

session on June 26, 2014.

8. At Lane Tech during the 2014 summer session approximately 60

students were enrolled in ESY classes and approximately 40 students

actually attended ESY classes.

plaintiff's ticket was for only $100. Chicago Municipal Code, § 9-12-075 (amended Apr. 26, 2006). See also 625 ILCS 5/11-605(a) (West 2014) ("On a school day *** no person shall drive a motor vehicle at a speed in excess of 20 miles per hour while passing a school zone"). 8 No. 1-15-0520

9. The ESY program provides extended school year services to

students with special needs based on a student's individualized education

program ('IEF') pursuant to federal special education law.

10. At Lane Tech during the 2014 summer session approximately 31

students were enrolled in and attended the virtual learning credit recovery

program.

11. Students in the virtual learning credit recovery program take

online courses to make up credits in order to meet graduation

requirements. Students in this program must physically attend scheduled

classes in the credit recovery computer lab to take the online courses."

¶ 21 In his response, plaintiff did not contest the facts sworn to in the above

affidavit, arguing instead that, "[e]ven if 40 students actually attended classes at

Lane Tech during the summer, and 31 additional students attended the virtual

learning credit recovery program [citations omitted], 71 students constitutes a

very small minority only (1/69%) of Lane Tech's 4,200-student population."

¶ 22 In reply, defendant observed that the Code of Federal Regulations

provides that "[s]chool day means any day including a partial day that children

are in attendance at school for instructional purposes," and that "[s]chool day

has the same meaning for all children in school, including children with and

9 No. 1-15-0520

without disabilities."

(2014); 23 Ill. Admin. Code 226.75

(2007) (adopting definition).

¶ 23 III. Trial Court's Dismissal Order

¶ 24 On February 18, 2015, the trial court issued a written dismissal order

which stated in full:

"This matter coming to be heard on defendant's section 2-619 motion to

dismiss, with the court being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby

declared:

(1) For the reasons stated on the record, before a certified court

reporter, defendant's 2-619 motion to dismiss is granted[.]

(2) For the reasons stated on the record, plaintiff's request for leave to

amend is denied.

(3) This order is final and appealable."

¶ 25 At the hearing, the trial court stated: "I do agree with the City on its

interpretation of what the statute means. To the extent that there is an

ambiguity, I think that the legislative history makes quite clear that it's about–

as well as common sense would probably make quite clear, but both make it

clear that it's about protecting school children, and summer school children are

still school children." In response to plaintiff's discussion of statutes which

10 No. 1-15-0520

provide a definition of the school year, the trial court stated: "all those statutes

have a different agenda. They really do. They are about specific educational

requirements. They are about specific things that are not about safety."

¶ 26 The trial court ruled that, since this was a purely legal issue about which

the "DOAH," the Department of Administrative Hearings, did not have

particular expertise, there was no need for plaintiff to have exhausted

administrative remedies.

¶ 27 The City's attorney observed: "the speed limit doesn't change whether it's

a school day or not. The speed limit that was applicable here is applicable all

the time. It is a 30-mile-per-hour speed limit. Plaintiff was going 41 miles per

hour." Even if there is an issue with respect to when the City can or cannot

operate the cameras, he noted that "it doesn't change the conduct of drivers at

all."

¶ 28 Plaintiff's counsel then interjected, asking if he could "hop in on this

issue." When the court agreed, he stated: "The speed is irrelevant to this suit.

*** At issue is *** whether the City had the authority to operate [the cameras]

and issue violations at that particular time. Now, if there was an officer, police

officer, who was present at that time, and he clocked someone going 50 miles

an hour," he could have issued a ticket. Plaintiff's counsel stressed that: "The

11 No. 1-15-0520

issue is whether there should have been an issuance of the speed cameras

because those powers are limited."

¶ 29 Plaintiff's counsel stated that he had made a request in his response, that,

if the trial court ruled that the day in question was a school day, then he should

be allowed to amend his complaint. He sought to amend in order to challenge

the constitutionality of the law on its face on vagueness grounds, because a

driver would not know when the cameras were operating. When the trial court

observed that this issue was not in the briefs, plaintiff stated that it was in a

footnote. However, plaintiff's brief does not request, either in a footnote or in

the text, leave to amend the complaint.

¶ 30 The trial court asked the City's attorney to respond to the issue, and he

stated: "Legislation is only unconstitutionally vague if it does not provide a

person with a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited so that

he or she may conform his or her conduct accordingly. Here the 30-mile-per-

hour speed limit was clear."

¶ 31 The trial court denied plaintiff's request to amend, stating that plaintiff

was not "injured by any alleged vagueness, since it's clear he did not conform

his conduct to any possible speed limit, including the 30-mile-an-hour limit."

The trial court also granted defendant's motion to dismiss since neither the

Vehicle Code nor the School Code provided an applicable definition of "school 12 No. 1-15-0520

day," so "the dictionary definition of 'a day in which classes are held in a

primary or secondary school' is a very rational place to start." The trial court

explained:

"To the extent that there is any ambiguity–and I am not at all sure

there is, but to the extent that there is, the legislative history which makes

it clear that this is about promoting safety of school children, and at the

same time trying to not make the cameras operate unnecessarily lengthy

periods of time, does not compel or suggest that the distinction should be

made between the school year, the regular school year, and summer

school.

So I do believe that the City's definition of 'school day' to include a

summer school day is the appropriate definition under the statute and,

therefore, the City was within its home rule powers in enforcing the ASE

cameras during summer school."

¶ 32 On February 19, 2015, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, and this appeal

followed.

¶ 33 ANALYSIS

¶ 34 Plaintiff appeals the trial court's dismissal order on the ground that the

City was not allowed to operate an ASE camera on June 26, 2014, near Lane

Tech High School, when classes for students with special needs and virtual 13 No. 1-15-0520

learning credit recovery classes were in session, because this day did not qualify

as a school day. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 35 I. Standard of Review

¶ 36 A. Section 2-619 Motion

¶ 37 On this appeal, plaintiff asks us to reverse the trial court's dismissal order,

which was granted pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure

(Code). 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2014). "A motion to dismiss, pursuant to

section 2-619 of the Code, admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs'

complaint, but asserts an affirmative defense or other matter that avoids or

defeats plaintiffs' claim." DeLuna v. Burciaga,

(2006).

¶ 38 When we review a section 2-619 dismissal, our standard of review is de

novo. Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co.,

(2006); American Service Insurance Co. v. City of Chicago,

(2010). De novo review means that the reviewing court performs the same

analysis that a trial judge would perform. A.M. Realty Western L.L.C. v. MSMC

Realty, L.L.C.,

.

¶ 39 When reviewing a "motion to dismiss under section 2-619, a court must

accept as true all well-pleaded facts in plaintiffs' complaint and all inferences

that can reasonably be drawn in plaintiff's favor." Morr-Fritz, Inc. v.

Blagojevich,

(2008). "In ruling on a motion to dismiss 14 No. 1-15-0520

under section 2-619, the trial court may consider pleadings, depositions, and

affidavits." Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove,

(2004). "[T]he court must interpret all pleadings and supporting documents in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Melena v. Anheuser-Busch,

Inc.,

(2006).

¶ 40 Even if the trial court dismissed on an improper ground, a reviewing

court may affirm the dismissal, if the record supports a proper ground for

dismissal. Raintree,

(when reviewing a section 2-619

dismissal, we can affirm "on any basis present in the record"); In re Marriage of

Gary,

(2008) ("we may affirm on any basis supported

by the record, regardless of whether the trial court based its decision on the

proper ground").

¶ 41 B. Statutory Interpretation

¶ 42 The de novo standard of review also applies because the parties ask us

to interpret the meaning of the phrase "school days" as used in the ASE law, or

section 11-208.8 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-208.8 (West

2014) (entitled "Automated speed enforcement systems in safety zones")). The

interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we also review de novo.

People v. Anthony,

.

15 No. 1-15-0520

¶ 43 "As we do in every case of statutory interpretation, we look first and

foremost to the language of the statute itself." People v. Wright,

(citing People v. Cardamone,

(2009)).

"Our primary objective in construing a statute is to give effect to the

legislature's intent" (Wright,

(citing

Cardamone,

)); and "[t]he best indication of that intent is the

language of the statute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary

meaning." Brunton v. Kruger,

. In construing the plain

language of the statute, we consider the statute in its entirety, "keeping in mind

the subject it addresses and the legislature's apparent objective in enacting it."

Cardamone,

.

¶ 44 If the statutory language is clear, we must apply it, without resort to any

aids of statutory construction. Krohe v. City of Bloomington,

(2003). If, and only if, the statutory language is ambiguous, may we look

to other sources to ascertain the legislature's intent. Krohe,

.

These other sources include primarily the statute's legislative history and

debates. Krohe,

.

¶ 45 II. Threshold Issue

¶ 46 As a threshold matter, the City argues that plaintiff's claim is barred

because he voluntarily paid the ticket and failed to exhaust his administrative 16 No. 1-15-0520

remedies to contest it. However, plaintiff does not contest either that he was

speeding or the amount of the fine for this type of violation. His dispute is not

with the underlying violation or the fine, but with the City's means of

enforcement.

¶ 47 While our supreme court generally requires strict compliance with the

rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, it has recognized several

exceptions. Office of Cook County State's Attorney v. Illinois Local Labor

Relations Board,

(1995); Castaneda v. Illinois Human

Rights Comm'n,

(1989). An aggrieved party may seek

judicial review of an administrative decision without first exhausting

administrative remedies for several reasons, including: "when [1] no issues of

fact are presented or [2] agency expertise is not involved," or "[3] where the

agency's jurisdiction is attacked because it is not authorized by statute."

Castaneda,

. See also Office of Cook County State's

Attorney,

. In the case at bar, all three quoted exceptions

apply. First, no issues of fact are presented, since plaintiff does not contest that

he was speeding. Second, the agency's expertise is not involved, since this case

does not require a resolution of whether plaintiff did or did not violate the law.

Third, plaintiff attacks the City's jurisdiction or authority to issue the ticket,

claiming that it was not authorized by statute.

17 No. 1-15-0520

¶ 48 In addition, "[t]he issue before us is one of statutory and case law

interpretation, and therefore it falls within the scope of our particular expertise

and not [the agency's]." Office of Cook County State's Attorney,

. "As we have previously noted in discussing the exhaustion rule and its

exceptions, '[t]he agency's particular expertise is not implicated in statutory

construction.' " Office of Cook County State's Attorney,

-07

(quoting Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board,

(1978)).

¶ 49 Accordingly, we conclude that the exhaustion doctrine is not a bar to our

consideration of the present dispute. Office of Cook County State's Attorney,

.

¶ 50 III. Two Issues

¶ 51 The case before us presents two distinct issues: whether the schooling of

special needs children qualifies as a school day for purposes of the ASE law;

and whether recovery classes qualify as a school day for purposes of the ASE

law. In the case at bar, 40 students attended an extended school year program

for students with special needs, and another 31 students attended virtual

learning credit recovery classes to make up credits in order to meet graduation

requirements. If either qualifies as a school day, we must affirm the trial court

in the case at bar.

18 No. 1-15-0520

¶ 52 First, we will examine the plain language of the statute. Second, if there

is an ambiguity, we will look to the legislative purpose. Lastly, the parties make

arguments based on the provisions of other codes, which we will examine.

¶ 53 IV. Plain Language

¶ 54 As we observed above, if the language of the statute is clear, we are not

allowed to go further. See Krohe,

.

¶ 55 The Illinois Vehicle Code authorizes the City to utilize ASE cameras to

enforce the speed limit near schools "on school days." 625 ILCS 5/11-208.8(a-

5)(i) (West 2014). On this appeal, plaintiff does not claim either that he was

not speeding or that he was not sufficiently near a school. The dispute concerns

the meaning of the phrase "school days." As noted above, plaintiff argues that

school days should not include: (1) extended year classes for special needs

children; and (2) recovery classes for children seeking to meet graduation

requirements.

¶ 56 The Vehicle Code does not provide a definition of the term. Thus we

must turn to the term's plain and ordinary meaning. As we observed above, our

primary goal in construing a statute is to give effect to the legislature's intent,

and the best indication of that intent are the words of the statute itself, which

must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Brunton,

; People v. McChriston,

. When a statute does not 19 No. 1-15-0520

define its own terms, a reviewing court may use a dictionary to ascertain the

plain and ordinary meaning of those terms. McChriston,

;

People v. Bingham,

, ¶ 55.

¶ 57 While courts and lawyers frequently rely on Black's Law Dictionary to

define terms (e.g., McChriston,

, ¶ 17), there is no definition of

school day in that dictionary. Black's Law Dictionary 1373 (8th ed. 2004). In

its brief, the City quotes a number of dictionaries which define the term as a day

on which classes are held, or school is conducted or in session. We will not

quote them all here, but we provide an example from the New Oxford

American Dictionary (3rd ed. 2010)

https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=school+day&submit.x=54&

submit.y=23 (last visited Oct. 16, 2015) which defines "school day" as "a day

on which classes are held in a primary or secondary school." This is the only

definition that this dictionary provides for this term. Accord American Heritage

Dictionary of the English Language,

https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=school+day&submit.x=54&

submit.y=23 (last visited Oct. 16, 2015) (defining "school day" as: "1. A day

on which school is in session; 2. the part of a day during which school is in

session.").

20 No. 1-15-0520

¶ 58 Since classes were held and were in session on June 26, 2014, the plain

and ordinary dictionary meaning of the term shows that it was a school day.

Plaintiff does not argue that there is a definition from another dictionary which

we should employ or that application of these definitions results in a different

conclusion. Instead, he argues, as we discuss in a section below, that we should

turn to other statutory codes, outside the Vehicle Code, for a definition. (See

infra "VI. Provisions of Other Codes.))

¶ 59 V. Statutory Purpose

¶ 60 After a court examines the plain and ordinary meaning of the language,

the rules of statutory construction direct us to consider the statute's legislative

history, if the words still appear ambiguous. Krohe,

.

Although we do not find the language ambiguous, the undisputed purpose of the

statute wipes out any doubt.

¶ 61 The legislative history shows that the legislators' primary purpose in

enacting the ASE law was the safety of the children, and plaintiff does not

argue otherwise in this appeal.

¶ 62 As we noted above, a statute's legislative history and debates can be

valuable construction aides in interpreting an otherwise ambiguous statute.

Krohe,

. When interpreting an ambiguous phrase in a statute,

our supreme court looks especially to the remarks of the bill's sponsor. Krohe, 21 No. 1-15-0520

. See also In re Pension Reform Litigation,

(giving more weight to the remarks of "the chief sponsor of the

legislation"); Julie Q. v. Department of Children & Family Services,

(quoting the sponsor's remarks when interpreting a statute). The

remarks made immediately prior to passage are particularly important. Poris v.

Lake Holiday Property Owners Ass'n,

(quoting the

sponsors' remarks in order to interpret a statute and noting that, following these

remarks, the bill passed).

¶ 63 In the case at bar, the ASE law passed both houses on November 9, 2009.

On that same day, shortly before the final vote, Representative Barbara Flynn

Currie, who was the sponsor of the bill, stated that its purpose was "to protect

children." 97th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Nov. 9, 2011, at 131. She

explained that, "when you have strong enforcement of the speeding laws, guess

what, people slow down." 97th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Nov. 9,

2011, at 131. Currie stated: "This would not apply on nonschool days. So,

holidays, Saturdays, and Sundays are not covered[.]"97th Ill. Gen. Assem.,

House Proceedings, Nov. 9, 2011, at 140. She later repeated that ASE cameras

would operate "only on school days, not on Saturdays, not on Sundays, not on

holidays." 97th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Nov. 9, 2011, at 140. In

the case at bar, the day in question was not a Saturday, Sunday or holiday.

22 No. 1-15-0520

¶ 64 Senator John J. Cullerton, a sponsor of the bill in the Senate, stated:

"We have in Chicago a pedestrian fatality rate that's sixty-eight percent

higher than New York City. And we do lose a number of–young children

in these crashes in the City of Chicago. We have seen in other areas of

this nation where they've had this program, there's a big decrease in the

number of tickets that are issued *** [a]nd as a result, safety ensues."

97th Ill. Gen. Assembly, Senate Proceedings, October 26, 2011, at 61.

¶ 65 The only portion of the legislative history quoted by plaintiff concerns

the limits that the legislature placed on: (1) the location of the ASE cameras, (2)

the amount and use of the fines, and (3) the calibration of the cameras. On

November 9, 2011, Representative Currie stated that, although ASE cameras

provided the City with an opportunity to protect children:

"We do limit the opportunity for the City Council to do that, an eighth of

a mile from schools, an eighth of a mile from parks. We restrict how

revenues can be used. We require frequent calibration using Illinois State

Police standards, but we know all the studies show us that when you have

strong enforcement, when you have strong enforcement of the speeding

laws, guess what, people slow down." 97th Ill. Gen. Assem., House

Proceedings, Nov. 9, 2011, at 131.

Similarly, Representative Currie stated later: 23 No. 1-15-0520

"Representative Currie: [W]hat we have here are limits. We curtail

what they can do, but it may be they want to do a lot less. So, for

example, we say an eighth of a mile of a school or a park …

Representative Eddy: Yeah.

Representative Currie: … they could reduce that further. We say 100,

$50 for violations up to 10 miles above the speed limit, a 100 beyond

that. They could go lower. They could say 25 for the first." 97th Ill.

Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Nov. 9, 2011, at 133.

¶ 66 These quotes, to which plaintiff draws our attention, do not concern

limiting the definition of school days, and thus are inapposite to our discussion.

¶ 67 In sum, the legislative history shows that the legislators' primary purpose

was to protect children, and that they intended to limit the protection to days

when children were in school and to exclude Saturdays, Sundays and holidays.

This history bolsters our conclusion that Thursday, June 26, 2014, when both

special needs children and summer school children were in school, was a school

day.

¶ 68 VI. Provisions of Other Codes

24 No. 1-15-0520

¶ 69 Plaintiff argues that we should define school day for purposes of the

Vehicle Code, based on information provided by the Chicago Public Schools

and on provisions in other codes.

¶ 70 Plaintiff argues that the Chicago Public School's Calendar for 2013-14

shows that Thursday, June 26, 2014, was not a school day. However, the

calendar specifically lists "[d]ays of non-attendance for students," and June 26

was not one of these days. Since June 26 was not a "non-attendance" day, then

students were in attendance, and it was a school day for them. 4

¶ 71 Plaintiff also cites other codes. We are required to look at a statute in its

entirety when interpreting one of its terms. Cardamone,

("we

consider the statute in its entirety"). However, while we may turn to other

codes, we should only do so when the codes share similar goals and related

subjects. See Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co.,

(a

statute should be "construed in conjunction with other statutes touching on the

same or related subjects *** considering the reason and necessity for the law,

the evils to be remedied, and the objects and purposes to be obtained"); People

v. Steppan,

(1985) ("Because the statutes under

consideration have different goals and purposes," they need not be compared);

4 The 2013-14 calendar did not explain that the attendance days in the summer were for summer school, which was later noted in the 2014-15 calendar. 25 No. 1-15-0520

People v. Williams,

(2007) (considering "similar

statutes").

¶ 72 In support of his argument, plaintiff cites the definition of "a legal school

day" in the Illinois Administrative Code, which requires that 50 percent or more

of a school district's students must be in attendance. 23 Ill. Admin. Code

1.420(f)(3), amended at

(eff. Jan. 20, 2011). However, this

definition is directed solely to school districts for the "purpose of claiming

general State financial aid." 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 1.420(f), amended at

(eff. Jan. 20, 2011). The section quoted by plaintiff states that it

defines "a legal school day, which is eligible to be counted for General State

Aid *** during a work stoppage." (Emphasis added.) 23 Ill. Admin. Code

1.420(f)(3), amended at

(eff. Jan. 20, 2011). The purpose of

the ASE law before us has nothing to do with calculating State financial aid by

a school district during a work stoppage and, thus, there is no reason for the

definitions to carry over. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc.,

(2010) (it is proper to compare statutes when they "relat[e] to

the same subject matter").

¶ 73 Plaintiff also cites a number of other provisions, such as section 10-19 of

the School Code. 105 ILCS 5/10-19 (West 2012). This section authorizes

school boards to establish "experimental educational programs, including but

26 No. 1-15-0520

not limited to programs for self-directed learning," such as the virtual learning

credit recovery program occurring on June 26, 2014, at Lane Tech, in which

students took online courses to make up credits in order to meet graduation

requirements. See 105 ILCS 5/10-19 (West 2012). This section specifically

provides that these programs "shall be considered to comply with the

requirements of this Section as respects numbers of days of actual pupil

attendance." 105 ILCS 5/10-19 (West 2012). Thus, this section does not

support plaintiff's argument. See also 105 ILCS 5/14-13.01(h) (West 2014)

(providing for State reimbursement to school districts for special education for

up to "235 school days").

¶ 74 In response to plaintiff's citation of other codes, the City points us to a

different code, namely, the Code of Federal Regulations. Federal regulation

requires a State to provide "a free appropriate public education," or FAPE, "to

all children residing in the State *** including children with disabilities."

(a) (2014). "Each State must ensure that FAPE is available to

any individual child with a disability who needs special education[.]"

(c)(1) (2014). In order to satisfy this requirement, "[e]xtended school

year services," such as those being provided at Lane Tech, must be "available as

necessary."

(a) (2014).

27 No. 1-15-0520

¶ 75 Illinois law requires each school district to comply with all applicable

federal regulations, and it specifically demands compliance with federal

regulations for "the provision of extended school year services." 23 Ill. Admin.

Code 226.710(a), (b)(7) (2007). See also 105 ILCS 5/14-8.02(a) (West 2014)

(FAPE must "be available to all children with disabilities).

¶ 76 For the purposes of special education classes, the Code of Federal

Regulations defines a "school day" as follows:

"(1) School day means any day, including a partial day that children

are in attendance at school for instructional purposes.

(2) School day has the same meaning for all children in school,

including children with and without disabilities."

(c)

(1), (2) (2014).

Illinois adopted this definition in its Administrative Code, so the definition is a

part of Illinois as well as federal law. 23 Ill. Admin. Code 226.75 (2007).

Similar to the dictionary definitions, a school day in the above-quoted definition

means a day that "children are in attendance at school for instructional

purposes," and it specifically includes children with disabilities, such as the

children who were in school on June 26, 2014, at Lane Tech. See

(c)(1), (2) (2014); see also 105 ILCS 5/14-13.01(h) (West 2014)

28 No. 1-15-0520

(providing for State reimbursement to school districts for special education for

up to "235 school days").

¶ 77 Thus, the schooling of special needs children qualifies as a school day for

purposes of the ASE law. Since special needs children were in school on June

26, 2014, at Lane Tech, we need not consider whether recovery classes also

qualify as school days.

¶ 78 VII. Leave to Amend

¶ 79 In a one-paragraph argument in his brief, plaintiff asks us, in the

alternative, to find that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him leave

to amend his complaint.

¶ 80 When ruling on a motion to amend a complaint, the trial court enjoys

broad discretion. Ahmend v. Pickwick Place Owners' Ass'n,

(2008) (citing Loyola Academy v. S & S Roof Maintenance, Inc.,

(1992)). A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's

denial of a motion for leave to amend unless there has been a manifest abuse of

that discretion. Ahmend,

(citing Loyola Academy,

). In considering whether the trial court abused its discretion, a

reviewing court must consider whether the proposed amendment would have

cured the defective pleading. Ahmend,

(citing Loyola

Academy,

). "If the amendment would not have cured a defect 29 No. 1-15-0520

in the pleading," then the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying it.

Watkins v. Office of State Appellate Defender,

.

¶ 81 Plaintiff sought to add a count challenging the Illinois Vehicle Code

and the Municipal Code of Chicago as unconstitutionally vague.

¶ 82 A defendant can challenge a statute as unconstitutionally vague in two

ways: (1) on the statute's face; or (2) as the statute is applied to defendant's

actions. People v. Einoder,

(2004). A defendant may not

challenge the facial vagueness of a statute that does not implicate first

amendment freedoms unless the statute is incapable of any valid application.

People v. Izzo,

(2001). In the case at bar, plaintiff has not

argued that the statute, as written, is incapable of any valid application, but

rather he challenges the City's interpretation and application of the term "school

days." See also Schacter v. City of Chicago,

(the plaintiff had no standing to make a facial challenge to municipal

ordinances when his conduct clearly fell within the category of prohibited

conduct).

¶ 83 The City argues on appeal that the trial court correctly found that plaintiff

lacked standing to bring a vagueness claim and, thus, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by denying the proposed amendment.

30 No. 1-15-0520

¶ 84 The purpose of the standing doctrine is to ensure that courts are deciding

actual, specific controversies and not abstract ones. In re M.I.,

. If a person cannot demonstrate that a statute was applied

unconstitutionally to himself, then he may not challenge the statute on the

ground that " 'it might conceivably be applied unconstitutionally in some

hypothetical case' " against someone else. In re M.I.,

(quoting People v. Wisselead,

, 397 (1985)).

¶ 85 " '[A] statute does not violate due process clauses of the United States or

Illinois constitutions, on grounds of vagueness, if the duty imposed by the

statute is prescribed in terms definite enough to serve as a guide to those who

must comply with it.' " Fagiano v. Police Board of Chicago,

(1983) (quoting Chastek v. Anderson,

(1981)). "A

vagueness challenge is a due process challenge, examining whether a statute ' "

'give[s] a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what

is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. [Citations.] ' " ' "People v. Greco,

(2003). See also People v. Einoder,

(2004) (due process requires a statute to provide a reasonable opportunity to

know what is prohibited, so that a citizen knows how to act legally). Thus, a

person may challenge a law when the law is so vague that he does not know

31 No. 1-15-0520

how to act. Nowhere does the law provide a citizen with the right to challenge a

law because he does not know when he is most likely to be caught.

¶ 86 Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a vagueness challenge, since the law

governing his behavior was the same whether the ASE cameras were operating

or not. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request

during the dismissal hearing to amend his complaint.

¶ 87 CONCLUSION

¶ 88 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's grant of the City's

motion to dismiss and its denial of plaintiff's request for leave to amend.

¶ 89 Affirmed.

32